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Abstract 
Advancing Australia: Cultural Diplomacy in the Menzies Era takes a look at four examples of cultural 
exchange which occurred during the 1950s and 60s, and examines them through the lens of cultural 
diplomacy theory. The Menzies Era is unique in Australian history as it was a period of almost two 
decades influenced by the Prime Ministership of Robert Menzies. The period shows a shift from a 
post-war recovery phase and moves toward a technology driven age.  Menzies and the Ministers of 
the Department of External Affairs had a significant impact on the way Australia was seen in the 
world, and it was this period which saw an important refocussing of Australia’s position in the Pacific 
and Asian arena- advancing Australia into the international order.  
The term cultural diplomacy has no clear, agreed upon definition, and as such sees considerable 
debate. This thesis takes a look at the journey the study of cultural diplomacy has taken in its 
development, through soft power and public diplomacy, to be seen as an important part of the 
practice of diplomacy in its own right. The field of study was initially the preserve of diplomats, and 
as such much of the language surrounding it has been that of politics. As other academics have 
entered the field, the language has changed and the focus has shifted.  
Cultural diplomacy, in its simplest explanation, uses cultural exchange to support foreign policy aims. 
It is not designed to change or alter policy, but to complement it.  This study of the current literature 
accepts that these cultural exchanges must be backed by government legislation and have an 
opportunity to build and develop long term relationships in order to be cultural diplomacy activities. 
Other significant considerations to the activities are that they be long term in order to endure 
changes in government; collaborative; contribute to nation branding or national identity; promote 
ideologies such as freedom, equality, or justice; consider citizen diplomats; and, by nature of 
involving culture as a creative expression, generally be enjoyable experiences. 
The Menzies Era saw the birth of the Colombo Plan. The first of the case studies in this thesis, this 
project saw bilateral aid arrangements brought under one umbrella in an attempt to help 
underdeveloped nations in South and South East Asia. A Commonwealth backed enterprise which 
involved nations around the globe saw material goods, education, and on the ground support 
utilised to improve living conditions and provide political stability in a long term project.  
Later in the decade, Australia was to host the first Olympic Games in the Southern Hemisphere in 
Melbourne. These games in 1956 saw a renewed push to promote Australia to an international 
audience and in the process reinforced the national identity domestically. As the first games to be 
subject to boycotts, this project highlights the role of cultural events for foreign policy. Citizen 
diplomats and a carnival atmosphere marked these as The Friendly Games in Olympic records. 
A decade later, Expo 67 was celebrated in Montreal, Canada, and Australia’s participation had both a 
cultural and political focus. The best of Australian culture was exported to be presented in a pavilion 
along with others from around the globe, and for six months guests were able to experience 
Australia at this exhibition. Highlighting a wealth of natural resources as well as technological 
expertise the government worked on presenting a national image favourable to increased trade and 
tourism. 
Through the whole of the Menzies Era and beyond, ran the Radio Australia broadcasts across the 
world. Conceived as a propaganda tool in World War Two, the Menzies government refocussed the 
program’s efforts to improve the Australian brand. By considering the needs of the audience, this 
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project began an educational program which would allow a deeper understanding of, and sympathy 
with, Australian culture. The foreign policy aims of the Department of External Affairs married with 
the broadcasting knowledge of the ABC to produce a cultural diplomacy style activity which involved 
collaboration, entertainment, and international understanding. As the final case study, this project 
highlights the ways an established cultural diplomacy style project can allow changes in message as 
relationships mature. 
These projects are just highlights of the many cultural diplomacy style activities which could be 
studied. This thesis does not make judgement, nor analyse success or failure of these cultural 
diplomacy styled activities. By using case studies the necessity of the breadth of considerations for 
cultural diplomacy activities is emphasized. The projects are all cultural exchange activities which 
were used to support foreign policy aims, all were backed by legislation and sought long term 
relationships. Their methods, time frames, budgets, and participants are all varied.  They all describe 
how cultural exchange can be directed by, and affect, foreign policy. They all show that Advancing 
Australia, both domestically and internationally, is a political objective which can be effectively 
executed by cultural exchange. While the theory of cultural diplomacy may be relatively new, in 
practice these methods are well established. 
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In 2009, Naren Chitty claimed that ‘in some ways, Australian Public diplomacy is a terra 
nullius,’ especially from a research perspective.1 He wrote, however, that ‘if practice rather 
than research is the yardstick, the landscape is bustling with activity.’ This work attempts to 
redress this lack of research, define cultural diplomacy and explore examples from the 
Menzies Era of the Australian context. While Australian historians do not have the benefit of 
the large amount of resources that the United States Information Agency has, there are still 
numerous publicly available sources, and some exciting archives that can help tell some of 
the stories of Australian cultural diplomacy. Chitty is correct: the landscape is bustling with 
activity, and was during the 20th century, as this thesis will discuss. 
The Menzies Era, commonly defined as 1949–72, is a well-studied period in Australian 
history. Australia participated in global and regional activities, signed treaties, welcomed 
visitors and migrants and saw some major shifts in foreign and domestic policy. The young 
Australian Department of External Affairs (DEA) was faced with challenges that had no 
precedent. This thesis will look at how Department staff used four activities to achieve 
specific policy objectives; how they understood policy problems and used aspects of 
Australian culture to achieve particular goals; how they involved the public and its culture, 
and how the public reacted. Some of the programmes that this team created would now be 
classed as cultural diplomacy activities. 
The activities of the Colombo Plan, a regional developmental project based on bilateral 
agreements focusing on South and South East Asia, will be discussed as the first of these 
cases. This scheme was designed to run for six years from 1951, but because of its success it 
was extended into a considerably longer-term project. Student exchange was a significant 
focus of the Australian contribution to this collaborative plan, along with capital and 
consumable assistance. Radio Australia is also considered in this thesis, and was another 
long-term project for the Menzies government, intended to influence the information 
delivered to an international audience. The planning behind the programming shows a 
definite foreign policy objective to the broadcasts. These two programmes were characteristic 
of the Menzies Era, in that they involved the purposeful deployment of a venture to improve 
Australia’s reputation in the region. 
                                                          
1 Naren Chitty, ‘Australian Public Diplomacy’, pp. 314–322, in Nancy Snow & and Philip M. Taylor (eds.), 
Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 314. 
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Australia’s participation in the Olympic Games in Melbourne in 1956, and the International 
and Universal Exposition, or Montreal Expo 67 as it was known, were long in the planning 
stages but short in execution time. Both events deliberately and specifically presented 
Australian culture to an international audience.  
The four case studies in this thesis highlight that understandings of cultural diplomacy benefit 
from the study of a variety of cases, and that cultural diplomacy is an exceptional field. By 
examining two long and two short-term episodes that occurred at a specific time, we can 
better understand how these events fit into the larger historical context, and how cultural 
diplomacy activities are affected by time. 
Academic thought about cultural diplomacy has developed over the last half century, and 
includes the use of a nation’s culture to achieve foreign policy goals. Scholars and 
organisational bodies have shaped the definitions and structure of this field of study, and this 
thesis will condense some relevant aspects of the conversation. A broad field of modern 
scholarship, cultural diplomacy is often misunderstood and thus overlooked. There is 
continued debate over the terms ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘cultural diplomacy’, and these will 
be discussed in the following chapter. In practice, methods of negotiating diplomatic 
relationships have been developing over thousands of years of international diplomatic 
activity. 
Alexander the Great, around 300 years Before the Common Era (BCE), aimed to convince 
the nations he was conquering that he was not a barbarian conqueror but an agent of a 
superior civilisation.2 He spread Greek culture through the Middle East and into Asia. After 
his death in 323 BCE, the effects of Greek culture continued to expand through the 
Mediterranean: Greek became the common language, and Greek literature and science 
dominated scholarship. Alexander conquered lands as well as minds. His ultimate success 
was to spiritually unite people. The Greek armies did not just commandeer lands, but made 
the world Greek by undermining existing cultures and imposing belief in the superiority of 
                                                          
2 Nicholas Laos, Foundations of Cultural Diplomacy: Politics Among Cultures and the Moral Autonomy of 
Man, New York, Algora Publishing, 2001, p. 164. 
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their own. Conquering minds and cultures was considered equally important to conquering 
lands and assets, and is something of an antecedent to the idea of cultural diplomacy.3 
Student exchange continued the idea of knowledge transfer as a way of influencing the minds 
of others. Not necessarily the vanquished, as in Alexander’s time, but through the influence 
of academics. In the 12th century, Roman Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa granted foreign 
students special rights and imperial protection, hoping that their ‘light’ might ‘illuminate the 
world.’4 Serious scholars have always sought the best institutions, and deliberately 
welcoming foreign students so that they go on to promote the culture of their scholarship 
highlights the importance of person-to-person experiences in understanding foreign cultures. 
Students have often been the raison d'être for philanthropic organisations and exchange 
programmes. Their value as channels of communication across generations and borders, 
skills in gathering and disseminating information, and linking of politics with the respected 
realm of higher education has seen student exchange move from being a private affair to 
becoming one of the most important cultural diplomacy activities. 
Moving from the academic elite to the masses, the French government used international 
exhibitions from 1855 to 1900 to consolidate their political regime. They were also conscious 
to project a particular national image ‘in competition with other countries.’5 The exhibitors 
used the space to highlight contrasts: if Britain was advanced in industry, the French 
produced quality goods with superior taste. If Germany was a military power, then France 
was educated and civilised. These exhibitions also created a ‘shared experience of 
international community over a long time span,’ creating cultural understandings that 
influenced trade, economic and military policies.6 An effective tool of cultural diplomacy, 
international exhibitions are equally popular today. 
The inspiration for my exploration into cultural diplomacy came from a more modern 
example. In 1999, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht published Transmission Impossible, which is a 
fascinating history of Die Neue Zeitung, the newspaper launched by the Office of Military 
                                                          
3 The terms ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘cultural diplomacy’ will be defined in the next chapter. While the terms are 
not interchangeable, they are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature. 
4 Oliver Schmidt, ‘Small Atlantic World: U.S. Philanthropy and the Expanding International Exchange of 
Scholars after 1945’, pp. 115–134, in Jessica Gienow-Hecht & Frank Schumacher, Culture and International 
History (Explorations in Culture and International History), Oxford, Berghan Books, 2004, pp. 118, 120. 
5 Wolfram Kaiser, ‘The Great Derby Race: Strategies of Cultural Representation at Nineteenth-Century World 
Exhibitions’, pp. 45–59, in Gienow-Hecht & Schumacher, Culture and International History, p. 46 
6 Beate Jan, ‘The Power of Culture in International Relations’, pp. 27–41, in Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher, 
Culture and International History, Berghan Books, Oxford, 2004, p. 49. 
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Government in Germany in 1945.7 The purpose of this newspaper was to foster the 
democratic re-education of German society, informing locals of United States (US) foreign 
policy and the American way of life. The management team were American, the journalists 
and editors were predominantly American-educated Germans who had returned after the war, 
and the audience was the German public. They were self-conscious transmitter-interpreters in 
the process of cultural diplomacy. The editors, who were often ex-military staff, draped 
democratic notions in traditional German clothing, with the aim of appealing to the German 
middle class. 
Instead of preaching an anti-communist message they wrote of the American way of life. Out 
of respect for the gulf between prosperous post-war America and ‘hopelessness in defeated 
Germany’,8 the American news did not focus on material lifestyles, but rather on political 
significance, culture and German-American mutual perceptions. Articles deliberately 
explained and explored American culture, trying to see America through German eyes. As 
most staff had been raised in German culture, they were able to highlight the key words of 
‘happiness’, ‘optimism’ and ‘self-help’; characteristics that resonated with a German 
readership. There was no denazification and no blame. 
The editors introduced a heart-to-heart column that allowed readers to comment. This 
allowed the public to contribute to the newspaper, and it often published critiques as a 
‘manifestation of democratic freedom and willingness to think.’9 In a country newly free of 
censorship, the paper received mountains of letters. The central theme of the paper was the 
presentation of democratic behaviour in terms of Kultur, a concept as important to Germans 
as democracy was to Americans. 
Transmission Impossible is important to any study of cultural diplomacy, in its exploration of 
understanding the audience’s culture, history, and feelings about current events. These were 
used to form and announce foreign policies. The US promoted democracy through elections, 
freedom of speech and material culture. Through this project, Gienow-Hecht reminds us that 
cultural and informational programmes are difficult to evaluate. She stresses that ‘words are 
                                                          
7 Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in 
Postwar Germany 1945-1955, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1999, pp. 1, 6. 
8 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p. 55. 
9 ibid, pp. 63, 77. 
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not material goods; their influence is beyond mathematical calculation.’10 The success of 
cultural diplomacy programmes may be hard to measure, but that does not decrease their 
value. 
Transmission Impossible proposes that while the Allied soldiers defeated Hitler’s armies, it 
was the ‘army of Allied teachers, journalists, advertisers and professors’ who were 
responsible for Germany’s lasting victory and democratisation.11 This scheme had a firm 
footing in US government policy, with a government-defined focus. The project included the 
involvement of government agencies and private citizens across two countries, was deployed 
over a long time (10 years) and, importantly, focused on people-to-people relationships. It 
used a cultural experience to deliver a foreign policy objective. The newspaper outlasted any 
individual US government, and was not expected to have a defined or quantifiable outcome. 
Die Neue Zeitung was an innovative method of winning the hearts and minds of another 
nation, and proved to be a valuable tool for diplomacy. It is an example of how a government 
initiative can be viewed and understood through a modern cultural diplomacy lens. 
I had begun to develop an interest in Australian cultural diplomacy. A meeting at a 
conference with Tim McDonald, former Australian High Commissioner to Singapore, 
revealed some fascinating results of Australian cultural diplomacy. He recalled that until the 
early 1980s, new buildings in Singapore were dependent on bamboo scaffolding. With a 
boom in construction, emphasis on high-rise development, and concerns about workers’ 
safety, the government decided to phase out bamboo scaffolding and introduce steel. There 
was a need to legislate the specifications and regulations that would govern standards and 
use. McDonald was asked by a senior manager in a government department to provide copies 
of relevant Australian specifications. This individual had studied engineering in Australia 
under the Colombo Plan scholarship scheme, and as he was familiar with Australian 
standards and regulations, he wanted to adapt the scaffolding specifications for Singapore.12 
The Australian standards and building regulations governing its use were put directly into the 
new building regulations. Australian manufacturers had a considerable advantage in 
responding to tenders for supply of scaffolding to a booming new market. This extended to 
Australian builders and construction companies who were familiar with steel scaffolding as 
                                                          
10 ibid, p. 169. 
11 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p. 117. 
12 Unrecorded informal conversation with Tim McDonald, Alfred Deakin Research Institute, Geelong, 2014. 
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the transition from bamboo took place.13 This ex-Colombo Plan student had been comfortable 
enough to call on Australia when he needed advice, and had trusted the information and help 
enough to put it into his country’s legislation. Presumably, this is the result of a positive 
student experience in Australia. Asian students had lived and worked with Australian 
students, often billeted in domestic homes. They also worked in local businesses, and spent 
holidays exploring Australia with organisations such as Rotary and Apex. I began to look for 
more stories of Australian cultural diplomacy activity. 
I explored theories of cultural diplomacy, learned how it differs from public diplomacy, and 
began to understand the varying fields of scholarship. In Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the 
Past historian Nicholas Cull called for a public diplomacy playbook of examples of 
diplomatic endeavours, on which diplomacy practitioners could draw from accumulated 
experience.14 He believed that this could be a positive way of empowering countries and 
enhancing the global conversation. I determined that this thesis should contribute to a better 
understanding of both public and cultural diplomacy, and improve the profile of cultural 
diplomacy in its own right. By using a case study approach I could contribute to this 
playbook, adding to the conversation on cultural diplomacy by understanding historical 
events through a cultural diplomacy lens. 
I met with people who participated in these initiatives. These people were proud of the nation 
they represented, enjoyed promoting it, and formed permanent friendships and understanding. 
It is from person-to-person relationships that national friendships develop, and can underpin 
cultural diplomacy’s function of pursuing foreign policy aims. I interviewed Raymond Smee, 
Captain of the Australian Water Polo team in the 1956 Olympic Games. Stories of comradery 
between teams, mixed social events, laughing about inaccurate cultural perceptions and the 
shared belief that they were all participating in a ‘wonderful experience’ dominated the 
interview with Smee. He vividly remembers the controversial Hungarian/Russian water polo 
match, and recounted his frustrations at not being able to communicate with other captains 
the importance of keeping politics out of sport. Exploring cuisines in the shared dining halls 
                                                          
13 Unrecorded informal conversation with Tim McDonald, Alfred Deakin Research Institute, Geelong, 2014. 
14 Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, Los Angeles, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at 
the Annenberg School, Figueroa Press, 2009, p. 57. 
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was enlightening, and he retains pen-pal relationships around the world that he cultivated 
during his time as an Olympian.15 
A hunt for Expo 67 memorabilia led me to Kate Bourke, who had donated items to the 
PowerHouse Museum in Sydney. Kate, along with Helen Clugston and Kay Gagnon (nee 
Swinney), had been part of the team of hostesses led by Rosemary Sinclair in the Australian 
Pavilion.16 A coffee morning with these cultural ambassadors produced a wealth of 
memorabilia and stories. They recalled the great friendships formed through their 
participation in the event, the enthusiasm of the visitors to the pavilion, and the fact that the 
staff at the Expo socialised and learned from each other. These meetings revealed a personal 
side to the cultural diplomacy story, and thus enriching and complementing the archival and 
newspaper sources that covered the event. 
A scholarship from the Museum of Australian Democracy (MoAD) at Old Parliament House 
in Canberra allowed me to work closely with the National Archives of Australia, and source 
documentation relating to the case studies. Working with MoAD, I was able to follow the 
paths of Menzies Era ministers, listen to their speeches in context and get a sense of ‘place’, 
which added temporal reality to the research. Reading interdepartmental memos, suggestions, 
reports, plans and ideas helped give a clearer idea of the workings behind these initiatives. 
Investigating how the DEA was working with aid programmes, Radio Australia and non-
governmental groups to bring about positive relationships reveals that in the 1950s and 
1960s, what would today be called soft power diplomacy was important. I read 
autobiographies, biographies and personal papers of Ministers Menzies, Spender, Casey, 
Barwick and Hasluck. This enriched my understanding of the men behind the decisions, and 
the context of their decision making. 
From encountering Gienow-Hecht’s book to meeting some of the participants to immersion 
in the archives, my own journey to understanding cultural diplomacy paralleled the breadth of 
the field. The academic literature on public and cultural diplomacy, communications, 
propaganda, soft power, diplomacy and other related fields complemented my research into 
the uses of specific fora and events as cultural diplomacy activities. Using the cultural 
experience to promote foreign policy aims is a complex and exciting field of investigation. 
                                                          
15 Unrecorded interview with Raymond Smee, Goulburn Valley RSL Club, 2 February, 2015. 
16 Unrecorded interview with Kate Bourke, Helen Clugston, Kay Gagnon, Rosemary Sinclair, private residence, 
Sydney, 7 February, 2014 
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The international literature included case studies from both public and cultural diplomacy, 
and originated in Germany, Britain, Japan, Russia, China, Central and Eastern European 
countries and the Middle East. Public and cultural diplomacy programmes have been 
practiced worldwide, from Communist states, Western nations, countries small and large, and 
have mixed aims and methods. Scholars who have analysed such programmes are from 
varied backgrounds: political scientists, communications academics, diplomatic staff, 
international relations theorists and practitioners. Historians add to the conversation by 
relating people or events to modern theories, as they are able to follow the chain of thought 
and action from conception to implementation, with rich historical context, then analyse 
effects. 
Cultural exchange and understanding made a slow start in Australia. When The Mikado was 
performed in Sydney in 1885, the Japanese costumes were displayed in department store 
windows to attract interest. The show was a success, and the store displays were a popular 
attraction. In 1888, the Governor of New South Wales, Lord Carrington, nervously 
recognised that ‘Australian ports are within easy sail of the ports of China’ and that Australia 
would be attractive to the Chinese regarding the climate, trade and industry opportunities.17 
Carrington was not anxious to encourage intermarriage between Australian-British18 and 
Chinese people. Detractors like Carrington put fear into the public, and commerce and trade 
were not yet ready for interaction with Asia and a culture Australians did not understand. 
By 1893, Alfred Deakin claimed that the ‘intellectual give and take which is everywhere a 
stimulus to thought should be especially quick and prolific between Australia…and its 
northern continent [India].’19 In a lecture at the University of Adelaide in 1908, James Curries 
Elles described how ‘the growth of commerce multiplied contacts between cultures, helping 
the spread of knowledge and fostering energy, enterprise and inventiveness.’20 Twenty years 
after Carrington’s warnings, awareness and acceptance of Australia’s geographical 
neighbours was slowly beginning to be accepted through trading relationships. It would take 
two world wars, forced exposure to international cultures and experiences, and some 
                                                          
17 David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939, Brisbane, University of 
Queensland Press, 1999, p. 40. 
18 At that time, residents of Australia were British citizens. 
19 Walker, Anxious Nation, p. 22. 
20 ibid, p. 82. 
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exceptional External Affairs ministers to see the beginnings of a deliberate programme of 
cultural mindfulness in diplomacy, which would nowadays be called cultural diplomacy. 
Historian Akira Iriye wrote that modern cultural diplomacy could be seen to begin with issues 
that disregard national borders. Through the 1950s and 1960s, universal notions of human 
rights and a shared responsibility for the protection of the natural environment were 
prioritised in the interests of a global community. As the whole world understood the 
imperative to protect oceans and endangered wildlife, so they also came to respect that 
different ways of life and thought should be an important agenda for international affairs.21 
During the Menzies Era it was gradually accepted that autonomous culture positively 
contributes to that global community. ‘Multiculturalism’ was not really developed until the 
1970s, so the subjects of this thesis predate this term, but not the idea behind it. As cultural 
understandings evolved, the role of cultural diplomacy also developed. 
Encouraging economic relationships was, in the early 20th century, seen as the best way to 
prevent war.22 This trade would encourage cross-nation understanding. From the 1870s, the 
rise of international organisations (from postal unions to aid organisations) promoted Western 
ideology across the globe. Iriye proposes that because cultural internationalism was weaker 
than economic internationalism before the First World War, the champions of the former 
movement redoubled their efforts to place it ‘at centre stage’ after the war. The cultural 
internationalists believed their movement would be more successful in reducing conflict, as it 
focused on the ‘cultural, intellectual, and psychological underpinnings of the international 
order’,23 and that at a basic level, peace and order begins with individuals. It would begin 
with understanding the ideology and culture of the citizens. The war had brought into 
question the ‘complacent assumption that the West represented the world.’24 These ideas 
bring culture to the forefront of international relations and diplomacy, and as such are 
important ideas for the discussion of cultural diplomacy. 
                                                          
21 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organisations in the Making of the Contemporary 
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Australian thinking about international relations has been based on Western ideology, and a 
national identity which is an invention, imposed upon a people and a landscape, a construct.25 
When we look at ‘national identity’, it is useful to ask what the function of the identity is, and 
whose purpose it serves. National identity must always be seen within the global context, 
economically, politically and developmentally. This is important when looking at the 
branding of nations and international reputation as concepts within cultural diplomacy. Why 
would a country like to portray a certain image? What tools would it use to promote this? 
How can we know what a country ‘really’ is, and if we share its values? Does that determine 
our trade or security policies? 
In the post-war era of the late 1940s, Australia found its political and trade relationships 
shifting focus and new relationships with Asia were emerging. Writing on cultural relations, 
Neil Manton stated that in 1949, an exhibition of Australian paintings went on tour in South 
East Asia, and was viewed with great interest by locals. This was considered Australia’s first 
foray into the Asian region to cement cultural ties and build multicultural understanding. 
High Commissioner in Colombo, J. C. G. Kevin, wrote to Minister Richard Casey that he 
believed this exhibition would add to Australia’s reputation as a race of sporting giants.26 
Australia hoped to educate its neighbours to a larger range of its achievements. Not only did 
the nation produce exceptional athletes, but its creative culture was innovative and talented. 
The organisers of this 1949 exhibition found that they needed to be selective in the artwork 
they sent, including being aware of local customs regarding nudity and other themes common 
in Western art. Artist Donald Friend found another problem with the exhibition: the 
Australian organisation had refused to print the leaflets in Singhalese and Tamil, rendering 
them useless to most visitors.27 This shows that experience of other cultures and 
accommodation of taste, language and local cultural expectations are important for 
international cultural relations, and even more so if these efforts are part of a government 
policy of cultural diplomacy. 
The importance of this ‘on the ground’ experience of other cultures was increasingly shared 
by university students during the Menzies Era. In 1957, the National Union of Australian 
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University Students sent a delegation of 10 students to Malaya. This was to allow the student 
ambassadors to ‘help promote goodwill between Australia and the Asian countries.’28 The 
publication of this story in Australian newspapers was designed to encourage a public appeal 
to raise funds to send a similar group to China. The Student Union believed they could ‘help 
Australia’s future wellbeing by learning something of the Chinese students.’29 They also 
hoped to ‘teach the Chinese students and people something about Australia.’30 Asian students 
(self-funded as well as those on Colombo Plan scholarships) in Australian Universities had 
raised an important point: that the Chinese public knew very little of Australia, and made 
several incorrect assumptions, highlighting the need for two-way exchange. 
The students believed it was important for them to go, and to be distinct from the trade 
groups and diplomats. Students were, they suggested, an integral part of the Australian 
community, with an obligation to learn something of their neighbours. They argued that 
‘criticism comes easy to the intolerant, the narrow-minded, and to the person who always 
judges another by his own standards.’31 While they acknowledged the value of Asian students 
in Australian universities, a reciprocal arrangement would create even greater understanding. 
The Argus newspaper added that Australia could not avoid being involved in Asia’s future, 
and the best way to deal with this was to try to attain understanding.32 
The importance of travel and of the person-to-person contact so necessary for all cultural 
exchange increased as international travel became more common in the 1950s. Travel is a 
means of fostering international understanding and goodwill.33 The foreign policy objectives 
of international development projects, including the Colombo Plan, were complemented by 
the exchange of personal visits, with the resultant increase of knowledge and understanding. 
International tourism ‘can assist in setting a background of wide human understanding for 
future international relationships,’ and this is its ‘greatest responsibility and value.’34 As 
international travel became faster and cheaper it became possible for more individuals, and 
provided a focus of study for those interested in international relations. 
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This new experience of travel allowed Australians to visit and be exposed to other countries, 
and for international visitors to explore Australia. Increased exposure to and from 
international audiences heightened Australia’s ongoing identity construction and projection. 
Graeme Davison introduced the notion of the Imaginary Grandstand, to which Australians 
were performing. As Australians were ‘beginning to seek the approval of new role models on 
the other side of the Pacific,’35 they began to consider what the new audience perceived. 
Davison proposed that nations define themselves in relation to this imagined audience, and 
that the image Australians formed of themselves was a ‘product of the favourable impression 
they sought to create in the minds of others.’36 That this was not necessarily the vision the 
audience received was not so important, as Australians were creating a story of national 
identity that they felt they needed, and this promoted a social cohesiveness and common 
purpose. This is one important purpose of cultural diplomacy when focused on the domestic 
audience. In the 1950s and 1960s, new Pacific and South East Asian relationships defined 
Australian culture in new ways. 
The four cases researched in this thesis were chosen because they involved government 
departments, and thus would have a presence in the archives. They also involved the general 
public, so would be publicly commented on in the media. This allowed for a more balanced 
understanding of how culture was used to support the policy. Expo 67 and the Melbourne 
Olympics are present in academic scholarship, but have not been viewed through a cultural 
diplomacy lens. While there has been much research on the Colombo Plan, few scholars have 
assessed the use of culture in achieving the project’s aims. Radio Australia is little seen in 
academic research during the Menzies Era. This research proves Chitty’s point: Australia has 
participated in activities that have used aspects of the nation’s culture to achieve foreign 
policy aims, and the historical analysis in this thesis will bring some of them to light. 
Sometimes a phenomenon is more easily understood by example than definition. As cultural 
diplomacy is complex, this work seeks to clarify definitions by exploring case studies.37 They 
show both regional and global exposure for cultural exchange, had very varied budgets, and 
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involved both the domestic and international audience to different degrees. While the time 
frame for the specific activity varies, the international relationship has been long-term. 
Importantly, they were all initiated by government policy with the intent to broaden 
Australia’s international reputation. Sources used for this thesis were government archives, 
the private papers of Richard Casey, newspaper reports, secondary sources including books, 
journals, film and advertising materials. Each case has an explanation of the idea and its 
history, why the mechanism is valid as a scheme for cultural diplomacy activities and how it 
was used by the Australian government. 
The Menzies Era is an appropriate focus for this type of study because there was a shift in 
alliances and engagement during the time that Menzies was in office. His term as Prime 
Minister (1949–66) saw the birth of the ANZUS Treaty,38 which promoted a real focus on the 
Pacific region, as well as the Colombo Plan and trade initiatives in Asia. These were imposed 
upon a ‘British’ Australia, one that celebrated when their young Queen came to visit, and that 
defined much of its identity in terms of Britishness. Menzies and his External Affairs 
ministers brought about a shift in thinking about Australia’s place in the world, as will be 
discussed in the first case study in Chapter 4: Presenting Australia. 
Chapter 5: Developing Australia will highlight the mutual benefits of the Colombo Plan 
development programme, its breadth and importance to the Australian, South and South East 
Asian region. An analysis of a publicity booklet and documentary intended for Australian 
audiences is presented alongside a discussion of a journal created for the regional audience. 
Publicity for the plan was a priority for the Department. A sample of the activities conducted 
under the plan highlights the breadth of the programme, the number of individuals involved, 
and the potential for cultural exchange. 
This was just one example of cultural diplomacy-type activities during this period. Chapter 6: 
Pitching Australia discusses another; the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, which brought 
athletes and visitors from all over the world to interact with the public, perform, exchange 
cultural ideas, bring awareness of international matters and, from an Australian perspective, 
show off Australia and particularly Melbourne. One highlight of these games was the 
mingling of athletes in the closing parade. The suggestion of a Chinese-born Australian 
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student, this highlighted an important Australian attitude: that while we compete as separate 
countries in athletics, we can also be one global human family. Considering negative 
comments about the White Australia immigration policy, this was a clever cultural diplomacy 
style strategy. 
Expo 67 was an international extravaganza held in Montreal, Canada, to mark the nation’s 
100th birthday. As a fellow Commonwealth country, Australia sought to put on the best show 
possible. In a global arena, Australia established a reputation of calm competence, promotion 
of economic and manufacturing capabilities and celebration of natural bounty. While the 
purpose was to advertise Australian trade and commerce, sending koalas and kangaroos was a 
positive cultural drawcard. Chapter 7: Exhibiting Australia focuses on this Expo. It analyses 
an example in which researching audience expectations resulted in the promotion of a 
positive Australian identity. 
Radio Australia provides the final case study in Chapter 8: Broadcasting Australia. From its 
inception as an apparatus for propaganda, during the Menzies Era the focus shifted to 
understanding audience needs, and supplying programmes that met these, as well as attaining 
policy goals. Public diplomacy commentator Ali Fisher explains that to create networks for 
long-term engagement, one must speak to the audience on the basis of their priorities. 
Effective communication involves listening and telling, and in relation to cultural diplomacy 
requires the ‘provision of projects tailored to the recipient audience through negotiation or 
dialogue.’39 In Asia in the 1950s, the audience requested English language lessons. The 
scripts for these reveal a careful description of Australian culture, resources and subtle 
explanations of migration policy, among other issues. The audience’s experience of 
Australian culture was backed by deliberate foreign policy aims. As this medium was 
accessible to huge areas and populations of South East Asia, the message was targeted. As 
programmers understood much of of the audience culture, they could manipulate the 
messages so as not to cause offence, while encouraging friendship. 
The idea of exchange is inherent in the state-to-state interactions of traditional diplomacy. 
The interpersonal nature of the exchange experience, coupled with its inherently private 
character, has led to these encounters being largely written out of the documentation of 
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diplomacy,40 but it is important to cultural diplomacy studies to return them to this public 
arena. Exchange in the guise of scholarship is but one aspect. The construction workers, 
engineers, health professionals, and others who travelled to South East Asia under the 
Colombo Plan and other collaborative initiatives; the staff who built, maintained, serviced 
and attended the pavilion at the Expo; the organisers, athletes, and visitors of the Olympic 
Games; the broadcasters and script writers of Radio Australia all experienced exchanges and 
personal interaction with the international community. 
This is all summarised in the final Chapter 9: Cultivating Cultural Diplomacy in Australia. 
With a clearer understanding of cultural diplomacy, a glance at modern thinking on 
Australian cultural diplomacy activity and policy is provided as an Epilogue, highlighting the 
current government’s approach. 
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Defining Cultural Diplomacy 
17 
 
 
 
 
Defining Cultural Diplomacy in Australia 
  
Defining Cultural Diplomacy 
18 
Power is one of those terms which becomes more complex the more it is questioned. As we 
think about what power is, why it is desired, how it is used, how it is measured, and how it 
shifts, the more we question - in true Socratic style - the more questions develop. It is the 
relationships around power in the mid twentieth Century, how the tools of power are used and 
for what purpose, which lead to the formalisation of scholarship around different types of 
international interactions related to power relationships.  
Soft power is a concept crucial to any scholarship on public and cultural diplomacy. Joseph 
S. Nye Jr. defined soft power as the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments.1 Hard power includes the use of the military, trade embargoes, 
commerce restrictions and other command behaviours. Smart power is a term now used by 
some analysts to describe modern diplomacy, which combines all types of power in 
combination.2 This thesis will focus on one element of soft power: cultural diplomacy. 
The development of diplomacy and international relations, cultural and scholarly exchanges, 
sporting contests, exhibitions of progress and the sharing of knowledge are all ways that a 
country can achieve policy objectives. In a complex web of relationships, the use of culture to 
support foreign policy is not new. However, it has only recently been developed as a 
significant field of study. There have been numerous contemporary contributions to the field, 
and these will support the goals of this thesis, which is to understand how the initiatives of 
the Menzies Era might fit into modern theories of cultural diplomacy. 
Public diplomacy, and to a lesser extent cultural diplomacy, have been written about from 
varying backgrounds. Each definition includes several related concepts, but few address all 
terms associated with either public or cultural diplomacy. This deficiency of definition and 
scope has been a challenge to those attempting to focus government and public attention on 
this vital aspect of diplomacy in the modern world. Public and cultural diplomacy work in 
conjunction with traditional diplomacy. 
While both public and cultural diplomacy rely on Nye’s established definitions of soft power, 
the field has developed and encompasses many important scholars. As discussed earlier, 
Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht has written multiple works on cultural diplomacy, including 
Transmission Impossible. Historian Nicholas Cull has written on public diplomacy, including 
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The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public 
Diplomacy 1945-1989. Simon Mark has explored cultural diplomacy. He has compared 
Canadian and Australian efforts, and contends that cultural diplomacy is potentially a 
considerably more significant diplomatic tool than is currently understood. These three 
scholars inform my conceptual approach in this thesis: Cull for his work on public 
diplomacy, and Gienow-Hecht and Mark for their explorations and clarifications of cultural 
diplomacy. 
Other authors who have participated in the discussion differ in their priorities and approaches, 
mainly due to their academic focus. As communications experts, international and/or cultural 
relations scholars and political scientists discuss the theories of diplomacy, practitioners 
contribute another perspective. Historians have added an additional layer, telling stories with 
a long view, linking demonstrated truths with modern theories, and have the ability to 
reinforce messages, frame the conversation and provide an authority to practitioners and 
policy makers. The Clingendael Institute (Netherlands), The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy 
(Berlin) and the Centre for Public Diplomacy (California) are all think-tanks wherein cultural 
diplomacy is explored by a number of people. Their scholarship is important in establishing a 
context for this thesis. While the most influential of academics to this work remain Gienow-
Hecht, Cull and Mark, these others whose approaches enrich the definition are also included. 
As there is currently no clear classification of what public or cultural diplomacy activities are, 
the following types of questions are often raised: 
Is there to be one-way or two-way communication in the activity planned? If it is to be 
two-way communication, how is the ‘listening’ aspect to be used? 
While the target country/regional audience is generally the objective, should the domestic 
audience be used as part of the programme? If so, what role should they play, and are 
they an audience or a participant? 
Are only government operatives to be used for public diplomacy activities, or should 
larger international non-government organisations (NGOs) be included? Can ‘citizen 
diplomats’ be used? 
While it is not important to categorise initiatives so tightly for the purposes of this thesis, they 
do raise interesting points about the potential reach of cultural diplomacy, and its importance 
in diplomatic practice. 
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One thing that all writers agree on or assume is that both public and cultural diplomacy are 
focused on medium to long-term relationships and programmes. This is not always clarified 
in the primary definitions that this thesis uses, highlighting the need for a comprehensive 
reading of other authorities. Cultural diplomacy projects and programmes are generally not 
measurable in any quantifiable way. This could be why governments seem to hesitate to 
invest significant funds to them. Long-term relationships cannot be limited to the ideologies 
of the government of the day, so are not the same as foreign policy. They must be in-line with 
the current government’s policies, but also have a longer range. This thesis combines a focus 
on the use of culture in support of foreign policy with an emphasis on uncovering the 
essential nature of long-term relationships. 
Educational exchange, tourism, disaster relief and developmental aid, sporting competitions, 
trade and commerce agreements, radio and television broadcasts, peacekeeping initiatives and 
journalism all form part of the dialogue of public diplomacy. These enterprises all involve 
international people-to-people relationships on a long-term basis, are often guided by policy 
and involve multiple diplomatic practitioners, formal and informal. This explains why there 
are so many ‘grey’ areas to this field of study. Is sending government-funded emergency aid 
to an earthquake stricken area an act of public diplomacy? Is funding a press tour of a 
government development project a public diplomacy effort if the audience for the 
documentary is domestic? Is allowing the export of Hollywood films to a worldwide 
audience public or cultural diplomacy? Is a trade agreement to import cultural icons public or 
cultural diplomacy? If I listen to British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio in Australia, 
am I buying into their diplomacy programme? 
As this thesis will demonstrate, it is not easy or even necessary to fit individual acts into 
particular areas of diplomacy. What is important is to understand how different relationships 
can be used to strengthen diplomatic ties, in order to promote the best possible outcomes. 
This work aims to contribute to the conversation on cultural diplomacy by establishing a 
working definition that will be used to explore relevant case studies. This chapter will discuss 
soft power, diplomacy and public diplomacy, leading towards a discussion on cultural 
diplomacy. The explorations of soft power and public diplomacy will set the scene for 
clarifying cultural diplomacy as an equally important, yet different, tool of diplomacy. We 
will then look at Australia during the Menzies Era, to establish the environment in which the 
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case studies grew, and the issues the government and community were facing, to establish the 
context for the case studies. 
Power 
Political and social theorist Steven Lukes noted that ‘Power is at its most effective when least 
observable,’ and while power is a difficult concept to define, his discussion of ‘the securing 
of compliance to domination’ underpins his explanation.3  He claims that the significance of 
the outcomes which power can bring about is most often how power is measured, and that 
being able to avert disagreement and securing consent to domination is an important 
dimension of power.  Power is at the heart of most international interactions, and 
understanding what it is, how it can be gained, and how it can be employed is a vital study. 
While most of us can name those we feel are powerful, it is harder to pinpoint why we think 
so. Thinking about power will allow us to understand how domination can be secured, why 
we comply, and how it changes our world. 
The above definition leads to questions of how to define who or what is dominated. Lukes 
calls on Charles Taylor to help clarify the point, who writes that if ‘some external agency or 
situation wreaks some change in me that in no way lies in me athwart some such 
desire/purpose/aspiration/interest, then there is no call to speak of an exercise of 
power/domination.’4  Lukes notes theorists who propose that if we can further our interests 
without intervening in others’ actions we might speak of this as luck, however Lukes 
disagrees and classes this as one of the most insidious forms of power.  A person, group, or 
country who agrees with the changes imposed upon them does not think they have been 
dominated, and securing domination of this type requires creating an environment where 
hearts and minds have been conditioned to a similar way of thinking to those wishing to 
impose the changes. It is the questions around how this compliance is secured which form a 
central part in studies of diplomacy, and are particularly important in studies of cultural 
diplomacy. 
The most significant power struggle of the twentieth century would arguably be the Cold 
War. The struggle for domination between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist republics (U.S.S.R) forms the background to the political atmosphere 
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discussed in this thesis. These two superpowers had profound differences in economic and 
political ideology, and both determined to “secure compliance to dominion” as widely as 
possible.  
In his book Power Politics: How China and Russia Reshape the World, Rob de Wijk 
discusses power and the global order, and particularly that when the Cold War ended 
America emerged as the single superpower.5  In this new world order, America found itself 
with the ‘unprecedented opportunity to “shape the world in accordance with American 
ideas.”’6  de Wijk notes that the first priority was to ‘prevent the emergence of a rival, who 
would curb American freedom to act in international politics,’ and with potential political 
strength gathering in China, a united Europe, or a Russian phoenix, America could face a 
multipolar world, which would come with more competition and ‘put American interests at 
stake.’  
Working with the theory of Immanuel Kant, that ‘democratic countries do not go to war with 
each other,’ the new American Defence Planning Guide advises that ‘the best way to stabilise 
the countries in Eastern and Central Europe would be to bring them into Western [or] 
European institutions…’7  While this may not be a surety against armed conflict, and de Wijk 
notes examples which belie this point, it is the general framework of much of Western 
diplomatic effort. Having a similar base of cultural understanding is more likely to bring 
partnership than conflict. de Wijk proposes that for political aims it ‘is not essential to 
convince one’s opponent that they are wrong … but to manipulate and influence his politico-
strategic choices.’8  
 
While armed conflict might be seen as the primary instrument of international power, 
economic sanctions (and conversely economic support) are an equally effective tool for 
countries to employ.  A challenge de Wijk discusses is for powerful countries to carefully 
determine which countries may grow and shift in the international power game, and 
cautiously balance alliances. Countries with the greatest potential for development can be 
seen as a challenge to world order, particularly those with economic weight and differing 
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political systems. Developing countries are less likely to be affected by global financial crises 
and as they are already in growth mode are likely to continue growing during these periods, 
while those affected stagnate or regress.  
The level of international power a country has is determined by its ‘wealth, innovation and 
conventional military capabilities’ and these determine how effectively a country can 
influence international politics, and countries lacking strength in one or more of these will 
often align themselves with similar geopolitical aims to bolster their position.   
In international politics many tools and theories have developed and been employed for the 
purposes of gaining power and using it to strengthen a country’s position and diplomats are 
often the instrument of deployment. Soft Power, Smart Power, Public Diplomacy and 
Cultural Diplomacy are part of a diplomatic toolset which are based on relationships, where 
the more ‘powerful’ party is able to use agreements and programs to influence the other. It is 
this ability to influence, to be seen as the model to aspire to, to secure the compliance to 
domination with the minimal of disruption to ones own community, which is the aspect of 
power crucial to this thesis. Cultural Diplomacy theories rest on power relationships; they are 
less designed to create power, than to use it to spread influence to a larger audience. 
de Wijk simply defines power as ‘the ability to get others to do what one wants,’ and notes 
that this can be done in a positive way through encouragement (incentives), or in a negative 
way through force (coercion).  Joseph Nye’s work on Soft Power turns on the same basic 
definition and focuses on the incentives and encouragement angle of the power equation; and 
is the next focus in understanding the place of cultural diplomacy in the calculation of power. 
Soft Power 
The soft power prestige of a nation is successful ‘when it gives the nation pursuing it such a 
reputation for power as to enable it to forego the actual employment of power.’9 For 
American political scientist H. J. Morgenthau, a policy of prestige involves revealing just 
enough of a nation’s power to the world to reduce the transactional costs of demonstrating it. 
This is soft power. To let the world know that your words are backed up by military, trade, 
economic, scientific and human power, which could, and would, be deployed if necessary. 
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The theories of soft power are a basis for understanding the importance of cultural 
diplomacy. 
Nye coined the term soft power, explaining that ‘it arises from the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.’10 It is important to understand Nye definition 
in full, as it is the basis for the majority of works on both public and cultural diplomacy. He 
notes that seduction is always more attractive than coercion, however we must be mindful not 
to become arrogant, as the attraction can easily turn to repulsion. Like other definitions 
regarding culture, Nye has seen soft power trivialised as ‘merely the influence of Coca-Cola, 
Hollywood, blue jeans, and money’.11 While these things definitely play a part in 
disseminating American culture in particular, it is only a small part. This aspect of culture 
may be a resource of soft power, but it does not belong to the ideology that produces it- and 
that is the key to soft power, it is not an item but an ideology. For example, millions of 
Chinese people have been introduced to American culture through television. In an example 
of Nye’s, Chinese viewers commonly saw American characters resorting to courts to resolve 
difficulties, and over time understood this to be a positive cultural norm that they wished to 
use themselves. Adopting this recourse to the legal system is a significantly more powerful 
cultural influence than just drinking Coca-Cola. This was a success in cultural relations, 
though an unintended one, and highlights the effectiveness of a long-term subtle message to 
influence an audience. 
Nye lists daily communications, strategic communications (long-term campaigns on a policy 
or idea) and the development of lasting relationships on a public level as essential for soft 
power.12 The beauty of soft power is that it is available to all countries, regardless of their 
hard power potential. NGOs, religions and international organisations can all use soft power, 
as its main tool is communication. Most crucially, Nye points out that ‘soft-power resources 
often work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes take years to 
produce the desired outcome’.13 This is the element most relevant to cultural diplomacy. 
Four years after the publication of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Nye 
commented on the progression of thinking about public diplomacy and soft power. He 
contends that soft power ‘rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others’, not merely 
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influencing, but enticing and attracting.14 A country’s soft power rests on its culture (in places 
where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and 
abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority). Culture only becomes soft power when it is used deliberately. Like-minded states 
that share language and cultural norms will send and receive cultural diplomacy messages 
more easily, especially if they gain a reputation of practicing what they preach.15 This infers 
that a strong soft power reputation requires honesty and openness. This aspect is particularly 
important to cultural diplomacy, as it speaks to essential qualities in long-term relationships, 
in order to foster an environment for policy initiatives. 
Nye explains that in recent history, the disclosure of America’s exaggeration in accusing Iraq 
of possessing weapons of mass destruction ‘dealt a costly blow to American credibility.’16 
Similarly, the revelation of the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay—which was 
inconsistent with American values—led to perceptions of hypocrisy. Without credibility, Nye 
argues, ‘the instruments of public diplomacy cannot translate cultural resources into the soft 
power of attraction.’17 Long-standing friendships may allow more tolerance; sometimes 
friends will give you the benefit of the doubt, or forgive mistakes. Effective public diplomacy 
efforts endeavour to create this environment, however self-serving or arrogantly presented 
policies cannot be assisted by public diplomacy. The best advertising cannot sell a bad 
product. 
Sometimes criticism of a government or particular policy is an effective way of establishing 
credibility. Nye writes that while it is sometimes difficult for a government to support views 
that are critical of its own policy, promoting this criticism can send a positive message to 
international publics, especially oppressed publics, thus allowing them to realise an 
empathetic relationship.18 This is an important aspect of cultural diplomacy, allowing a 
‘warts-and-all’ honesty that is necessary for authentic identity, and encouraging national 
relationships. Should one party be exposed to the ‘faults’ of the other, a more sympathetic 
relationship can be forged. 
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Working with Nye’s explanations, Nicholas J. Cull notes that the advantage of Nye’s term, 
soft power, is that ‘it has moved the conversation around public diplomacy into the realm of 
national security and provided a language for arguing that attention be paid to public 
diplomacy.’19 Just as using the term ‘war on terror’ elevates participants to the rank of 
soldiers, the word ‘power’ gives this aspect of negotiation a specific relevance. The word 
‘soft’ may have been unfortunate, as it implies a gentleness and lack of force that is 
inaccurate. While soft power tries to manipulate situations without resorting to arms or harsh 
consequences, the potential for affecting negotiations is not lenient or indulgent, and the 
consent to domination of traditional power is implied. 
Diplomacy 
In the 15th century, Europeans realised the importance of onsite diplomats. The resident 
embassy was born in Italy, as an economical measure that proved particularly effective.20 
Having a trained diplomat onsite allowed a source for in-depth and continuous knowledge 
gathering. In the same period, French noble and statesman Cardinal Richelieu understood this 
as continuous negotiation, as the diplomat was not only gathering knowledge about his host, 
but spreading news and ideas, too. Achieving specific political and economic goals was a 
secondary intention- for knowledge is power. The first and most important goal was to 
advocate viewpoints and increase awareness in the diplomat’s employers. This suggests 
cultural relationships founded in diplomacy, and highlights that understanding the culture of 
the country you are dealing with has long been of high importance. Diplomacy brokers 
various relationships and serves multiple purposes. An understanding of the benefits of 
addressing different audiences, of listening to various publics and of establishing a respectful 
relationship allows a more favourable environment for the introduction of policy initiatives. 
2.2.1 Public Diplomacy 
Public diplomacy can be a mechanism for the deployment of soft power, but it is not the same 
thing.21 Soft power is a concept that affects the activities of public and cultural diplomacy. 
Public diplomacy has some distinctions from cultural diplomacy, and to appreciate the two 
fields, an analysis of the current academic conversation follows. It is generally accepted that 
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Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 
coined the term public diplomacy in 1965, when opening the Edward R. Murrow Centre of 
Public Diplomacy. He stated: 
Public diplomacy…deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and 
execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond 
traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries, 
the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of 
foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is 
communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural 
communications.22 
The preeminent institution in the field is the University of Southern California’s (USC) 
Centre for Public Diplomacy (CPD). Their scholars explain that the traditional view of public 
diplomacy is as a ‘means by which a sovereign country communicates with publics in other 
countries aimed at informing and influencing overseas audiences for the purpose of 
promoting the national interest and advancing its policy goals.’23 This definition has public 
diplomacy as a one-way communication to a purely international audience. The audience 
could be either the state or the general public, but the speaker is the sovereign state. The 
Centre further explains that since 2001, a new concept of public diplomacy has been 
developed, in-line with changes in international relations, and would now include non-state 
actors. These are qualified as organisations that have a standing in world politics, and could 
include some NGOs and private companies. The activities of these organisations are classed 
as public diplomacy only when they engage with a foreign public to develop and promote 
government policies. 
The Centre describes public diplomacy as a tool to be used in conjunction with the state, and 
not to replace traditional state-to-state diplomacy. This definition acknowledges that public 
diplomacy is multi-disciplinary and, as scholars come from varied backgrounds, the 
definition of public diplomacy is fluid. They confirm that the most common themes are a 
focus on soft power, reaching out to an international audience, and that initiatives have a long 
time frame. Nicholas J. Cull is currently the Director of the Master’s in Public Diplomacy 
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programme at this institute, and his work will form the basis of discussions of public 
diplomacy. 
Cull considers the fluid definition, reminding present practitioners and scholars of public 
diplomacy that their deeds and theories may not be understood in the future in the terms used 
today. Further, that today’s audiences may understand public diplomacy by its 1856 or 1916 
meaning, or ‘may already understand the term in a 2016 sense of which we are not yet 
aware.’24 This suggests that definitions of public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy, must 
rely on foundational purposes rather than get bogged down in attempting to clarify black-
and-white examples for inclusion or exclusion. Where traditional diplomacy must depend on 
state-to-state official communications, determined by the government of the day, public 
diplomacy looks at communications that are state-to-public, in order to explain and inform in 
relation to policy, and creates relationships designed to last longer than one project or 
government. 
Definitions for public diplomacy have developed over the last decade. The ‘new’ public 
diplomacy, Cull discusses, draws attention to key shifts in the international arena, including 
the increased global involvement of non-traditional actors in diplomacy, including NGOs, 
global technologies that increase information flow and the now-blurred line between 
domestic and international news. The increase of ‘marketing’ terms replaces propaganda, the 
incorporation of a ‘language of prestige’, with terms such as ‘nation branding’ and ‘soft 
power’, the increase of people-to-people communications, and the traditional ‘top-down’ 
approach are now being joined by a focus on ‘relationship-building’. 
The dominance of the (now disbanded) United States Information Agency (USIA) in the 
distribution of information on behalf of the government demands that any conversation on 
public diplomacy be centred on this organisation. Established in 1953 with a mission 
statement to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in the promotion of the national 
interest, this agency supported varied exchange programmes, and provided information to 
both non-government and government departments, including the President, with staff across 
the world.25 In 1965, the USIA began to use the term public diplomacy, and Cull notes that ‘it 
was the perfect piece of propaganda about propaganda.’26 Public relations (PR) was deemed 
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‘vulgar’, and by using the term diplomacy, it ‘enshrined the USIA alongside the state 
department’ as a legitimate organ of foreign relations.27 At its inception, the agency was an 
amalgamation of existing information and publicity agencies, so its early budget is not easily 
defined. However, by its closure in 1999, its expenditure was estimated to be US$1.109 
billion. The agency covered all conceivable methods of communication, and its arena of 
influence was so large that the organisation is an ample resource for public diplomacy 
analysis. Cull inevitably explored public diplomacy through the lens of the agency. He 
explained that the term was little used outside the agency until the 1980s, and graduated to 
common usage overseas only in official circles. Public diplomacy broke into the public 
consciousness following the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001. 
Cull described public diplomacy as having five main concepts: listening, advocacy, cultural 
diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting.28 Listening includes research 
and analysis, and feeding this information back into the policy process. The creation and 
dissemination of information materials to build understanding of a policy is the advocacy part 
of the process. In this context, cultural diplomacy is the dissemination of cultural practices 
designed to promote the interests of the actor. Cull included participation in World Fairs as an 
investment in cultural projection, which ‘became vast arenas of intercultural gladiatorial 
combat’.29 Exchange diplomacy involves the exchange of persons for mutual advantage, such 
as student exchange. Transmitting news over state-funded international radio is an important 
aspect of the international broadcasting portion. Both exchange and listening involve two-
way communication. However, Cull’s public diplomacy as a whole is considered a one-way 
phenomenon. Public Diplomacy does not necessarily engage directly with the mass audience 
and often practitioners will engage ‘significant individuals’ with the expectation that the 
individual will disseminate the message more effectively due to their existing local influence. 
Acknowledging the growth of public diplomacy post 9/11 as a worldwide phenomenon, Cull 
wrote that the primary American contribution to the phenomenon is the term ‘public 
diplomacy’, which is essentially a publically acceptable term for propaganda.30 He reminds 
us that in earlier times, the French, German and Italian communities had organisations 
designed to promote their culture. America’s first official forays into public diplomacy were 
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student exchanges in the 19th century. These were primarily philanthropic ventures. 
Evaluating each of the five aspects of public diplomacy through the life of the USIA, Cull 
noted that the agency became good at listening. It used opinion polls and analysis internally, 
all forms of one-way media and embraced changes in technology. Agents worked with 
Hollywood to ensure that the biggest pictures did not offend an overseas audience, although 
culture never sat well within the advocacy driven organisation. Most veterans of the agency 
list exchange as the most effective tool of public diplomacy, primarily as they were two-way 
endeavours, although as any results would be long-term, they were harder to implement for a 
short-term objective. Here, the government played the role of coordinator, and Cull raised the 
possibility of this as a model for the future of public diplomacy. As the agency had ‘a 
preoccupation with the ends of American power,’31 initiatives which could not be measured 
against this were often not highly valued. Exchanges were treated as ‘just another way to 
convince a foreigner of the superiority of the American way.’32 
Every Director of the USIA that Cull interviewed named the ‘Voice of America as the most 
potent tool at the agencies disposal.’33 Broadcasting American opinions, news, politics, and 
items of general interest across the globe was the most efficient means of sending the 
American message. As transistor radios were achievable acquisitions, and the transmissions 
reached remote and isolated people, this was an efficient means of global communication. As 
an arm of the advocacy function of public diplomacy, this was a powerful tool when used 
carefully.34 
Accepting the role of the citizen diplomat, Cull recognised the behaviour of any American 
encountering a ‘foreigner’ plays a part in US public diplomacy. While this may seem 
contradictory to the definition, which relied on an interest in policy, in his final words there is 
some room for a new understanding of public diplomacy. He writes that in the concluding 
analysis, ‘one is struck by the limits of public diplomacy.’35 The best public diplomacy 
cannot make a bad policy good, although ‘if properly empowered, public diplomats might 
know enough to prevent a bad policy from being enacted in the first place.’36 He describes 
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aspects of diplomacy that may improve public diplomacy, including more listening, exchange 
and establishment of relationships. This introduces aspects more often described in cultural 
diplomacy theories. 
Along with moving towards ‘new’ public diplomacy definitions, a number of scholars have 
suggested we pay attention to particular aspects of public diplomacy and a summary of their 
main points follows. These intellectuals are often seen through the lens of a particular 
academic or practical focus, but they do enrich the environment of cultural diplomacy 
scholarship. While Cull is a leading historian on public diplomacy, Phillip M. Taylor 
highlights some of the limitations of public diplomacy theories. Understanding audience 
perception of the message, Ken S. Heller and Liza M. Persson discuss the importance of 
choosing the most appropriate messenger, as well as including the audience reaction in the 
formation of the policy. R. S. Zaharna, William P. Kiehl and Beatrice Camp promote using 
the audience’s language to deliver the message. Bruce Wharton and Narren Chitty discuss 
using public diplomacy activities to inform future policies, and involving the domestic 
audience. Jan Mellisen cautions that public diplomacy works best where language and other 
exchange relationships of economics or education already exist, and Brian Hocking 
highlights the importance of active audience participation. Sherry Mueller introduces the 
concept of the citizen diplomat, a slightly controversial but relevant addition, as governments 
do use it deliberately. These scholars add to Culls’ description on public diplomacy theory, 
and move us towards a discussion on cultural diplomacy. 
The majority of modern literature on public diplomacy centres on American research. In the 
Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, several definitions of public diplomacy can be 
found, and they show some differences of perspective.37 This is a very valuable compilation, 
as it explores definitions of public diplomacy by experts from different professional and 
academic backgrounds, and includes international case studies. Taylor, who specialises in 
International Communications, challenges the public diplomacy maxim that ‘to know us is to 
love us,’ as the 9/11 hijackers knew the West well, having travelled to America and been 
educated in Europe.38 They saw that the West was not only tolerating but also accepting, and 
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even encouraging, values that were anathema to their own culture.39 Taylor contended that 
strategic communications should be more about telling people who you are and why, than 
demanding they be more like us. His work reminds us that there are limits and challenges to 
public and cultural diplomacy work, and that we must always consider these when planning 
new, or studying historical, case studies. 
Like Taylor, Heller and Persson argue that the purpose of public diplomacy is to influence the 
audience. Their work highlights the importance of long-term relationships in public and 
cultural diplomacy programmes. They add that the purpose of this is to ‘shape the global 
mental environment in such a way as to shape the opinions, actions and perceptions [of 
others] to be more in line with U.S. national interests.’40 Advocates of public diplomacy 
propose that practitioners use activities such as sports, cultural events and exchange 
programmes as tools for cultural understanding, and also as a way of analysing the reception 
of the message. While the intent of the message is important, understanding how the audience 
receives that message, with the flexibility to alter delivery, is an important dimension to 
remember when looking at the following case studies. 
Extending the motif of shaping opinions in public diplomacy, Zaharna explains that 
communication can be viewed as a linear process of transferring information, or a social 
process of building relationships.41 As public diplomacy is as much a communication 
phenomenon as a political one, Zaharna describes the information framework here as 
generally focusing on design and dissemination of a message to advance political objectives, 
often with the goal of persuasion or control. Cultural and exchange programmes are an 
initiative used by practitioners to build trust and relationships, usually in an effort to enhance 
a political message by engaging publics. Media driven informational campaigns are common 
in public diplomacy literature, but relationship-building cases are comparatively rare. Both 
linear and social processes of communication are used, which makes public diplomacy 
initiatives interesting for communications scholars. 
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Relational communication, Zaharna continues, favours the notion of ‘fellowship’ in 
establishing interactive communication channels. Exchange programmes and visits are the 
first tier of this framework, and success is often tied to the participants’ personalities. The 
second tier initiatives involve institutions, communities and societies, tend to be open-ended 
and integrate foreign participants. A benefit is that the participants often take partial 
ownership of the programme, and it provides valuable cultural knowledge and connections. 
While these communication channels are used within public diplomacy, as Zaharna’s paper 
explains, they are used to impose information from the top down (government to public). 
That communication equals information, and that communication problems can be solved by 
providing more or better information, appears to be a dominant Western ideology.42 Zaharna 
notes the danger of using this assumption when creating initiatives for non-western publics. 
She warns that more must be understood about assumptions of communications theory and 
practice in different cultures, confirming the importance of Heller and Persson’s work. 
Looking at the activities and opinions of diplomats who are at the coalface is crucial in 
manifestations of cultural diplomacy. William Kiehl, editor of The Last Three Feet, writes 
that the modern public diplomat understands that the messenger is as important as the 
message.43 Looking at the case studies in this volume, he acknowledges that the public 
diplomat struggles to explain his work to the layman, because public diplomacy is so 
multifaceted and requires a different approach in each case. In this volume, Beatrice Camp 
explains that at the Shanghai Expo in 2010, the Mandarin speaking American student 
ambassadors in the US Pavilion joked with the crowds, and encouraged audience response ‘in 
a very American way.’44 Camp, a former US diplomat, describes that this was ‘people to 
people diplomacy at its best.’45 This became an opportunity for many to have a taste of 
‘America’ that they would not otherwise experience. By meeting the student ambassadors 
who spoke a familiar language, they were able to experience cultural differences in a semi-
familiar way, not unlike the readers of Die Neue Zeitung. 
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In the same volume, Wharton clarifies that good public diplomacy officers (PDOs) ‘must find 
productive common ground with people from cultures and histories that are not like ours.’46 
Great public diplomacy officers will ‘use that understanding to inform our policies and shape 
our programs.’47 Here, Wharton is shifting from a top-down focus of a policy-centred public 
diplomacy to a cultural diplomacy that uses the cultural understandings to form policy. He 
continues that the next generation of PDOs will make public diplomacy programmes ‘such a 
natural and integral part of an embassy’s exercise of smart power that we will stop thinking 
about public diplomacy as a separate diplomatic function.’48 They will understand the policy, 
and how the host nation will perceive it, and will ‘use that knowledge to make policy and 
programs more effective.’49 This seems to be a revolutionary idea in definitions of public 
diplomacy, and fits with the definition of ‘new’ public diplomacy. Wharton adds the idea that 
public diplomacy can be used to shape policy, and this is an important consideration for 
cultural diplomacy programmes, too. 
Confirming this idea, Chitty, Director of the Soft Power Advocacy & Research Centre in 
Australia, has written one of the few Australian contributions to the discussion. He states that 
‘a strategic public diplomacy perspective should inform foreign policy development as well 
as the management of image and diplomatic events and activities.’50 There is a clear view, 
Chitty explains, ‘that public diplomacy needs to be directed externally,’ although it is 
important to involve the domestic public. The focus here is still external communications and 
explaining us to them, but the inclusion of elements of informing foreign policy development 
confirms that this is the underlying theme of public diplomacy. 
In her piece for The Last Three Feet, Snow considers traditional public diplomacy to be 
governments addressing global publics to inform, influence and engage those publics in 
support of national objectives and foreign policy. She also acknowledges that inclusion of 
non-governmental entities in the discussion is a feature of a newer definition of public 
diplomacy. She writes that the US government does not focus on its domestic audience in its 
public diplomacy programme. The domestic audience is often not considered in diplomacy 
theories. Snow also sees a communications shift towards two-way interactive strategies, as 
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social and personal persuasion develops into an effective tool.51 Snow has experienced 
several different aspects of public diplomacy in her career, which has allowed her to 
understand the development of theories and practice. Shifts in thought, audience and purpose 
are acknowledged in these ‘new’ definitions, highlighting a move in academic discussion that 
moves towards ideas encapsulated in cultural diplomacy theories. 
Working at the Clingendael Institute, Mellisen has written and studied public diplomacy 
extensively.52 As a structural development, public diplomacy thrives in an environment of 
independent countries with multiple relationships. Where countries share language, trade, 
economic and educational exchange relationships, public diplomacy is at its most successful. 
Mellisen points out that examples such as German and Japanese post-war efforts to re-
establish links with the international community were deliberate, integrated movements to 
ensure the country’s survival, and are exceptional. Melissen also recognises that public 
diplomacy is moving towards two-way communications, to engage more with foreign 
audiences, although he acknowledges the challenge of ensuring the message is received in the 
way it was intended. Mellisen’s explanation of public diplomacy is that it targets the general 
public in foreign societies.53 He sees that the ‘starting point of this variant of diplomacy 
is…the perceiving end, with the foreign consumers of diplomacy,’ that public diplomacy 
focuses on the perceptions of the receiver, rather than the sender of the message. Here, 
‘cultural relations’ pave the way for the establishment of relationships with foreign publics, in 
order to use them for the more policy-driven public diplomacy initiatives. 
Also working with the Clingendael Institute, Hocking writes that developments in diplomatic 
communications have created an opportunity to redefine public diplomacy with a focus on an 
active role for foreign publics. As individuals and groups are empowered by information 
technology, public diplomacy, he affirms, is increasingly defined as ‘diplomacy by rather 
than of publics.’54 Traditional diplomacy emphasises a top-down process, and Hocking 
believes that this is reflected in public diplomacy, although this is shifting in the modern 
climate to include a bottom-up influence. Hocking’s point contributes to the discussion on 
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audience participation in these new aspects of diplomacy, and how new practices are 
challenging traditional theories. 
Another concept that involves civilian participation is citizen diplomacy, as explained by 
Sherry Mueller. This is the concept that each individual has the right and the responsibility to 
shape their country’s foreign relations ‘one handshake at a time.’55 This includes not only 
exchange programme participants and travellers, but all who interact with people from other 
nations: hosts and hostesses, journalists, taxi drivers and sportspeople. As the media has a 
wider reach, as communication technology improves, and as international travel becomes the 
norm, it is vital that we understand the effects of cultural diplomacy. Citizen diplomacy is 
generally not accepted as part of either cultural or public diplomacy definitions, as there is no 
policy behind it. However, this type of diplomacy can be used very deliberately by 
governments (as will be seen in the chapter on the Melbourne Olympic Games), highlighting 
the differences between theoretical debate and practical application. 
Jens Nielsen Sigsgaard looks at the possibilities of the new dynamics of international 
relations, and how they can be affected by non-traditional means.56 While public diplomacy 
is sometimes used casually as a modern, and more palatable, term for historical propaganda 
activities, Sigsgaard claims that public diplomacy is considerably more complex, with 
propaganda traditionally focused on narrowing horizons of thought, and public diplomacy 
endeavouring to open them. He explores propaganda and its modern potentials in diplomacy 
when combined with new audiences and purposes. Hosting events like the Olympic Games 
and International Summits are classified as ‘strategic communications’, and a way of creating 
and controlling the news agenda. Sigsgaard adds that the most important relationship-
building scheme is that of student exchange. Exchanges of ideas, language, art and religion 
have always been a vital aspect of diplomacy.57 He explains that cultural diplomacy is 
different to cultural exchange, in that the former requires a basis in an official initiative, and 
this important distinction makes his work particularly important for this thesis. For Sigsgaard, 
public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are closely related and overlapping. Public 
diplomacy is a more formal, policy-driven initiative, and cultural diplomacy is an overarching 
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forum in which public diplomacy can be practiced and enhanced.58 The importance he places 
on the role of cultural diplomacy signifies the need for more focus on these studies. It is 
beyond the means of this thesis to elevate cultural diplomacy, or for it to be seen as an 
overarching forum in which to practice public diplomacy, although this is a noble aim. 
These differences show how various elements contribute to the field of public diplomacy. 
Most are also applicable to cultural diplomacy. It is important to understand public diplomacy 
theories, in order to appreciate the similar but separate place of cultural diplomacy. All 
themes are relevant, and the multitude of diplomatic interactions require just as many 
solutions. Undoubtedly, as Sigsgaard claims, the academic discussion is fascinating, but 
when it is used as a lens through which to view actual events and historical case studies, both 
areas of scholarship are enhanced. These contributors are all enriching the debate by 
suggesting important aspects for consideration in our study. Improving and expanding 
communications to identify and build relationships, to shape opinions and to include wider 
audiences appears to be the focus of developments in public diplomacy. To listen more, in 
order to use communications in conjunction with policy objectives, is a way forward for the 
‘new’ public diplomacy. Public diplomacy discussions do generally centre on 
communications in support of policy. Cultural diplomacy theories centre on using culture in 
promotion of policy, using relationships to support government agendas. 
2.2.2 Cultural Diplomacy 
At its simplest, cultural diplomacy uses cultural exchange to support foreign policy aims. The 
complexities of definitions and any discussion of what specifically is or is not included in 
either public or cultural diplomacy is ultimately a reflection of the complexities of statecraft 
and international relationships. Cultural diplomacy is not a new way of undertaking 
diplomacy, but a new way of thinking and planning. The following discussion of cultural 
diplomacy explains how this field differs from public diplomacy, and is a significant tool in 
its own right. International relationships are complex, and the more diplomats understand, the 
better prepared they are.  
It is perhaps the words of Milton C. Cummings Jr. which are the most clear on cultural 
diplomacy, which he defined as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of 
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culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.59 In an essay 
entitled ‘Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A survey’ published in 
2003, the political scientist wrote of the history of arts and culture in US government policy 
and explored some of the patterns and trends from the previous seventy years. One of the 
most important points he noted was that ‘programs in cultural diplomacy are often strongest 
if they have a firm institutional base, grounded in legislation, and when they have strong 
support at the top of the federal government.’60 This is the main criteria for defining an 
activity as cultural diplomacy, and the contributions of other scholars extend on this. 
Working at the Centre for Public Diplomacy with Nicholas J. Cull, Cynthia P. Schneider 
bases her work on the definition given by Cummings and explores the idea that as cultural 
diplomacy is based on sharing creative expression it is inherently enjoyable. This makes 
cultural diplomacy one of the most effective tools in the diplomacy toolbox. Academic 
exchange, aid, sports, tourism and cinema are all examples of cultural expression that 
combine pleasure with the potential for relationship-building and cultural exchange.  
One of the most important works to come out of the Clingendael Institute, in regards to this 
thesis, is that of Simon Mark. Mark compared cultural diplomacy activities in Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia, and promotes the importance of cultural diplomacy as a field of 
diplomacy. In ‘A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy,’ he is disappointed when cultural 
diplomacy is referenced as just one of the components of public diplomacy, and argues that 
cultural diplomacy has the potential to become a powerful tool for ‘improving a country’s 
image and its relations with other countries.’61 Mark describes cultural diplomacy as ‘the 
deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy.’ He claims that one of the 
primary benefits of cultural diplomacy is that it can ‘overcome audience suspicion of official 
messages and serve to provide substance to national reputation.’ It does this by being open 
and honest about the speaker’s country, admitting mistakes and is committed to being ‘on the 
ground.’ Mark’s discussion helps capture the breadth of the field, and adds to it the 
overcoming of audience suspicion of official messages, to provide substance to a nation’s 
reputation, which makes this an important contribution to modern diplomacy. 
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Mark points out that unfortunately, cultural diplomacy has been regarded as a lesser tool of 
diplomacy, which is itself often seen as a lesser tool of foreign policy. This has been 
exacerbated by confused definitions, and the difficulty in determining the impact of cultural 
diplomacy programmes has seen the potential of this field largely undervalued. The 
functional objectives of cultural diplomacy, as defined by Mark, include ‘advancing trade, 
political, diplomatic, and economic interests, developing bilateral relationships,’ and then to 
maintain, and possibly strengthen, these relationships in times of tension.62 His works seek to 
elevate cultural diplomacy in both theory and practice. 
It is difficult to make distinctions between these theories of diplomacy. Exchanges between 
academics, writers, artists and intellectuals have long been regarded as cultural relations. 
Does this extend to journalists? If an exchange is funded by a university, which itself is 
government funded, is it part of a cultural diplomacy activity? Cultural exchange does not 
just refer to high or popular cultural exchange; all are important to cultural diplomacy, as the 
significance is in their purpose. If a junior cricket team receives a government grant to go to a 
neighbouring country to play a tournament, is that part of a cultural diplomacy programme? 
 Cultural diplomacy also has a domestic objective, which is to ‘build an improved identity 
awareness.’63 Mark sees that cultural diplomacy can contribute to social cohesion, balancing 
the pressures of global homogenisation, and it affects domestic policies by instigating 
national compliance with the image being projected abroad. This is an important addition to 
the scholarship, as it widens the scope for activities and, importantly, looks at the effect of 
international exchange on the domestic audience. The chapter which looks at the Olympic 
Games particularly focuses on this aspect. 
In Mark’s analysis, cultural diplomacy can ‘raise a state’s profile, contribute to nation 
branding, advance core interests, connect with the elite, mass and diaspora audiences,’ and 
provide powerful opportunities for minority groups.64 However, to reach its full potential, a 
change in the perception of cultural diplomacy is required. Its power rests on the intersection 
between national culture, values, identity and pride. While we must be careful with terms that 
invoke a national homogeneity, this does not decrease the potential of cultural diplomacy in 
practice. Mark asserts that cultural diplomacy can give substance to public diplomacy. I argue 
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that it does this by adding an intimacy and acceptance that is based upon personal 
relationships. Cultural diplomacy, by its nature, can reflect passion and excitement; it can 
advertise the pleasures of creative expression, reflect the morals and attitudes of a people, and 
promote a state in ways that are denied to the more formal realms of diplomacy.  
Mark places a high value on cultural diplomacy as a part of the public diplomacy toolkit. 
More importantly, his work strives to elevate cultural diplomacy from being just one part of 
public diplomacy into a significant phenomenon in its own right. Combined, the priorities of 
Mark and Cummings would see that cultural diplomacy is used to deploy a state’s culture in 
support of foreign policy, with the consideration that cultural exchange helps foster mutual 
understandings, and gives us a more comprehensive understanding of the discussion. Where 
Cull has helped understandings of how governments use public diplomacy, Mark has helped 
explore how cultural diplomacy is different and a valuable companion. 
As with public diplomacy, numerous scholars contribute to the discussion, adding dimensions 
and exploring fields that build a dynamic patchwork of considerations. These ideas are all 
important in understanding how various episodes fit and are relevant as diplomatic initiatives. 
The following scholars enrich our understandings of what cultural diplomacy is, and what 
huge potential it has. In the following section, Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault 
introduce collaborative projects as an important priority for cultural diplomacy. Robert J. 
Williams highlights that cultural exchanges can claim government resources when they are 
linked to foreign policy, thus forming a defining criterion of cultural diplomacy projects. 
Long-term relationships are the only way for a government to promote thematic cultural 
ideologies, as discussed by Andrew Fenton Cooper. Maki Aoki-Okabe, Yoko Kawamura and 
Toichi Makita agree on the importance of collaborative works, and warn of the dangers of 
creating a cultural hierarchy. David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla remind us that cultural 
diplomacy can have a dark purpose: soft power and cultural diplomacy do not necessarily 
have the best interests of the audience behind them. These scholars enrich our understanding 
of cultural diplomacy theories, which in turn enhance our understanding of this thesis’ case 
studies. 
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Cowan and Arsenault explore the theme of moving from monologue to dialogue to 
collaboration as layers of diplomacy.65 They define collaboration as initiatives in which 
people work together on a joint venture or project, and assert that in some cases, this can be a 
more effective approach to engaging foreign publics. Collaboration is one of the most 
important aspects of cultural diplomacy, as exchange examples show. It is significantly more 
than two-way discussion, as it relies on action. Diplomacy activities are most effective when 
they are focused on building credibility among foreign publics, and by actively participating 
in creation, credibility is built into the end product. They further point out that: 
individuals who engage in conversation may each leave the room with a better 
understanding of the other. Individuals who build or achieve something together—whether 
it be in building a home, a school or a church; in composing a piece of music; or in playing 
side by side on a sports team—are forever bound by their common experience and/or 
achievement.66 
Cowan and Arsenault see collaboration as the most important form of creating social capital, 
which can be invaluable in times of crisis. 
Participants in collaborative projects form bonds of trust, and are more likely to cooperate in 
future endeavours, thus creating a virtuous circle.67 This then extends from the participating 
individuals to their communities, and this ‘societal trust’ can become a ‘trust of a broad fabric 
of social institutions’, promoting shared values in society as a whole. These projects work 
best when there is a definable goal, suggesting that they could easily fit into a policy 
objective and produce measurable results. Collaborations necessarily involve negotiation and 
often compromise, and if the project goals are altered or the parties feel disenfranchised, the 
project can fail. As with any diplomatic initiative, clarity of purpose and design minimise the 
risk. 
In Culture and International History, Schumacher and Gienow-Hecht explore how ‘culture 
has emerged as an attractive new variable in the study of foreign relations.’68 They write that 
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the strength of this approach to international history ‘is its ability to place a narrow range of 
ideas and individuals in a broader context,’69 and to point to the varieties of the term ‘culture’ 
as it is used by theorists and practitioners. Yuzo Ota describes cultural diplomacy as ‘any 
official and unofficial undertaking to promote a national culture among foreigners, when 
performed by those who identify themselves as part of the national culture at hand.’70 This is 
a very broad and generous definition for cultural diplomacy, but the focus is on promoting 
national culture. Ota’s definition allows for unofficial undertakings which is generally not 
accepted in cultural diplomacy terms, however that he specifies that they are performed by 
those who identify themselves as part of the national culture provides insight into the intent- 
actors are deliberately portraying a cultural aspect. This speaks to the importance of cultural 
diplomacy on the domestic audience in belonging to and identifying with a national culture, 
and then exporting those ideals.  
Soft power is portrayed as virtuous by Ronfeldt and Arquilla, who explain that ‘standard 
presentations tend to portray soft power as “good” and hard power as “bad”.’71 Cultural 
diplomacy can, however, be used in a tough, heavy and even dark manner: to warn, 
embarrass, denounce or shun a target. They discuss examples in which media organisations 
have been infiltrated or encouraged to portray a negative depiction of a country or 
organisation. This is done in both public and cultural diplomacy, and the messenger/infiltrator 
is trained to understand the most effective means of communicating their message, including 
the forum, the language and the timing.72 Where the purpose is to win ‘hearts and minds’ and 
shape opinions, cultural diplomacy can be very powerful. 
The Centre for Cultural Diplomacy Studies (CCDS) in Berlin is committed to the promotion 
and development of cultural diplomacy.73 It works in partnership with six universities across 
Europe. The CCDS’ Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary provides for the public and private 
sector actors in cultural diplomacy initiatives, and acknowledges that the exchange of ideas, 
values and traditions can strengthen relationships. This is similar to the work of Mark and 
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Cummings, and adds the term ‘sociocultural cooperation’ to the discussion, which is an 
important layer. 
Vasile Puscas works with the CCDS, and he explores how: 
cultural diplomacy can be defined as a track II, non-conventional diplomatic practice, 
aimed at identifying cultural patterns of behaviour as well as the commonalities of two or 
more competing groups in order to find a common ground of dialogue, while preserving 
culturally sensitive aspects.74 
This discussion supports those that focus on using cultural diplomacy to facilitate long-term 
relationships. Puscas’ work addresses the importance of finding common elements in the 
dialogue (whether the physical or emotional needs of the negotiators) while respecting 
differences. This aspect must be respected in order to maintain long-term relationships, and 
contributes to a respectful and balanced relationship. Radio Australia did this when it altered 
broadcast times in consideration of the traditional prayer times of its audience. 
These contributions introduce themes of collaboration, perceptions of self, promotion of 
national culture, cooperation across societies and cultures, and insights into the debates 
surrounding the images of hard and soft power to the discussion of cultural diplomacy. It is 
important to acknowledge these issues as part of the larger scholarship. Cultural diplomacy is 
not easy to describe, either in its theory or its practice. Realising the voluminous layers of 
cultural diplomacy has allowed a richer understanding of the value of the case studies, such 
as how important citizen diplomats can be, how sound and visual effects can affect an 
audience and how these and other aspects can be used to send a particular message. Knowing 
there are various theoretical viewpoints allows observers to expand their thinking, and see 
historical events in a new light. 
Both cultural and public diplomacy incorporate a wide range of activities. Public diplomacy 
deals most specifically with those activities aimed at a foreign public in order to explain a 
course of action or present a case. Where the communication is that of an informative or 
explanatory nature (one-way), the action is generally not considered to be cultural diplomacy. 
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These interactions, while sometimes falling within the scope of cultural diplomacy, are more 
closely linked to traditional or public diplomacy than they are to forging cultural 
relationships. Briefing diplomats and facilitating their communications are the responsibilities 
of public diplomacy, and do not involve the culture of the state. There are many grey areas. It 
is not important to categorise specific interactions, but it is to understand ways of thinking 
about interactions and how they can be used best. 
Cultural diplomacy is able to promote ideologies that specific policy cannot. Freedom, 
progression, acceptance and welcoming are values that governments are keen to promote, yet 
they cannot be defined by a policy. In pursuit of this, culture is politicised and cultural 
‘products’ (literature, film, television, radio, the arts, science, music, sports, language and 
natural resources for trade and tourism) are marketed and bought and sold as fora for 
influence and understanding. Cultural diplomacy focuses on the public relationship, and on 
sharing cultural experiences and understandings in order to create an environment that will 
endure changes in government. 
Classifying cultural diplomacy as part of public diplomacy, and restricting it to the exchanges 
of creative cultural expressions, causes discomfort to some government institutions. Cull 
notes that the British Council prefers to distance itself from the term public diplomacy, as this 
suggests that the organisation is a pawn of the government. They prefer the term ‘cultural 
relations.’75 A government should not use a non-government entity to push diplomatic 
agendas. Cultural resources are the concern of cultural relations in the exchange of ideas 
without a specific policy directive, even when they are government-funded and conform to a 
government agenda. They should not be confused with cultural diplomacy. 
As the definition of public diplomacy changes, we must be wary of broadening the scope too 
far. Public diplomacy is an important aspect of the broader task of diplomacy. To try to add 
too many layers and actors may reduce its effectiveness. Definitions that include state-to-
people communications for the purpose of informing publics of a national interest or policy 
goal should hold. Just as there have been developments in thinking that have brought about a 
‘new’ public diplomacy, perhaps there is a case for a ‘new’ cultural diplomacy. The political 
endeavours that aim to build relationships, foster mutual understandings and embark on long-
term projects, as well as those that are removed from specific policy initiatives, should be 
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given a separate place. This place is in the realm of cultural diplomacy. It is not a lesser or 
competing arm of diplomacy, but a complementary one. 
2.2.3 Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War era 
Thoughts of using cultural exchanges to influence and inform public policy came to especial 
prominence as the international political atmosphere shifted from World War Two into the 
Cold War, and targeted campaigns of influence were employed by governments. Hugh 
Whitford writes of the dismay and anguish of W. Eugene Groves, who ran for president of 
the National Students Association (US) in 1966, and discovered that it was ‘secretly funded 
by the Central Intelligence Agency.’76 The arrangement dated back to the early years of the 
Cold War to combat similar activities of the Soviet Union in their efforts to ‘win the 
ideological allegiance of young people’ through an indirect program, financed by Moscow, 
using private citizens and groups to spread an ideological message.77 
Groves investigated further and gradually other similar relationships came to light, showing 
many officials in the American labour movement, anti-Communist intellectuals, writers, 
journalists, missionaries and activists ‘all belonged to the CIA’s covert network of front 
operations.’78 As these links were exposed, the network dissolved, with funding for these 
ending in 1967. 
The CIA’s first chief of political warfare, Frank Wisner, had deliberately created and 
encouraged these relationships, calling them ‘a “Mighty Wurlitzer” organ, capable of playing 
any propaganda tune he desired.’79 Whitford explores how the subversive tactics of the 
Communists in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. had inspired the formation of the CIA and a 
similar mode of operations.  
With ‘academics, émigrés, and labour officials … sharing their expert knowledge and 
contacts in foreign countries and blurring boundaries between the official and civil realms,’ 
the CIA was able to influence groups of citizens which traditional diplomacy could not. 
William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information appointed in 1941, believed ‘persuasion, 
penetration and intimidation … are the modern counterparts of sapping and mining in the 
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siege warfare of former days.’80 In a political atmosphere of the Truman Doctrine, the 
Marshall Plan, Kennan’s Long Telegram, the formation and activities of the Soviet Union’s 
Communist Information Bureau, and the ‘alarming deterioration in American-Soviet 
relations,’81 support was growing for a formalised central information agency.  
One of the first activities of this Agency was to distribute anti-communist literature in Italy 
before the 1948 election, and providing scarce newsprint to pro-Western newspapers. Covert 
campaigns designed to influence public opinion were seen simply and justifiably as a 
response to the political warfare campaigns engaged in by the Kremlin.82 The CIA has often 
been depicted as exercising complete control over the recipients of their covert largess. The 
case studies Wilford examines, and many others related to public or cultural diplomacy style 
activities, suggest a more complex reality. Members of the public and the various 
stakeholders (particularly in international activities) will act according to their own needs and 
belief systems. Similarly, the contribution to the war to win hearts and minds is very much 
open to question, and the impact of propaganda on target populations is notoriously hard to 
measure.83 
Operating these types of programs throughout the 1950s and 60s, the CIA was certainly using 
cultural exchanges to support foreign policy aims, and in a very strategic way. The Australian 
government records do not show such a targeted approach, but the politicians, diplomats and 
other prominent stakeholders were certainly aware of the advantages as possibilities of this 
approach to diplomacy. 
 
Interest in the concept of modernization, particularly in post-World War Two America, was 
so compelling to foreign policy makers, due to the ‘perceived potential to link the promotion 
of development with the achievement of security.’84 By using development aid, technological 
assistance, foreign investment, and integrated planning, foreign policy makers hoped to 
accelerate the passage of traditional societies through to the liberal, capitalist, and democratic 
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ways of life of Western countries. By guiding this transition, American, or other Western 
governments, could guide, and protect, these emerging nations.85   
Scholar Michael E. Latham argues that ‘modernization promised an altruistic solution to 
some the Cold War’s most vexing problems,’ and providing a forum for America to promote 
democracy and alleviate poverty in conjunction. This would not only contain the dangers of 
communism, but dramatically improve the lives of millions. He discusses how modernization 
theories and concepts of social progress were subjects of discussion for intellectuals such as 
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and that these early considerations ‘helped 
create the framework for ideas of modernization to be developed in the challenges faced in 
the Cold War.’86 
Modern thinkers in governments of the 1950s relied more formally on studies of psychology 
and psychoanalysis than before, and the acknowledgement of a truly global Cold War made 
the demand for programmatic, policy oriented knowledge appear greater.87 As the political 
power of Mao Zedong increased, and he entered a treaty of support with the Soviet Union in 
1950, ‘the jarring realization that the world’s most populous country had fallen under 
Communist control’ had a tremendous impact on US foreign policy.88 The tasks of the 
psychologists, psychoanalysts, front organisations of the CIA, and all those in favour of 
modernization development policies had their work cut out for them. 
Latham acknowledges that the theory of Modernization was discredited in the wake of U.S. 
failures, but has made a comeback when the world has faced new crises where ‘policy makers 
once again linked the promotion of development with the enhancement of security.’89 He also 
recognises the suggestions of some critics and commentators who, in the 1970s, questioned 
the suitability and possible effects of imposing technologies in certain cultural contexts.90 
These challenges are valuable in recognising that while the intention of modernisation or 
development projects might seem honourable, understanding the cultural context and 
adjusting programs to suit is at the core of good public and cultural diplomacy. 
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Challenges imposing US led modernisation in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq 
highlight the limitations to any policy which seeks to impose cultural ideas on another. These 
failures ‘demonstrated that foreign societies and cultures were not so pliable, and that the 
United States could not easily impose its own version of modernity at the point of a gun,’91 
and this must be considered when exploring all cultural diplomacy style activities. 
The concepts which are fundamental to this study include understanding power relationships, 
the exchange of ideas and information in order to foster mutual understandings across 
cultures, activities which are based on legislative directives, and those which have the 
potential for long term international relationships form the core of cultural diplomacy 
activities, and will be used throughout this work. 
With a clearer understanding of what cultural diplomacy is, and as a historian understanding 
past events and their relationship to cultural diplomacy, it is important to understand the 
context in which these events happened. Appreciating the political, social and economic 
situation of the day, and how this might affect decision-makers, helps us understand their 
priorities. During the Menzies Era, Australia was struggling socially and economically in the 
post-war and Cold War context. It had to understand a new geographical shift in relation to 
security and trade, and balancing old Commonwealth ties with a new Pacific focus. While the 
politicians and government of the 1950s and 1960s did not use the language of cultural 
diplomacy and did not work within modern communications theories or those of conflict 
resolution or national branding, they were pioneers in practice. We will meet these people 
while examining the case studies and their significance for theories of cultural diplomacy. 
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Setting the Scene 
The Main Characters 
To make sense of the case studies in this thesis, it is essential to understand what cultural 
diplomacy is, how it is deployed in the world, and the historical context of the era. It is also 
helpful to understand some of the major players in External Affairs in Australia. Robert 
Gordon Menzies was the Prime Minister and for a short time also Minister for External 
Affairs. Percy Spender and Richard Casey were activist Ministers to External Affairs. These 
three men made significant contributions to policy and diplomacy, to understanding others 
and seeing that Australia was understood. They were followed by Garfield Barwick and Paul 
Hasluck, who faced new challenges in the 1960s. These ministers were involved in the cases 
studied in this thesis. 
Robert Gordon Menzies 
 
Figure 3.1: Robert Gordon Menzies 
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Born in the small town of Jeparit in north-western Victoria in 1894, Menzies was the son of 
the owners of the general store.1 Menzies considered his birthplace to be a tiny outpost in a 
forgotten backwater, and the notion of being ‘forgotten’ became the cornerstone of his 
political rhetoric.2 In the harsh environment and economic climate of his childhood, 
determined self-reliance was prominent, and this sentiment carried through many policies. 
Menzies learned fast, worked hard and did not let his circumstances disrupt his ambitions. 
His political experience as a Victorian State Minister, the State Deputy Premier, Federal 
Treasurer and first term as Prime Minister (1939-41) saw that he came to his second term in 
government (1949-1966) with ‘more knowledge and experience of the Australian federal 
system than any Prime Minister since Alfred Deakin.’3  
Paul Hasluck has commented that the unfortunate Australian tendency of labelling someone 
who reveres anything other than beer and sport as ‘un-Australian’4 affected Menzies. As 
Menzies was careful in his speech, academically successful, and had formal manners, he 
struggled to be seen by his electorate as Australian. A journalist for the Melbourne Herald 
confirmed this, writing: ‘Menzies commanded respect, but he was too dignified, too literate, 
too cerebral to be thought “one of us”.’5 Yet overseas, Menzies was certainly considered 
‘Australian,’ and not a British pawn, which was important. Menzies had a reputation for 
being very British. His famous quote ‘I love Britain because I love Australia’6 reflects his 
pride in the British institutions adopted by Australia. Yet he also considered the US a 
powerful and necessary ally.  
Menzies had visited Britain, Canada and the US in his first term as Prime Minister, but had 
little exposure to Asia until well into his second term.7 Hasluck notes that late in the 1950s, 
Menzies began to appreciate the social and political complexities of South East Asia, likely 
as a result of travel to Port Moresby, Thailand, Manila and Japan.8 He was responsible for 
building further a strong civil service team, which allowed ‘some of the greatest public 
                                                          
1 Judith Brett, Robert Menzies’ Forgotten People, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2007, p. 132. 
2 That the word ‘outpost’ is used in the 2007 Senate Report suggests that Menzies was not alone in these 
thoughts, and that Australia had not freed itself from this fear. ibid, p. 135. 
3 David Lee, ‘Cabinet’, pp. 123–136, in Scott Prasser, J. R. Nethercote & John Warhurst (eds.), The Menzies 
Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, Sydney, Hale & Iremonger, 1995. 
4 Paul Hasluck, Sir Robert Menzies, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1980, p. 17. 
5 John Bunting, Sir RG Menzies—A Portrait, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1988, p. 14. 
6 Robert Menzies, The Measure of the Years, London, Cassell, 1970, p. 212. 
7 Hasluck has noted that it was after Menzies’ Asian tour (1958-9) that he began to fully appreciate the situation 
in South East Asia, and the value of ‘doing the right thing’. As discussed in A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A 
Life, Volume 2 1894-1943, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1993, p. 357. 
8 ibid, pp. 356, 357. 
Presenting Australia 
52 
servants in Australian history’ the opportunity to shape the country.9 Early in his second term, 
Menzies was supported in External Affairs by Spender and Casey, two men who strongly 
believed that personal relationships and the understanding of international cultures was 
important to the pursuit of diplomatic goals. Menzies himself thought more in terms of 
traditional diplomacy and prioritising state-to-state negotiations. However, he did not stop his 
ministers from initiating and participating in other diplomatic programmes. 
Percy Claude Spender 
 
Figure 3.2: Percy Claude Spender 
Spender graduated in law, and was admitted to the Bar in 1923. Spender’s personal interests 
lay in discovering Asia. He made three personal trips between 1929 and 1937, and they 
‘awoke an awareness of endemic poverty in these countries.’10 Entering Parliament in 1937, 
he was determined that Australia be more mindful of its ‘destiny in the Pacific’, and he 
encouraged journalists to travel ‘to the places of activity and decision making’.11 Spender 
advocated seeing Australia and its role ‘through world eyes’, allowing for a better approach 
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to foreign affairs. Spender’s approach to international relations in the post-war period 
revolved around adjusting to modern technology, the need to combine foreign and defence 
policies, an altered relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth and proposing ‘the 
closest possible liaison with the United States in relation to Pacific Policy’.12 He argued that 
the best response to the problems in South and South East Asia was through both economic 
and military measures. 
Spender was successful in Cabinet, and his legal training enabled him to argue successfully 
for the initiatives of his post. In 1950, Spender was authorised to commit £13 million for 
Colombo Plan efforts, which were yet to be stipulated. David Lowe suggests that this was 
testament to both his high status in the government, and possibly to ‘a certain willingness by 
Menzies to give Spender his head’ in matters Menzies himself deemed less crucial to national 
interests.13 After an active role in the formation of the Colombo Plan and ANZUS Treaty, 
Spender left his Ministerial position to take up the role of Ambassador in Washington in 
1951. 
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Richard Gavin Gardiner Casey 
 
Figure 3.3: Richard Gavin Gardiner Casey 
Casey joined the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) in 1914, aged 24, receiving a commission 
and a junior staff job. Distinguished service was followed by manufacturing and business 
enterprises, and a role as Australian External Affairs Liaison Officer in London, before he 
was encouraged to apply for the position of High Commissioner in London in 1924. He 
became fascinated with the way that the British Foreign Office and the Fleet Street Press 
interacted.14 This was the beginning of a close relationship with journalism and Public 
Relations that would last his whole career, and affect the Liberal Party and Menzies 
considerably including encouraging Menzies to employ a PR firm in the lead-up to the 1949 
elections.15 When he was Minister for External Affairs from 1951, Casey used the press to 
inform the public about his policies and international relationships, in particular introducing 
the Australian public to South East Asian leaders as friends and neighbours. 
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In Washington as Australia’s first Minister 1940-42, Casey further developed his skills to use 
the press to promote Australia to the American public.16 Then a post in the Middle East for 
the British Government, 1942-44, at the invitation of Winston Churchill, allowed Casey to 
become acquainted with military, political, trade, and social affairs of people of various 
places and cultures during the latter part of World War Two. And he continued a highly 
international period as Governor of Bengal 1944-46. He learned the value of speaking with 
citizens, understanding their religion, ways of life and understandings of their place in the 
world, and used his understanding to broker gainful agreements. Later, the External Affairs 
portfolio allowed him to take advantage of his experience and connections, and he held this 
position from 1951 until 1960. His first overseas trip in this role was to countries in South 
East Asia and this converted him to the importance of the region to Australian foreign affairs. 
He had inherited the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan from Spender, and worked to 
ensure their success.17 
Casey saw diplomacy as nothing more than the application of informed common sense, 
‘exercised in relation to the national interest when it is in competition with other national 
interests.’18 He understood that the modern diplomat should not only know his own country’s 
defence and trade priorities, but be practised in the arts of diplomacy-by-conference and be 
fluent with all stakeholders, including NGOs and the press. The diplomat’s mind ‘has to be 
conditioned to a degree of publicity which was unknown to his predecessors of a generation 
ago.’19 Casey was practising public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy long before these had 
been academically theorised. As he held this post for almost nine years, and is recognised as 
one of Australia’s most diplomatically gifted External Affairs ministers, his tenure is ideal for 
studying Australian cultural diplomacy. 
Casey struggled to convince Cabinet of his aims and their importance to Australia. He did not 
have the advocate’s skill in presenting his case, and his uneasy relationship with Menzies 
added to his struggles in Cabinet. Christopher Waters notes that when Casey was Minister, he 
complained that Australians were not seriously interested in foreign policy.20 Casey’s 
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reputation and success in leading Australia’s engagement in Asia was claimed to be largely 
because this was a region in which Menzies felt culturally and politically uncomfortable. This 
enabled Casey to broker relationships and encourage programmes of cultural understanding 
that contributed to Australian cultural diplomacy at the time. Upon his retirement from 
Parliament in 1960, Menzies complimented Casey, noting that ‘he has done more than any 
other to cultivate friendship with our Asian neighbours, and to improve that mutual 
understanding which is the true foundation of peace.’21 Menzies held the portfolio of External 
Affairs for two years 1960-61, before handing over to Garfield Barwick. 
The reach of Australian external affairs was still new and growing during the Menzies Era, as 
the Australian Government had previously followed Britain on most issues. There were few 
precedents or procedures to follow. Practitioners with experience or theoretical 
understandings of international relations were scarce, as were professional diplomats. Yet 
during this period, and because of their lack of experience, several ideas and programmes 
were developed that incorporated what we now consider to be cultural diplomacy. 
International Relations as a discipline was introduced to Australian universities from the 
1930s, and became more popular after World War Two.22 The war had brought South East 
Asia sharply into focus for Australians, and understanding poverty, ideological conflict, and 
social change became essential. By the 1930s, the link between trade performance and 
cultural knowledge of Asia was becoming widely accepted.23 
The Australian Institute of International Affairs, formed with momentum grown from State-
based organisations in 1933, considered Australia’s place in the world. The name of its first 
journal, published in 1946, was ‘Australian Outlook’. This title combined the idea that 
Australia observes the wider world, with a suggestion that a distinctive Australian perspective 
exists.24 As trading relationships shifted towards customers and producers in the Western 
Pacific, recognition that Australia’s future required closer relations with its northern 
neighbours increased. By the 1950s, the Institute produced articles such as ‘China and the 
World Community’ and ‘Asia and the Western Pacific,’ as well as articles on the US and the 
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United Nations (UN). In the 1950s, a series titled ‘Australia in World Affairs’ was produced, 
aiming to place Australian policies in the international sphere. Unfortunately, according to 
John Legge, the institution assumed that ‘western inquiry could identify and solve the 
problems of the Third World,’25 and there was little appreciation of the difficulties of 
understanding cultures. Casey was the first External Affairs Minister to gain for himself, and 
encourage in others, an intimate understanding of South East Asia. The initiatives of the 
Department and its ministers suggest that this is an appropriate period to begin looking for 
cultural diplomacy initiatives, they were becoming aware of a new role for Australia in world 
affairs, and searched for the best ways to achieve new diplomatic relationships. 
Australia in the World Under Menzies 
The Cabinet that Menzies led in 1949 was strengthened by young members from a military 
background. The Australia that emerged from World War Two was impatient for change,26 
and the new generation of politicians would implement it. During the Menzies Era, the 
population grew from eight million to around 11.5 million, and became more culturally 
diverse.27 The period was marked by the testing of orthodoxies such as the as changes to the 
British Empire and Commonwealth relations in a new era of Sub-continental independence 
and republicanism, the spread of communism and the Cold War, and a shift in Australian 
defence orientation, as evidenced in pacts  such as like the ANZUS (1951) and the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organisation SEATO (1954) pact. 
In 1954, Queen Elizabeth II toured the country and the effusive and popular response to the 
young queen seemed to remind the world of Australia’s Britishness, but this may have also 
covered over substantive changes at work.28 The Cold War and communist threat provided 
the framework for foreign policy, and Judith Brett believes that this masked the decline of 
Britain’s global power and the rise of nationalism in Asia.29 Australian membership of the 
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SEATO later that year was framed by concerns of communist containment, as many of the 
European powers had left the region.30 
As both economic and security fears eased from 1955, the domestic economy focused more 
on manufacturing, the building of suburbs and the accompanying consumer durables that 
formed the backbone of the Australian ‘way of life.’31 Social mobility of female and migrant 
workers changed the shape of the workforce and of suburbs during the Menzies Era. 
Immigration laws shifted to include the wider European community, and race issues were a 
challenge for Australians. How could the country work with post-colonial Asia while 
maintaining a White Australia policy? How could it resolve the position of the Indigenous 
population while encouraging migrants from Europe? English-educated Indians were insulted 
by the policy, Japanese war brides were not granted entry until 1952, and the international 
goodwill promoted by the Colombo Plan was compromised by this issue.32 
Beside the increased movement of people, trade of commodities was expanding too. The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade saw global trade expand and traditional trading 
partners shift. Early on, the Australian Government wanted to retain the imperial preference 
system, whereas the wool and wheat growers were keen to diversify markets. The 
Department of Trade was established in 1956, and by 1967 Japan had replaced Britain as 
Australia’s leading trade partner.33 
In a similar expansion effort mode were other fields. In 1943 there were approximately 500 
research sites in Australia for scientific, technical and medical studies, and this doubled by 
1966.34 National cultural institutions, such as the National Ballet, Opera Company and 
Institute of Dramatic Art, were also initiated in the Menzies Era.35 Financially things were 
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looking positive for many Australians during what became known as ‘the long boom’ - a 
Holden family car, made in Australia and launched in 1948, cost £760, and by 1960 the price 
had increased by a third while male wages had quadrupled.36 In 1961, newly appointed 
External Affairs Minister Barwick noted that Australia is ‘at the one time a granary and a 
highly industrialised country’, with a European background and an ‘intimate geographical 
propinquity to Asia.’37  Australia experienced a resource shift in the Menzies Era, moving 
from a primary industry focus towards a mineral trade concern in the late 1960s. 
Not all the items in the headlines were so positive though. Australian forces were in Japan, 
Korea, Indonesia and Vietnam at various times during this period, so the first experience of 
Australia for a lot of Asians was in a military context. Cold War concerns dominated the 
newspapers, and news of communist activities across Asia brought the region into focus for 
Australians. Shifts like these help explain the progress of the Menzies Era, from the security 
concerns that formed the basis of Colombo Plan Policy, to the projections of the future 
displayed at Expo 67. Domestic and international issues progress produced both challenges 
and opportunities- and what makes this era particularly useful for a study on cultural 
diplomacy activities is that this was a time of also marked by increased air travel and 
communications generally. And enhanced scale of human interaction was made possible by 
developments in mobility.   
Substantial cultural diplomacy activity occurred in mid-20th century Australia. Regionally, 
there were political and economic shifts, and the Pacific became a focus for national security 
policy. In 1949, Australians elected a Prime Minister who would hold office for 16 years. 
Australia’s place in the region, its relationship with the Commonwealth and Pacific powers, 
the post-war/Cold War social and political environment and the youth of the DEA are all 
significant in understanding the following case studies. 
The Menzies Era was also an era of continued decolonisation. Akira Iriye notes that more 
than twenty new states were created in the South and South East Asian region between 1945 
and 1949, and another thirty in the following decade.38 The majority of ‘new’ nations were 
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non-European, non-Western and generally underdeveloped. They would represent a vast 
array of ethnic, religious, and linguistic traditions. As these nations presented their own 
perspectives on international events, understanding cultural diversity became essential for 
governments and internationalists. 
In the post-war period, when a new international order was being determined, Australia had a 
chance to form new relationships. Waters writes that before Menzies, the Chifley 
Government supported Asian nationalists and rejected military intervention in the region.39 
Unfortunately, this policy of friendship was not backed by economic or social aid on any 
significant level. The Colombo Plan instigated under Menzies in 1951 went some way to 
tangibly backing up these overtures of support. Australian support of new states economically 
and developmentally helped establish a regional reputation, and affected both domestic and 
international ideas about Australian identity. 
James Curran explains that as British identity lost its vitality, it became important to find an 
Australian ‘distinctiveness’ that would ‘transcend postcard stereotypes.’40 It was important 
that Australia participate in world events on its own, as ‘Australia’, and in as many different 
fora as possible. The focus was on showing ‘Australia’ as an individual nation that was part 
of, but not dependant on, the British Empire. Belonging to the Commonwealth, the Pacific 
region and bordering and trading with South East Asia would become part of Australian 
identity in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Being a British colony had been an integral part of Australian identity. From the late 19th 
century to the early 1960s, schoolchildren sang the British national anthem God Save the 
King (or Queen), oaths of loyalty to the crown were an integral part of public ceremonies and 
Australians were secure in their ‘Britishness’. Prime Ministers repeated the story of Australia 
as an outpost of the British Empire.41 While there may have been debate about whether 
London directed affairs as the centre of the imperial metropolis or if each dominion held 
equal status, the fact was that Australian residents were British citizens, and this was not 
questioned. National identity was a focus of the age, both in understanding domestically who 
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Australians were and in establishing this reputation to an international audience. Shifting 
perceptions of identity throughout the Menzies Era would affect foreign policy. 
As Australian governments reluctantly endured their own ‘de-dominionisation’, they became 
more empathetic to South East Asian states fighting for independence. Australia was 
emerging as a nation, and the focus was on establishing international status and claiming a 
measure of influence in international affairs. Many nations—including the US and the Soviet 
Union—considered Australia to be a dominion of the British Empire in the 1940s. The 
‘battle’ for status as a sovereign nation still had to be ‘fought and won’,42 and this occurred to 
some extent in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In 1950, Menzies gave the Roy Milne Memorial Lecture in Adelaide, highlighting that 
Australian institutional structures were based upon those of Britain, and that Australian 
identity therefore had a British foundation’.43 In this speech he noted the debt owed to 
America, and the ‘particular interests’ in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. 
Although he was fiercely loyal to Britain, he understood that shifting global forces would not 
allow Australia to play any significant role, should it continue to be tied to one alliance. 
The Cold War and spread of communism was probably the most significant paradigm for the 
developed world during the Menzies Era. In 1949, Communist Party leader Mao Zedong 
proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. In 1950, the Chinese and 
Soviets signed a Treaty of Mutual Friendship, and Mao proceeded to model China’s 
economic development along Soviet lines. A huge portion of the global population came 
under communist control, and, at a level of popular fears and also some strategic and 
intelligence analyses, the influence was moving south. Australians read about this in 
newspapers and heard about it on the radio. They understood that with political upheaval to 
the north, the spread of communism to Australia was a real possibility.44  
Early in Menzies’ second term as Prime Minister, the Cold War dominated political thought. 
Communism meant the end of everything that Western democratic capitalist culture valued. It 
restricted religion, free enterprise and international markets. Having fought two wars to 
preserve the established way of life, fear of communism was real in 1950s Australia. Menzies 
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himself was anti-communist and tried to ban the Communist Party in Australia. He had the 
support of his government, but the Act could not pass as the High Court determined it to be 
unconstitutional. Menzies was a constitutional lawyer, so for him to have attempted this 
move signifies his fear. Cabinet was ‘crowded with ministers’ who had either served in the 
armed forces, or as ministers during World War Two.45 In 1948, 67 per cent of voters 
believed another world war was likely in the following 10 years. 
In 1948, as leader of the opposition, Menzies arrived in London a few weeks after the 
Russian blockade of the western sections of Berlin.46 This was seen as an act of war by 
Russia. Later, as Prime Minister, Menzies delivered a Defence call to the Nation, in which he 
emphasised the Cold War’s capacity to ruin the Australian economy and change the ‘way of 
life’ so important to the people.47 
Menzies attended the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s meeting in Britain in 1951, and heard 
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru explain that in Asia, ‘communism was the product of 
bad living conditions’.48 By 1953, the prospect of global war was receding, and the 
Australian Government turned its efforts to developing Australian diplomatic missions across 
South East Asia. Membership of the Colombo Plan also grew. While this remained strongly 
anti-communist, it was the ‘bridge building’ focus of international goodwill that Richard 
Casey later publicised.49 This is an example of a cultural diplomacy activity that was based 
on a policy to prevent communist incursions into Australia, but enacted with person-to-
person relationships, using soft power strategies. By its very nature the Cold War promoted 
soft power negotiations over hard power aggression, as well as the development of 
international friendships as security buffers. 
Australia’s engagement with regional diplomatic initiatives, however, was not unreserved. 
The Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955 was a gathering of African and Asian leaders. 
Leaders of 29 countries met to discuss colonialism and communism, as well as the reluctance 
of Western leaders to include Asian leaders in global discussions. The core discussions 
related to political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-
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interference in internal affairs and equality. The delegates condemned colonialism in all of its 
manifestations. A ten-point declaration on the promotion of world peace and cooperation was 
unanimously adopted. This was based on the UN Charter and included principles of mutual 
respect for other nations, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Australia sent no official representatives, but was 
present as an observer to the proceedings. On behalf of Radio Australia, Hood reported that 
Australia was regarded by other participants as an ‘absent party,’ and that this was a theme 
that Radio Australia should bear in mind: ‘to what extent does Australia “belong to Asia?”’50 
Australia held a unique position as a Western country within the Asian geographic area, and 
could have used this opportunity to have a greater effect on Asian friendships and decision 
making. This was part of the identity that Australians were negotiating in the 1950s, 
culturally and politically, and several themes of Australian cultural diplomacy focus on 
activities in this geographic region. 
 
Figure 3.4: Participants of the Bandung Conference 
 
The ANZUS initiative showed a shift towards Pacific thinking for security issues. Menzies 
supported the ANZUS initiative as a guarantee of support in the event of a resurgent Japan.51 
This alliance—which ensured that each member country would come together to consult 
should the territorial integrity of either be threatened—was to inform the direction of 
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Australian foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Roger Bell states that this alliance drew 
American political and cultural forms into Australia, contrasting with the existing British 
influence.52 
In the US, the Truman Administration was determined to tie up the world in security pacts.53 
The ANZUS initiative was made possible by a combination of circumstances, including US 
gratitude for Australia’s early response in Korea, and anxiety over a Japanese peace treaty.54 
At the end of World War Two, the Soviets were granted control of the north of Korea and the 
Americans the south, following the Japanese defeat and subsequent removal from Korea. As 
tensions rose between the West and communist countries, the border between North and 
South Korea became the focus of hostilities. In June 1950, the Korean People’s Army in the 
North launched a military offensive, and Australian troops were swiftly sent to assist the local 
and American forces in South Korea. While in general Australians were still anxious about 
Japanese atrocities in World War Two, it was also appreciated that a Western-controlled 
Japan was security against communist threats. A treaty that involved US military support was 
welcomed as providing hard power to protect Australia’s security interests.55 
Menzies came to see the ANZUS initiative as vital to Australia’s security, physically and 
emotionally. He believed that the ANZUS Treaty was the keystone of the Pacific structure.56 
At the end of his Prime Ministership, Menzies believed that without it, Australian 
apprehension over Communist China ‘would be much greater and more oppressive’.57 
Regional relationships were developing in a new way, and treaties and agreements tied many 
countries together. 
Understanding the reasons for the shift towards the Asia Pacific region while staying within 
the Commonwealth family is important to understanding the motives behind Australia’s 
participation in various cultural diplomacy-style programmes. Participation in global, 
regional and Commonwealth events during the Menzies Era highlights the political focus on 
establishing a global space for Australia, and how it was both presented and perceived by the 
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domestic audience. By advancing Australian interests in the international sphere, the nation 
adjusted its reputation, and cultural diplomacy style activities were used to do this. 
Current Scholarship on the Menzies Era 
The US Department of State and the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Office have, according 
to Joan Beaumont, ‘generated a vast and often sparkling literature.’58 In Australia, the 
‘history of foreign policy and diplomacy has a far weaker tradition,’59 and the collection 
Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats, Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941-69 goes some 
way to remedying this absence. The volume looks at the contributions of the External Affairs 
Minsters of the Menzies Era to Australian foreign policy. It is a valuable resource for 
understanding not only the lack of diplomatic scholarship available, but also the issues the 
Menzies governments faced and the difficulties in forming foreign policy. Beaumont attempts 
to uncover the reasons for this lack of discussion, explaining that as scholarship on Australian 
political history is fairly new, and academic study has tended to focus on social histories, 
traditional foreign policy studies have been unfashionable. Another reason she mentions is 
Australia’s record in diplomacy and foreign policy.60 Mainstream historians have been 
concerned with the ‘dependent and derivative quality of Australian culture,’61 and this 
dependence is discernible in its foreign policy. The simple view that has affected academic 
thinking is that as an Anglophile, Menzies’ foreign policy narrowed to alliances, moving 
towards US relationships as the UK withdrew their interests. 
In fact, the growth of the DEA, both in size and professionalism, is reflected in the maturity 
of the foreign policy it delivered. David Lee writes that Australian governments of the 1940s 
and 1950s sought to secure the nation from military threats while ‘simultaneously promoting 
Australia’s economic prosperity in a changing world.’62 All of Australia’s external relations 
were multidimensional, providing for a complex and challenging environment for staff. That 
other ministers and Members of Parliament (MPs) questioned the value-for-money that the 
Australian public were receiving from the External Affairs Department highlights the 
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difficulties of establishing positive international relationships at this time, and in this context 
the successes of the ministers and diplomats involved are even more noteworthy.63  
The capacity of the diplomat to affect foreign policy was dependent upon the posting, the 
capabilities of the individual, the Minister and the current importance of the relationship with 
the government that the diplomat was accredited to. Beaumont writes that ‘diplomacy is the 
most visible face of foreign policy’.64 Diplomats were expected to represent Australian 
interests, manage negotiations and report relevant intelligence. In 1949, Australia had 28 
overseas posts, mainly due to the activism of H. V. Evatt.65 During Casey’s time as Minister, 
a further 12 Asian posts were added, and by 1966, Australia had diplomatic representation in 
all Asian countries except China, North Korea and North Vietnam. 
Australian diplomats were to promote, explain and attempt to make palatable Australian 
policy ‘to the government to which the diplomat was accredited.’66 The focus on government-
to-government communications conforms to a traditional diplomatic role. However, in 
practice, personal relationships were formed, collaborative projects designed and, in some 
cases, a programme of cultural diplomacy begun. Australian culture was used to support 
foreign policy aims, ideas were shared and cultural awareness was improved, as the case 
studies will show. Domestically, Australians understood a new geographic role and were 
being introduced to more of their Asian and Pacific neighbours at home. The conflux of 
foreign policy and domestic culture has been little explored, but we can gain insight from 
some works written about the period. 
David Walker’s Anxious Nation and Alan Renouf’s The Frightened Country67 explore 
Australian’s history in its region. In Anxious Nation (1999), Walker describes the contrasting 
opinions of politicians and other leaders working with the Asian community, and notes that in 
the mid-nineteenth century there was a general domestic fear of being invaded both 
physically and culturally.68 Earlier, in 1979, Alan Renouf explored the foreign policy 
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objectives of physical security, economic and social wellbeing in The Frightened Country, 
and the effects of an insular and dogmatically nationalistic foreign relations agenda.  
Before 1970, most Australians who travelled to Asia did so as warriors or peacekeepers.69 
Military personnel had been deployed in South East Asia almost continuously since the 
1940s, ‘not only because of altruism, but also because of widespread fear.’70 Often those who 
had begun their deployment with colonial pretensions became sympathetic to Asian demands 
for independence. Agnieszka Sobocinska notes that during the Menzies Era, book titles often 
referred to the region as a neighbourhood, allowing individuals to participate in international 
relations just as they would with their more local neighbours. Private travel increased during 
the period, and in 1968, for the first time, more Australians travelled to Asia than to Europe. 
Introducing a cultural aspect to the foreign affairs agenda is former diplomat Neil Manton’s 
Cultural Relations: The Other Side of the Diplomatic Coin.71 He discusses art exhibitions, 
sporting and other tours of Australians to Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, and claims that 
despite the lack of a formal programme linking cultural activities with policy initiatives, some 
activities had taken place that served the department’s overall diplomatic objectives. He 
discovered a file in the archives (authorless, but dated 1942) that describes a cultural relations 
policy including exchanges, and the establishment of a committee to oversee such 
interactions. This project was not embraced at the time, and Manton found that every few 
years, someone in the Department would recycle this idea and propose a submission for 
cultural activities overseas, only to have it rejected by other departments.72  
Elsewhere, Lowe explores the deliberate connection between culture and policy.73 He 
suggests that information activities related to these initiatives bred a new form of PR between 
member countries during the 1950s. His paper blends the idea of soft power with the spaces 
explored by Gienow-Hecht on the role of information provision and dissemination in Cold 
War examples of cultural diplomacy.74 Both the overseas and domestic images of Australia 
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were challenged and shaped by these publicity efforts. The international relationships forged 
by this programme have been insufficiently understood, and Lowe highlights the importance 
of examining the soft power effects of foreign policy events on the people upon which they 
are imposed. 
These works encourage the view that the Menzies Era was one of establishment. In the early 
20th century, Australia was viewed as a frightened, anxious, unknown nation negotiating a 
changed world. It is undeniable that World War Two, new technologies, the speed of 
communications and movement and the Cold War all affected Australia domestically and 
politically. Ideas behind more recent cultural diplomacy theory, including how the Australian 
way of life and culture were used to sponsor policy initiatives, beg more sustained 
examination by scholars. 
 
In the 1950s no one was using the term cultural diplomacy, as the concept had not been 
developed. What language politicians, diplomats, and other stakeholders did use, however, 
shows that the concepts of cultural diplomacy were certainly understood, and believed to be 
an important angle for diplomatic activity. The idea of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is at the 
core of these activities, most especially where they could encourage peace and thus national 
security. If the border to Australia’s north could be protected by nations friendly to Australian 
ideologies, then the Australian government would be able to shift the focus and energies 
away from defence and security and on to growth and other areas which would strengthen its 
position in the international community. 
To understand how politicians thought of the ideas now encompassed in cultural diplomacy 
theories, we must look at the comments they made and uncover their thoughts on cultural and 
political activities of the day.  While there are many similar comments to be found, written or 
spoken by various diplomats and public figures, special attention is given to those politicians 
who tell of the attitude of those with the power and influence to make changes - if the 
definition of cultural diplomacy activities is that they be backed by government initiatives, 
the words of the Department of External Affairs (DEA), Spender and Casey should be 
considered in particular. 
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In a paper written by staff at the DEA in 1949, discussions on the repercussions of large scale 
armed conflict or disorder in any part of South East Asia were followed with the conclusion 
that Australian national security would be directly threatened, and policies ‘fostering friendly 
relations with the governments and peoples of South East Asia’ have become a priority. ‘In 
this way,’ the paper continues,’ foreign policy considerations would have a major share in 
determining the commercial, defence and other policies which should be pursued.’75 If the 
best form of defence is a good offence, the strategy of ‘offence’ would be to encourage 
economic development alongside influencing political ideology. 
A further note in the DEA files on the Colombo Plan, dated 1956, claimed quite clearly ‘The 
aim is political, the means only are economic. The provision of aid may have good, bad or no 
results, according to political factors.’76 An assessment of the Colombo Plan written in 
Australian Outlook (an academic journal) explained that to achieve such progress ‘required 
grafting onto Asian societies … the best in capitalist thinking and attitudes, as well as 
techniques.’ For this reason ‘the importance of education and the mass media in helping to 
disseminate the Western Cultural and attitudinal qualities’ was essential.77 And in a memoir 
from John Rowland, Charge d’Affairs in Saigon, Rowland noted that Australia’s Colombo 
plan contributions ‘relatively small though they may be, have a political importance that they 
possess nowhere else.’78 
It is clear that Percy Spender saw many benefits to the Colombo Plan, and it is from his 
comments we can understand much of the focus of this activity as a cultural diplomacy style 
activity. Writing in 1969, Percy Spender noted that ‘by concerted action, we … can help the 
countries of South East Asia to develop their own democratic institutions and their own 
economies and thus protect them against those opportunistic and subversive elements which 
take advantage of changing political situations and low living standards.’79 He also 
commented ‘the story of the Colombo Plan provides a dramatic example of how a small 
nation, as Australia still is, may influence history.’80 Linking to theories of power and 
influence, and understanding the benefits of having democratically governed neighbours on 
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peace and security, Spender’s prioritisation of spreading democratic governance suggests he 
understood the relevance of this cultural exchange as a tool of foreign policy. 
After receiving food donations from the Australian government, Indian Prime Minister Nehru 
spoke of the ‘importance of fraternal consultations’ and that it is ‘from the psychological 
impact as much as from the actual economic contribution’ that projects like the Colombo 
Plan derive their importance.81 Nehru’s comments confirm that the manner of delivery of 
assistance would have benefits above and beyond that of a simple charitable donation- as the 
underlying purpose was to assist the country to be more independent into the future, with the 
added benefit of political alliance, or at least sympathy. 
Spender had also remarked ‘It was, moreover, fundamental in my thinking that recipient 
countries should, to the extent of their resources, as their development permitted, also become 
donor countries, thus furthering national self-respect and confidence and good relations 
between member countries’82 If Spender had thought in the terms of using a cultural 
exchange to promote a foreign policy, comments such as this would link easily to the ideas 
that as the Australian aid and influence had been disseminated in one place through one 
project, that this influence and way of thinking might be further promoted by the 
beneficiaries of the original aid. 
The third and very important aspect of the Colombo Plan, to Spender’s way of thinking, was 
‘that Australia be given responsibility of convening the first meeting of the consultative 
committee; in that way, Australia could keep its hand upon the tiller.’83 This would allow 
Australia the most influence over the languages, technologies, and aid the recipient countries 
were exposed to, further highlighting links to cultural diplomacy theories surrounding the 
influence of publics of other nations and influencing political support or sympathy. 
In Friends and Neighbours, Casey writes of Australia’s relationships with all the Asian 
countries which are our nearest neighbours that ‘we need to understand these nations, to be 
understood by them, and to live on terms of friendly co-operation with them. Our ideas of 
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security arising from our geographical isolation have been greatly altered [by the events of 
WW2].’84  
Casey also acknowledged in the early 1950s that the Australian government ‘recognised that 
security must be sought not in one single direction, but through several.’ This included 
‘strengthening individual countries, dependence on the US, and our thinking had to be in 
much broader terms than military strength. We had to recognise that security was not a 
military matter only, but entailed international cooperation to improve economic and social 
conditions, and with full political aspirations and rights of the peoples of the region.’85  
Exploring the idea that peace and resistance to Communism would not be a purely military 
issue for the South East Asian countries, Casey stated that ‘we need to win and retain the 
confidence of the free countries of Asia by showing them that our only object is to help them 
to strengthen their economies in a way which will enable them to reinforce their political 
independence and deal with the pressing social problems of their peoples.’86 
In a similar vein, Robert Menzies wrote; ‘it seems to be to be clear … that our foreign policy 
should be to cultivate friendly relations with our neighbours; to do what we could to help 
with development and stability; to encourage every means of peaceful economic and financial 
so-operation,’ among other things. However, he noted, in the event that conflict does erupt, 
‘that the business of foreign policy is to see that we enter it with great and powerful 
friends.’87 While this was written at the end on Menzies’ political career, it seems, at least in 
hindsight, he understood the driving force behind Spender and Casey, and the ideas around 
using cultural exchange to support foreign policy. 
 
Neither politicians nor the public in Post-War Australian knew that they were at the 
beginning of an unprecedented economic boom that would last until the 1970s. They did not 
know that the Cold War would not turn into a ‘hot’ war,88 and they did not know that 
Menzies would be their Prime Minister for 16 years. A historical perspective allows us to 
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follow the shifts in thinking, watch policy ideas unfold and examine how Australian culture 
might have been used to advance those aims. The following chapters will explore case 
studies, look at why particular activities are valuable to cultural diplomacy programmes and 
how Australia has used these as part of successful diplomatic activities. Cultural diplomacy 
may be a modern academic field, but the activity was certainly practised during the Menzies 
Era. From an exploration of the concepts involved in cultural diplomacy theory, the 
Australian political environment and role of the influential figures in External Affairs, we 
move to understanding how particular activities sponsored by the Federal and State 
Government played out. 
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The history of international aid is short, and most assistance given to other countries before 
the 20th century was related to colonial possession. The promotion of international 
relationships through long-term collaborative projects earns these activities a right to be 
called cultural diplomacy when aid can serve a foreign policy aim. Australia’s first major aid 
project was the Colombo Plan, an umbrella term for bilateral agreements providing assistance 
to South and South East Asian countries. As a step toward gaining political sympathies and 
loyalties, this effort to involve Australian ideologies into the everyday lives of millions of 
people was also a play for strengthening ties and influencing power relationships.  This 
scheme served broad international and domestic objectives for both donor and recipient 
countries, which will be explored in the chapter. 
The origins of the Plan lie in the rapid political, economic and social changes that occurred in 
South and South East Asia during the 1930s and 1940s, and in consideration of ways to 
address causes of instability while promoting national and regional development.1 It was 
important to develop workable aid plans quickly as a counter to communist influence on 
underdeveloped nations in the region, and to be seen to be helpful neighbours in the effort to 
win the battle for hearts and minds.  In a submission to Cabinet dated 1950, Spender 
described that ‘short of armed force, economic assistance and technical advice directed to 
improving the efficiency and administrations are the only methods open to us of maintaining 
stable democratic governments in the area.’2. The Australian Government was determined to 
make the largest impact possible with the resources available, to manage efforts in such a 
way that the risk of being accused of imperialism was minimised, and to avoid the impression 
of a preoccupation with fighting communism. The Colombo Plan was ideal for these aims. 
Australian governments wanted to be identified as a good neighbour, so participation in 
projects such as the Colombo Plan was an important part of helping establish this reputation. 
The giving of aid demonstrates that a country has commodities to spare. In an era when it was 
important to highlight the benefits of a democratic system, and that democratic countries 
could produce enough to spare, giving aid was a practical example of these benefits. 
Colombo Plan activities can easily be related to modern cultural diplomacy theories. It was a 
cultural exchange backed by foreign policy and a long-term collaborative project involving 
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people-to-people relationships and funded by governments with specific aims. This chapter 
analyses some of the political motivations and methods, and reveals the stories of some 
people involved in the activities of the Plan.  
For Australia, the foreign policy objectives of the Colombo Plan involved Cold War security 
fears and increased trade agreements, and the methods concentrated on people-to-people 
relationships and education. The media had a significant role to play in recording and 
reporting on the methods and objectives of the Plan (particularly Hemisphere, ‘The Seed of 
Freedom’, and ‘The Builders’ which are examined as a focus in this chapter), and in 
providing valuable insights along with the archival records. A look at the history of 
international aid and its relevance to cultural diplomacy is followed by an exploration of 
Australia’s efforts in the Colombo Plan. The effect on some local and international 
participants is discussed, in order to highlight the human element of this endeavour. The 
following will show that not all benefits were physical or economic, and that cultural 
exchanges and long-term positive relationships were as valid as outcomes as the 
infrastructure and training. 
History of International Aid 
The first recorded example of foreign aid was when the US passed the ‘Act for the Relief of 
citizens of Venezuela’ in 1812.3 Such aid differed from gifts from one country’s rulers to 
another’s, in that the aid is ‘seen as a general benefit to the population of the recipient 
country.’4 From here, modern international aid has been shaped by international activities 
after World War Two.5 The massive destruction across the world and the first wave of 
independence of many former colonies re-structured the map and created new ruling regimes. 
New political leadership in former colonies was often confronted by massive population 
disruption, infrastructure damage and agricultural destruction. This was of particular concern 
in South and South East Asia, where these newly formed governments led over 600 million 
people. With two significant communist regimes to Australia’s north—China and the Soviet 
Union—the political, economic and humanitarian issues accompanying this wave of 
independence were ripe to be influenced. 
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The motives behind international aid are the base of many academic studies. Peter Hjertholm 
and Howard White discuss the focus of different models, and have determined that donors 
will support a country based on the attainment of specific objectives. Donor-recipient trade 
relations, geographic proximity to a communist state, political and strategic importance of the 
recipient, the year of independence, foreign exchange reserves, UN voting behaviour and 
consistency with donor characteristics are just some of the reasons for determining how aid is 
offered, and on what scale. Most studies treat aid as a foreign policy instrument, ‘applied to 
(help) achieve a range of political, strategic, economic, as well as genuinely humanitarian 
objectives.’6 Hjertholm and White claim that over the past five decades, donor self-interest 
has been the enduring feature of aid programmes, whether bilateral or multilateral.7 This is 
important to keep in mind when examining aid programmes. 
Foreign aid can take various forms, including the transfer of financial resources or 
commodities, technical advice, and training.8 The primary form is bilateral grants determined 
by the donor and recipient countries. Countries often provide foreign aid to enhance their 
own security or to prevent a friendly government from falling under the influence of a 
country that they considered to be unfriendly. Foreign aid also may be used to achieve a 
country’s diplomatic recognition, or to increase its diplomats’ access to foreign officials. It is 
also a tool for promoting exports, spreading language, culture and religion. As most foreign 
aid programs are complex and designed to serve multiple purposes, it is impossible to 
determine a hierarchy of motives. 
After World War Two, the aid programmes of former colonial powers grew out of the 
development assistance they provided to their colonial possessions. The US implemented the 
Marshall Plan to assist the reconstruction of much of Europe. The Cold War saw foreign aid 
used as a diplomatic tool to foster political alliances and strategic advantages. It was withheld 
to punish states that seemed too close to the opposing side. The nations of South East Asia 
were in dire need of assistance, and all world powers recognised the opportunity to affect the 
region. 
The Colombo Plan aimed to empower the people of South and South East Asia by providing 
the necessary training for establishing stable governments and agricultural, manufacturing, 
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industrial and educational institutions. This, in turn, would provide stability and security for 
individuals, families and the nation. By understanding and respecting the cultures of Asia, 
Australia used the Colombo Plan as part of a diplomatic programme to foster positive, 
peaceful relations. Before the Colombo Plan, the major international development plan was 
part of an American scheme known as the ‘Point Four Programme’, which is important here 
because it prioritised the sharing of knowledge. 
Point Four 
‘Development’ came to be used in its current sense in the mid-20th century. President 
Truman’s inauguration speech in 1949 included three significant points of foreign policy, 
including support of the UN, the continuation of the Marshall Plan and the Creation of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to meet the Soviet threat.9 Gilbert Rist notes: ‘a 
civil servant suggested adding that the technical assistance already granted to parts of Latin 
America would be extended to poorer parts of the world.’10 This civil servant had included 
what would become the famous ‘Point Four’, which gained a lot of attention and established 
what would become known as the ‘Development Age.’11 
Point Four emphasised the sharing of technical knowledge due to the scarcity of material 
resources in the post-war world. It was designed to help people produce what they needed in 
a cooperative enterprise. Truman’s speech focused on the idea that ‘greater production is the 
key to prosperity and peace,’12 and that only by helping less fortunate people can we achieve 
a satisfying life for all. Here, Truman proposes a new way of conceiving international 
relations, one that would see development and aid as cooperative ventures. The speech also 
introduced the term ‘underdeveloped’ as an alternative to ‘economically backward’. This 
changed the perception of the word development. The change in terminology from 
‘coloniser/colonised’ to ‘developed/underdeveloped’ was a small semantic shift that proposed 
a new, equal relationship.13 The underdeveloped could become developed, which was a 
positive, forward-thinking and modern term. 
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Rist explains that the speech’s style was based on religious discourse, offering hope and 
salvation to the condemned, so long as they adhere to the demands of the faith. He explored 
the place of development in modern philosophies, and explained how a ‘belief’ in 
development creates a situation in which the process is more important than the outcome.14 
Development was a way of making the world better and attaining salvation, and individuals 
could participate in this. Development implied hope, which was vital and inviting in the post-
war era. 
Point Four is significant to the history of international aid and development, as it was the first 
public interpretation of the new way of dealing with underdevelopment. It redefined the 
problem, creating an atmosphere of change. The term underdeveloped did not apportion 
blame, but promoted an orientation towards the future, and development policy became the 
answer. This helps explain the motives behind the Colombo Plan. By helping underdeveloped 
nations become developed, Australia had the opportunity to realise the foreign policy 
objective of creating political and social stability in its near northern neighbours. This was the 
objective of the Departments of Trade, Immigration, Defence and External Affairs. 
Some might consider that the newly independent nations sold their right to economic 
autonomy and were forced to travel the development path mapped out by others.15 The 
Colombo Plan, developed soon after the Point Four speech, countered this idea by being 
based on a bilateral system of agreements, where the underdeveloped country was able to 
specify the aid it wanted. Some recipient countries sought assistance from both Western and 
communist sources. The Colombo Plan’s donor countries were careful not to define strategies 
for other nations, and respect for autonomous rule was a guiding principal. 
In the early stages of the Cold War, US diplomat George F. Kennan promoted the notion that 
cultural exchange would combat ‘the negative impressions about [the US] that mark so much 
of world opinion’.16 Kennan was keen to encourage and expand cultural exchange 
programmes, in order to promote understanding of the US and thus ease reception of some 
foreign policies. And in an article published in 1999 Liping Bu noted that as ‘the newly 
independent nations formed in the mid twentieth century, both the United States and Soviet 
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Union eagerly offered them educational resources and political ideologies.’17 Educational 
exchange has long been a popular forum for cultural interchange. 
The American Advisory Commission of Educational Exchange listed the different purposes 
of the exchange programme: transplanting American methods and techniques to other 
countries in order to ‘Americanise’ them; acquainting other nations with the 
accomplishments of the US in fine arts and scholarship to impress them with their cultural 
achievements; helping other countries meet education problems guided mainly by local 
needs; and implementing a special form of the information programme of the State 
Department. If educational bodies protested being used for political purposes, Bu notes that 
they had to consider the funding the students brought them.18 
In the introduction to a booklet written by student delegates at an international student 
conference in 1959, a contributor asks: 
How is Australia going to fare with the Asian peoples, two-thirds of the earth’s population, 
our nearest neighbours? […] We can no longer cling to our isolationism and ignorance of 
Asia or hide our subconscious fear of Asia. We must win the confidence and friendship of 
the Asian Peoples.19 
Students were very conscious of their role in changing international relations, so even if their 
institutions balked at being used for political aims, the students themselves were happy with 
the new ambassadorial role. 
Werner Levi noted that as a programme of cultural diplomacy, the Colombo Plan was ‘the 
path of least resistance to the sympathies of the Asian peoples’ and the Australian 
Government were aware of this.20 Economics and culture are less controversial areas of 
international relations, in which ‘good relations’ can be more easily built.21 The Colombo 
Plan enabled the Australian Government to affect the thinking of the South and South East 
Asian peoples in a way that bypassed the more formal areas of diplomacy in security and 
trade. While the programme may have been initiated (politically) as the path of least 
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resistance, its success saw a shift towards a celebration of the cultural exchange aspects of the 
project. These are areas in which the soft power of individual contact can be well employed. 
Aid and development necessarily involve personal relationships of individuals and companies 
in both countries. Cultural exchange—in this case students, teachers and welfare workers—
exposed thousands of individuals to the ‘other’ cultural experience. 
These personal relationships are the most important aspect of cultural diplomacy, according 
to Edward R. Murrow, who claimed ‘the really crucial link in the international 
communication chain is the last three feet, which is bridged by personal contact, one person 
talking to another.’22 Murrow was a journalist chosen to be Director of the USIA when John 
F. Kennedy ‘needed to…rebuild the international image of America’.23 Murrow was 
influenced by the credo that ‘education is the only certain road to the attainment of world 
peace’.24 He was well-known for his succinct, telling phrases, such as his warning that ‘we 
cannot judge our success [in cultural diplomacy] by sales, no cash register rings when a man 
changes his mind.’25 Cultural diplomacy activities are not easily quantified; however this 
does not mean they are not successful or important. 
As the Western nations in the late 1940s and 1950s hoped to improve their reputations, 
provide political stability and security and increase trade, many under-developed nations 
focused more on new domestic situations. New leaders in former colonies were often 
Western-educated and had been exposed to Western forms of government and organisation. 
Often nations were recovering from the physical destruction of wars on their soil. All had rich 
cultural histories that pre-dated colonial times. Recent events taught leaders that they would 
need to combine their country’s heritage with modern forms of governance, which would 
enable them to trade with their neighbours.  
In this post war era, the centre of gravity of international matters was moving towards the 
Middle East and Asia, and away from the West.26 At the 1950 Commonwealth Foreign 
Ministers Meeting, Commonwealth Foreign Ministers determined that the political and 
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economic situation in Asia required further investigation, and took recommendations for 
economic development in this region to their respective governments.27 The meeting was 
significant in other ways, too. The newly independent South and South East Asian nations 
who were a part of the Commonwealth brokered a relationship that allowed influence and 
assistance to other Asian nations who previously had no connections to Commonwealth or 
Western support. Ensuring the political allegiance of these developing countries contributed 
to the power relations of the great- and superpowers of the international political community- 
for if the West did not take them under its wing, the Kremlin certainly would. 
Interactive communication and relational initiatives that focus on continuity and stability tend 
to be a focus of cultural diplomacy activities. Cultural diplomacy activities show the rich 
variety of ways that political entities communicate with publics.28 There are graduated levels 
of participation (individual, institution or community), degrees of coordination, scope, 
duration and policy objective. These relationships represent the ‘spectrum of relational 
initiatives’, which R. S. Zaharna claims is considerably broader and more sophisticated than 
current cultural diplomacy discourse acknowledges.29 This explains how aid, development 
and exchange are important aspects of cultural diplomacy, and the relevance of the Colombo 
Plan in a study of Australian cultural diplomacy. 
The Colombo Plan 
Aid is a central part of cultural diplomacy. It puts the donor country’s ambassadors on the 
ground assisting those in need. Goodwill is generated as hungry people are fed, medicines 
administered and homes constructed. By creating an atmosphere where an external agency 
can impose change where the subject feels no overt domination or subjugation is one of those 
examples of power relationships which can only occur when the hearts and minds of both 
parties are similarly aligned. Collaborating on a programme to achieve these aims enables 
shared cultural experiences and promotes the foreign policy objectives of encouraging 
political stability and empathy. 
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In 1947, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
proposed that countries like Australia, ‘whose educational systems had been left intact by the 
war’, might be in a position to offer assistance to less fortunate countries by taking in 
students.30 In 1948, Australia set aside money for a few such educational opportunities. 
William MacMahon Ball argued that ‘to win the friendship and goodwill of the students and 
technicians is to win the goodwill of people with great political influence,’31 and as a 
forerunner to future collaborative efforts, the existing scholarship scheme was expanded and 
upgraded. In this way, the Australian Government was able to train those who would go on to 
have political influence. The scholarship scheme became one of the most important aspects of 
the Colombo Plan, with the first students arriving in 1951. 
The Colombo Plan was Australia’s first real venture into international aid. It was originally 
administered by the Departments of External Territories, Education, and the Treasury, and 
was also guided by the DEA, reflecting the diverse nature and extent of the project.32 As the 
first serious effort to assist overseas nations, the Colombo Plan was complex. Various nations 
with different cultures and governmental structures, and differing levels of need, were 
involved. As a long-term programme, it encouraged ongoing international relationships, 
something that simple charitable donations do not. 
Spender became the Foreign Affairs Minister in December 1949, just before the Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Colombo, the agenda of which focused on South and South East Asian 
challenges. Spender had spent time in various Asian countries prior to his appointment, and 
had become ‘convinced of the need to bridge with human understanding and sympathy the 
vast gulf of ignorance and apathy which divided Asia and the West.’33 He made his intent 
known as soon as he was appointed, and set to work devising possible strategies. He wrote 
that to ensure the security in the Pacific, ‘economic and technical aid and political stability in 
Southeast Asia were…rather like two sides of one coin.’34 If Australia wanted to encourage 
political stability, an aid programme was the most appropriate tool. 
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South and South East Asian countries faced the immense task of creating new economic 
structures. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Don Stephen Senanayake, claimed that the 
fundamental problems faced by Asia were economic not political, which was something that 
Spender could work with. On the flight to Colombo, Spender began to formulate a plan and 
write a proposal. He envisioned long-term bilateral aid, with countries donating and receiving 
as their needs and resources required. Just as it had been important for Senanayake to ensure 
that Colombo was the host of meetings and organisation, so was it essential to Spender that 
Australia maintain leadership. 35 
Spender did not want to impose aid programmes on each country, but rather encourage that 
‘initiatives should come separately from each of the Asian countries themselves’, thus 
allowing each to determine the best course of economic development.36 This shows a respect 
for the new nation states, and also highlights that while Spender planned to take charge, he 
did not want to do so in such a way that the newly independent nations would feel controlled 
or oppressed, reminding them of their colonial past.  
A secondary part of Spender’s plan was ‘to induce the participation the United States’ who 
had previously been reluctant to assist in the region, insisting that initiatives must come from 
the region.37 This is further confirmed in a cablegram Spender sent to Menzies, where among 
other things, he claimed, ‘we should use the great potential Asian influence of the 
Commonwealth as a cohesive force progressively to bind Asia to the West in a way which 
has so far been impossible by direct political pressure…’ and that ‘we must regard this plan 
as part of foreign policy designed to deny this important part of the world to Soviet Russian 
influence.38 Spender saw the scheme as one which would both encourage political allegiances 
in the near north, and bring the might of the US into a defence scheme for Australia. As a 
scheme that involved exchanging cultural experiences to meet specific long-term policy aims, 
the Plan is worthy of historical analysis through a cultural diplomacy lens. 
In May 1950, a few months after the Plan was proposed, the first meeting of the Consultative 
Committee was held in Sydney. It was held at Admiralty House, near the Sydney Harbour 
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Bridge, where British settlers had established their first colony 160 years earlier.39 It was a 
location chosen to convey a connection to British heritage as well as the advances made by an 
independent people, and the thriving city of Sydney was an example of possible 
achievements. 
From the beginning, governments who contributed to the project determined that promotion 
of the virtues of the Plan was a priority. As most had limited resources, they wished to arrive 
at a scheme that ‘made the biggest impact with the resources available, in terms of publicity, 
and political, social and economic benefits.’40 For Australia, the focus was on traineeships 
and fellowships, as they were relatively cheap but enabled the person-to-person contact so 
essential for good relationships and, more importantly, the opportunity to influence. The 
Australian Government also admitted that the rise of communism in Asia was of concern, and 
a motive for the aid programme. The belief that stability was gained when living standards 
were raised was a key motivator. Before World War Two the South and South East Asian 
region had supplied rubber, jute, tea, tin and other key products, and reinstating this trade was 
essential.41 These industries would make available an export industry that would provide 
employment and economic resources, thus helping raise living standards. 
In a small booklet produced by the Australian Government, New Hope for Asia, the Colombo 
Plan was brought to the attention of the Australian people.42 It highlighted that the South and 
South East Asian nations were used to hardships, and that new democratic governments had 
to be supported. The development plans proposed to raise the quality of life in 
underdeveloped countries, but not challenge Australian prosperity. The stories in the booklet 
explained that each nation had differing needs, not all of them financial. By claiming that the 
peoples of South and South East Asia, with the support of other free peoples, could achieve a 
measure of prosperity, the publication drew support on a humanist level and also 
accommodated Western feelings of superiority. With so many ideologies and cultures 
involved, and budgets and political allegiances to consider, Spender’s sense of urgency was 
tempered by the caution of the Asian delegates. In 1950, the Colombo Plan was discussed in 
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Sydney. The developing nations asked for plans to be presented at the following year’s 
meeting in London. 
As Spender moved to another political appointment, Casey became Minister of the External 
Affairs Department. With similar zeal to Spender, he promoted the Colombo Plan as a 
priority. His talents lay in PR, and specific and measurable projects became a focus of 
Australian aid. 
 
Figure 4.1: Casey and the Colombo Plan signatories at Parliament House43 
Daniel Oakman has written the chief study on the Colombo Plan in his book, Facing Asia, He 
covered the public and private motives for the Plan, the Australian and Asian audience and 
the personalities of the main players. He noted that Casey’s prime objective was to ‘give 
Australia a visible presence in Asia and secure long-lasting political dividends.’44 This echoes 
contemporary definitions of cultural diplomacy, and it is easy to explore the aims of the 
protagonists in terms of a modern ideology. While Spender, Casey, Menzies and others 
understood that cultural relationships became political ones, the terminology of cultural 
diplomacy is recent, and in this thesis has been imposed upon them. 
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Between 1950 and 1960, the Australian Government spent £40,000,000 on technical 
assistance and capital aid. In this 10 year period, 3,816 awards for training had been granted 
to South and South East Asian students across varying fields of scholarship. A further 2,704 
students had participated in sponsored correspondence courses.45 The government claimed 
that the scholarships stimulated interest in private funding of students in Australian 
educational institutions.46 As Australia operated a White Australia immigration policy, the 
students were on strict visas, with the expectation that when they had completed their studies 
they would return home and be of social benefit to their communities. Each contributing 
country operated with a different foreign aid budget, resources and political and geographical 
focus. Australia’s contribution prioritised technical training and human resources. 
Casey used the media to promote the Colombo Plan activities, a skill he had learned in 
Washington. He informed the domestic public of the merits of the Plan frequently and 
informally. Newspaper reports of student successes gave a human edge to the programme. By 
advertising individuals and their academic achievements, Australians felt included in the 
regional development programme, participating in the hope and salvation it offered. The 
Colombo Plan students made it easy for Casey, as their accomplishments were often 
noteworthy.  
The English language was, for Casey, ‘a fundamental political and psychological tool, a 
“weapon in our hands.”’  He claimed that ‘Australia’s strength lay in the fact that it was not a 
major colonial power, but the successful product of a colonial regime serving as a model to 
the region.’ This is supported by comments in Friends and Neighbours where Casey wrote 
‘We sincerely believe that the survival and progress of our present civilization depends 
substantially on the English-speaking peoples…’47  
Despite English being a new language and learning in a different cultural environment away 
from their families, some students were still able to gain credits in exams.48 The heads of 
universities and colleges in Adelaide spoke highly of the students’ conduct and work. 
Predicting that his local and international students would take leadership positions in the 
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future, the Master of Lincoln College said: ‘they’ll have a far better understanding of each 
other by sharing a way of life’.49 And by learning, and learning to think, in the English 
language, the students had moved toward thinking like other English speaking peoples of the 
West. 
 
Figure 4.2: Indonesian Colombo Plan students in Sydney50 
The Asian students who came to Australia stayed in different types of accommodation, 
sometimes boarding at private residences, organised privately or through the Plan. Casey 
publicly thanked those who took students into their homes, announcing that the ‘promotion of 
friendship between Australians and Asians was no less important than the training the visitors 
received.’51 This also encouraged visiting students and their hosts to feel they were part of a 
collaborative enterprise, working together to achieve a goal that would benefit all. 
International House, a boarding house for students, was completed in Melbourne in 1957, 
with Colombo Plan funds.52 Other similar houses followed in major capitals. 
Frequently students were guests at the functions of the Rotary and Apex clubs, Country 
Women’s Association (CWA) and Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). They were 
often taken on tours of the region with club members, including visits to stone quarries, mills, 
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dairy farms, lakes, caves, bushwalking and beach days, often ending with a specially 
prepared luncheon or dinner, such as an Australian barbecue.53 At some of these events the 
students would give talks about their experiences studying in Australia, and provide some 
insight into their lives in Asia. In 1954, Sydney University arts graduate Adelina Agbayani 
addressed the Goulburn Rotary Club, highlighting the similarities in culture between the 
Philippines and Australia, and commenting that sharing a common cultural and political 
heritage would help ‘that precious seed of Australian-Philippine cooperation…grow in stature 
and strength’.54 This hope of continued goodwill and shared progress was a common theme 
of these speeches. The Apex Club of Moree enjoyed taking Colombo Plan student visitors out 
to the vast grazing areas, to ‘show them what our country was really like’.55 Club president 
John Adrian felt that offering the students hospitality was a good thing for Australia, as they 
‘would be ambassadors of goodwill towards us when they returned to their own lands.’56 He 
was supportive of the CWA’s call for members to host students in their homes during 
vacations. 
The Colombo Plan students were seen as a bridge to Asia by those who understood that the 
Australian public had an opportunity to promote their culture. William Douglas, Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, warned that as Communist China built its 
industries, India was poised between both worlds.57 ‘The outcome of communism depends on 
who does the best job. What happens to India will determine the history of Asia,’ he said.58 
The Colombo Plan students were an important way that Australia could help tip the balance 
away from communism. The person-to-person contact that was an essential component of 
Australian Colombo Plan efforts would help strengthen the soft power objectives of the aid 
programme. There is no direct evidence that Australia’s support of Indian students achieved 
this Cold War aim, but the intent was to generate a positive relationship with Australia and its 
political ideologies, to influence political thought, and gain sympathetic political 
relationships. 
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Not all media coverage was initiated by the Government or its organisations. The students 
found that writing to newspapers and journals was a good way of imparting their messages 
and opinions. Some student experiences were quite negative, mostly relating to loneliness and 
the difficulties of adjusting to cultural differences. Such experiences highlighted that there are 
limits to cultural diplomacy programmes, and they do not guarantee the outcomes for all 
participants. The publication of these letters shows an honesty that allows criticism and helps 
a nation build realistic long-term relationships, and this is discussed in modern cultural 
diplomacy theories. 
The Colombo Plan worked as a tool of cultural diplomacy because it allowed personal 
contact on many levels. While the majority of experiences were positive, some surveys 
conducted by the University of New South Wales show the students’ mixed experiences 
students. One student surveyed in the late 1990s states how they had had few Australian 
friends at university because they ‘felt ostracised because of different cultural backgrounds 
and misperceptions of Asian students.’59As a result of this, it became common for students to 
join clubs. One recounts enjoying the international students’ organisation because meeting 
other Asian students ‘helped me to get rid of prejudice about them, especially toward 
Chinese.’60 This comment reminds us that the Asian students in Australia were often just as 
foreign to each other as they were to domestic students. 
The High Commissioner for India in Canberra wrote to Casey in 1956, noting that some 
students were struggling in the Australian university system because it was so different from 
theirs.61 He suggested that some of the trainers might find value in visiting other Asian 
countries, in order to modify some of their methods. Language and cultural differences 
created problems for even the best students. By listening to the needs and experiences of the 
recipient countries, donor countries could better operate and adjust the aid programme. 
Feedback is a vital aspect of cultural diplomacy, and while this highlights a caution in 
cultural diplomacy plans, it also provides an opportunity to develop and improve. 
Often of the friendships formed by students during their years at university lasted for life. 
There are many stories of students continuing to write to their landlady, and ex-students 
enjoyed hosting their Australian friends when they travelled to Asia. Business and leisure 
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trips to Australia were made later, and the familiarity of the culture would probably have 
made these subsequent trips more relaxed. One student remembers being irked by the 
regulation that students must return to their home country after the completion of their 
studies, and some students found the re-adjustment quite difficult. This student, and most 
others, came to understand that this was the ‘right thing to do,’ as their home counties needed 
their new skills and knowledge to continue the development process.62 
Overt racism or discrimination was the exception rather than the rule experienced by 
Colombo Plan students, with most hosts sympathetic to the challenges the students faced.63 
The students became a non-threatening challenge to stereotypes, and most who hosted or 
entertained them became their advocates. The governmental publicity mill was happy to 
publish success stories. This encouraged the students and their hosts to feel that they were 
part of a collaborative enterprise, working together to achieve a goal that would benefit all. 
The students were not the only reason why the Colombo Plan was in the media. When Casey 
travelled to India in 1953, he said that ‘not by any means the least of the benefits of the 
Colombo Plan is the fact that it provides opportunity for us to get to know you and you to get 
to know us’.64 Casey also noted that Australia was still in a developmental stage (subtly 
explaining the limited resources available for the Plan), but highlighted his enthusiasm for 
Australia and India to work together. This story was published in an Indian newspaper, where 
the Indian public were assured that Australians saw the Plan not as charity or opportunity for 
domination, but for mutual growth and development. The Hindustan Times reported Indian 
Prime Minister Nehru saying that the Indian Government welcomed assistance under the 
Colombo Plan, in part because ‘it brings us into cooperative effort with various countries and 
also helps in avoiding development in compartments, which leads to isolation.’65 It was the 
cooperative nature of this Plan that made it attractive. Recipient countries were encouraged to 
become donor countries, as their circumstances allowed. 
In the early years of the Colombo Plan, newspapers reported the excitement of nurses 
heading overseas, telecommunications equipment going to Pakistan, Australian-made tractors 
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exported to help modernise farming practices, a plastic surgeon flying to Malaya66 and other 
positive stories. The media brought about a shift in the Australian public’s thinking about 
South and South East Asia, with stories highlighting the enthusiasm of those participating in 
the initiative. Most of the publicity served to justify the Australian money being sent 
overseas, as there were those who felt that the money would be better spent domestically. 
These attitudes do not take into account the foreign policy aims of the Plan, such as political 
stability, national friendships and trade agreements that resulted from person-to-person 
contacts. Domestic publicity and media stories highlighted the foreign policy benefits. The 
Australian Government ensured that local infrastructure projects and donations were clearly 
advertised as a gift from Australia. The locomotives exported under the Plan were promoted 
in the Pakistani News, and as they would travel over countless miles of Pakistan, ‘they would 
be seen by many people and wherever they went they would carry the good name of Australia 
and tangible proof of their interest in Pakistan’s great task of national development.’67 The 
publicity that stated which nations were actively and practically assisting Asian development 
was an important aspect of the Plan. 
A further positive feature of the Plan was that it provided extra work for Australian 
industries. Heavy machinery had to be manufactured and then purchased by the government. 
An article in the Herald Sun requested that the government subsidise the export of milk 
powder to Asian countries, thereby helping Australian dairy farmers.68 In July 1956, both The 
Herald and The Age ran articles promoting the Colombo Plan. The Herald wrote that while 
the nation was mindful of the economic benefits, ‘thoughtful Australians will not agree…that 
our annual contribution…to the Colombo Plan should be cut back’, noting that other 
countries ‘less closely related to Asia are giving more.’69 The Age described the same 
anticipated budget cuts, proposing that in ‘years to come it may well be that this small gesture 
of help and goodwill towards our Asian neighbours will be worth more to us—and to them—
than a far greater investment in rifles and bombs.’70 Asian students in Australia were seen as 
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‘potential ambassadors of goodwill’, and their very presence should be a constant reminder of 
‘the simple facts of Asia’s geography.’71 The Australian public were frequently reminded 
what their government was doing about the perceived communist threat to the north. 
The Australian Government wanted to avoid the impression that the only purpose of the 
Colombo Plan was ‘the establishment of a buffer to Communist expansion’, or that recipient 
countries were expected to enter defensive alliances with the West, although these were 
significant motivations.72 Sir Ian Clunies Ross, Chairman of the CSIRO 1949-59, delivered a 
lecture in Adelaide, in which he asked his audience if they would contemplate a larger 
investment in human welfare in other countries if it would make their own future more 
secure, fortifying the world against communism and expanding trade and commerce. His 
presentation indicates that the Australian people would agree to this if the issues were 
presented to them in clear terms. This would see aid shift from philanthropic motives to a 
deliberate tool used in a play for power and political security. 
Some letters to newspapers from the public reflected the realisation that defence and security 
were the primary aims behind gifts of wheat and university training. D. J. Bartels wrote to the 
Sydney Morning Herald: ‘If this laudable scheme is white-anted by…people who only have a 
mean knowledge of what the Colombo Plan is doing, then Australia will be the first nation to 
suffer.’73 He continued, ‘the communistic countries will cash in on this grievous error.’ The 
Melbourne Herald supported this argument, stating that the ‘communists are busy opening 
their coffers’ to the ‘uncommitted peoples of the world.’74 Among very generous donations to 
Asian countries, Denis Warner claimed that ‘in the past month the tiny Kingdom of 
Cambodia has been offered more aid by Communist China than Australia contributes each 
year to all the Asian countries in the Colombo Plan.’75 He pointed out that Australia’s 
security could only be attained with its capacity to defend itself militarily, or ‘by our efforts 
to help create in these same neighbouring countries a standard of living that will make their 
people impervious to Soviet blandishments.’76 Similarly, an editorial in the Argus commented 
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that ‘if we want to make an investment in national security we should forget racial nonsense 
and see how help we can give our Asian neighbours. It will be a sound investment.’77 The 
Melbourne Herald stated that ‘these gestures of goodwill should be made on a spectacular 
basis. They might be costly, but much cheaper than the price of a single air squadron or 
warship.’78 Casey added to this, claiming that most South East Asian political problems were 
fundamentally economic problems.79 He noted that the US, Britain, Canada and New Zealand 
joined Australia in an international effort ‘directed at producing stability and security in the 
area, and that is very much to Australia’s advantage.’80 He highlighted that the burden did not 
rest solely on Australia, but that the country would likely experience the greatest advantages 
because of its geography. 
Not all letters and comments regarding Australian participation in the Colombo Plan were 
from Australians. Japan had joined the programme in 1954, and the Japanese Prime Minister 
Shigeru Yoshida warned that aid to South East Asia as a whole should be increased, or else 
individual countries could fall victim to Chinese communism.81 Chinese economic progress 
was substantial, and Yoshida believed that the influence would be hard to resist. ‘Somewhere, 
somehow,’ he warned, ‘a way must be found to increase this help if these underdeveloped 
areas are to survive in the free world.’82 Dulles, Secretary of State in Washington, agreed. He 
described the vast improvements in infrastructure in China, but at the cost of individual 
liberties and freedom.83 He described how hundreds of thousands of Chinese people died 
during this work, ‘but they are forgotten as the infrastructure remains.’84 This is how 
communism was presented and contrasted with Colombo Plan aid, under which similar 
achievements could be made with a free economy. 
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This period saw a fundamental shift in Australia-Asian relations and foreign policy, with 
issues of economic security overshadowing military threats.85 The pursuit of economic 
interdependence would hopefully take the pressure off military defence. By inviting the 
future political and business leaders of Asia to live and study in Australia, and to train them 
in a way that would increase their individual economic prosperity, international scholarships 
would see economic and personal ties do the work of aggressive defence policies. That is, 
soft power replaced hard power. Newspaper articles and letters show that the Australian 
public were aware of the political, economic and personal aspects of the Plan, and that the 
majority supported the government initiative. 
Ten Years On 
Expansion of the diplomatic service, friendship missions, official visits, radio broadcasts, the 
creation of Australia-Asia associations and the introduction of Asian Studies at universities 
were all included in the diplomatic programme of the 1950s and 1960s. Levi noted that trade 
and investment opportunities were ‘supplemented by a bipartisan good neighbour policy 
which left out no paragraph in the modern text book on the creation of good will among 
nations.’86 Efforts to create cultural ties attested to the success of governmental efforts and 
the open mindedness of the Australian public in their increasing contacts with Asians. 
As new self-governing states were created to the north of Australia, it was vital for the 
Australian people to present an image of themselves as good neighbours, and to quietly 
suppress its history as a coloniser. Walker notes that by the 1960s, the Australian public were 
very concerned about their reputation, but focused more on self-definition.87 The idea was to 
shape opinion of Australia as a favourable trading partner. Australia was defining ‘Australia’ 
to its own people, inasmuch as it projected an image of itself to the world. Politically and 
socially, domestically and internationally, the Menzies Era was important in advancing 
Australia’s reputation. Being good neighbours was an integral part of that definition. 
The Colombo Plan’s 10th annual report surveyed its progress. While it was always noted that 
improvements would not be measured easily, the report does highlight positive developments 
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in all countries. The committee concluded that the most significant achievement ‘could well 
be the awareness growing throughout the area…of the urgent need for more rapid 
development.’88 By 1961, 3,816 scholarships had been awarded, and almost 10,000 privately 
funded students had attended Australian educational institutions. Australian contributions 
were largely Australian made, such as equipment for development projects or gifts of 
commodities that have then been sold to the public to raise funds for local projects. The 
Australian Government sponsored irrigation projects, electricity and thermal power plants, 
transport, communications and broadcasting initiatives. The report was supplemented by the 
more user-friendly booklet The Seed of Freedom (by Osmar White and James Fitzpatrick), 
and the documentary ‘The Builders’, sponsored by the Australian Government. 
By sending machinery made in Australia, local jobs were created. This allowed 
manufacturers to take pride in being part of the development of another country through 
making tractors, medical equipment or tools. Australian nurses, Red Cross workers and 
technical experts who worked in South East Asia also played an important role, imparting the 
Australian way of life. This reflects the idea of development as hope and saviour, and the 
Colombo Plan’s encouragement of individual participation. 
The political benefits and promotion of Western values were always discussed officially. 
Publicity and propaganda were essential components. Seed of Freedom was a user-friendly 
report on different projects within the Plan, and its complementary documentary, ‘The 
Builders’, gives a visual insight into the programme. Each told an important story in relation 
to the audience, purpose, national identity, communication strategies, shared cultural 
experiences and political aims involved in the regional collaborative project. The newspapers 
and Radio Australia were engaged, and person-to-person contact was endorsed. 
Hemisphere 
The magazine Hemisphere was created with the abovementioned cross-cultural 
understanding in mind. The promotion of Australia’s involvement in the Colombo Plan in the 
international and domestic media was vital. As discussed earlier, Australian newspapers, both 
urban and rural, published numerous articles on the Asian students’ activities. A publication 
specific to the needs of the visiting students sent messages to a targeted Asian audience, and 
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the Overseas Planning Committee, formed by Casey in 1955, supported the formation of 
Hemisphere.89 The editorial team often worked with Radio Australia, to provide 
complementary messages. Hemisphere was designed to specifically influence the student 
body, encourage Asian readers and inform Australian audiences. It contained articles on both 
Australia and Asian countries, and covered topics of interest to both groups. It was sponsored 
by the Australian Government and private advertisers. Articles were sourced from Asian 
students, Australian contributors and Asian specialists, providing a shared cultural 
experience.  
The Department of External Affairs discovered that the US already freely provided abundant 
English literature to Asian countries. It was noted that Indonesians did not appreciate these 
beautifully produced shiny brochures, as they resented the implication that they could not 
produce the same standard themselves.90 It was decided that an Australian publication should 
look and feel more like local productions. This would enable the publication to feel familiar, 
boosting readership and thus increasing its publicity value. The target audience would be the 
mainstream public, not just the educated elite. 
Hemisphere’s first editor was journalist C. C. D. Brammall. He wanted the journal to inform 
Asians about Australian culture and other Asian cultures, and he proposed recording student 
activities that would ‘augment mutual understanding and good will…by drawing attention to 
the exchange of ideas…and the cultural contacts…being made.’91 His advisor, Norman 
Bartlett, also realised that many readers might not have a firm command of English or 
Australian culture, and suggested that articles should be written simply.92 He also advised 
Brammall not to make assumptions about level of knowledge, especially of Australia, and to 
remember that to the readers, Australia was a foreign subject. Brammall understood that ‘the 
magazine [did] not desire nor intend to enter the field of controversy, but confined itself to 
furtherance of understanding.’93 It avoided contentious political issues, but noted that ‘there 
was no reason why it should not deal with broad economic interests as well as the purely 
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cultural.’94 This was, in part, to help Hemisphere avoid charges of censorship, and to present 
it as respectable journalism. While the foreign policy aim was clearly a focus, the magazine’s 
political connection was not meant to be obvious. 
In 1958, after the publication of 19 volumes, editor Selwyn Speight conducted a review of 
Hemisphere. Its articles had been criticised as too simple, or read as propaganda, and some 
Asian journalists commented that the style should be more personal. He recommended more 
articles from Asian experts, to balance the contributors. He also noted the amount of Chinese 
and Russian literature which was available in the target Asian countries, and that its 
predominant theme was that the Western world was crumbling, while the Asian peoples 
would ‘march together into a brave new world.’95 This gave Speight an impetus to update the 
content. Publications were available for the Asian public from numerous international 
publishers. Hemisphere was among a number of free publications distributed to students and 
diplomats. Speight understood its potential to explain and win respect for Australia’s outlook 
and policy. He interviewed Asian students in Australia, and found that many had little 
understanding of the historical factors affecting their home county’s economic position. The 
students enjoyed articles on spectacular projects and historical Asian materials. Generally, 
personal stories attracted Asian readers, not ‘dull facts and figures.’96 Speight also proposed 
to pay more attention to student activities, and introduce a letters page. Writing in 1999 about 
post-war Germany, Gienow-Hecht noted a similar tactic in the US-run German newspaper 
Die Neue Zeitung.97 By allowing readers to criticise or comment, a forum for discussion was 
opened that the communist-oriented papers did not have. It provided a freedom of speech 
aspect that was taken for granted in democratic countries. Speight allowed legitimate 
criticism of Australia. Titles such as ‘Australian diplomats do not know enough about Asia’98 
allowed Asians to feel that their voices were heard and respected. 
Speight believed that a key theme for the magazine should be ‘that in the new world taking 
shape, Australia and Asia have common problems.’99 As no other publication took this focus, 
he believed that this would create mutual sympathy. This tactic adds a dimension of cultural 
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diplomacy to the more overt and conscious need for Australian publicity. By relating to the 
problems of Asian countries, and by showing empathy and vulnerability, Speight would use 
Hemisphere to win over the Asian readership. The terminology of cultural diplomacy is 
contemporary, but the objective is not. 
From 1960, Hemisphere promoted Australian policies sympathetically. It was hoped that by 
explaining Australia’s lack of water, some of the reasoning behind a limited migration policy 
could be explained. Articles showing that Australia was proud of its British heritage and yet 
developing a ‘special character of its own’ would show identification with the recently 
independent Asian nations.100 Speight noted that ‘some themes…must obviously be 
developed by implication rather than by direct statement.’101 The editorial team often worked 
with the Radio Australia writers and editors to produce complementary materials, in a 
coordinated programme to deliver a consistent message. 
The advisory committee of Hemisphere met monthly to comment on the previous issue and 
propose suggestions for further issues. They were careful to be balanced and not favour one 
Asian country or culture over another. Speight felt responsible for evaluating the response of 
the Asian audience, researching other Asian magazines and interviewing students who had 
returned to Asia. The editors also realised that as a government publication, it had to balance 
caution with internationally contentious issues and retaining the interest of readers. Speight 
notes that his interviews with students ‘are designed to make [it] clear…that we do welcome 
their opinions.’102 This contrasted with the communist publications available to Asian 
readers. 
The inclusion of advertisements in Hemisphere gave the magazine a ‘more spontaneous, less 
official, flavour.’103 A 1957 special edition includes on its first page an advertisement for 
‘Holden, Australia’s Own Car’, depicting a happy Australian family and their new purchase. 
There is also a prominent advertisement for ‘Angus and Robertson, booksellers, for all your 
fiction, non-fiction and textbook needs’, and the new New South Wales University of 
Technology. These examples promoted Australia as a developed country with a high standard 
of living, possibly something to emulate. 
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The articles included topics such as an Indian scientist returning to India after making his 
name in Australian universities; the role of Radio Australia, its Asian language programmes 
and easy accessibility for Asian audiences; the formation of the Oriental Society of Australia; 
the election of a Malayan student as Student Representative Council (SRC) President; 
Melbourne University Law School’s completion of a Land Code for Brunei; Asian students’ 
revival of badminton as a sport in Australia; the Melbourne Olympic Games; the tin and 
rubber industries in Malaya; Burmese students studying mining techniques in Queensland; 
scientists studying the viability of Ceylonese clay for the production of tiles and bricks; 
Pakistani engineering students studying earth dams; and an Asian student concert in Sydney 
to raise money for an Australian charity. The readers were exposed to the breadth of 
Australian society and culture, as well as the variety of activities available to Asian students. 
In 1964, R. J. Maguire compiled a selection of Hemisphere’s articles. His intent was to distil 
the essence of the magazine. He wrote that ‘it has always been considered that the magazine 
could best fulfil its function by concerning itself with telling Australians about Asia, and 
Asians about Australia, and keeping itself free from national bias.’104 His selection shows that 
the editors were quite successful. Articles stating that Indonesians and Australians have been 
trading since the 16th century added an element of traditional cooperation. Archaeological 
and anthropological studies from throughout Asia highlighted a respect for the ancient (and 
pre-colonial) cultures of Asia, and corresponded to articles on Australian Aborigines. Stories 
exploring Buddhist, Japanese, Pakistani and Australian paintings showed that art transcends 
borders. Articles covering tropical architecture in Malaya, the beauty of Muslim architecture 
in Pakistan and the development of Modernist architecture in Australia equalised the 
countries, while still subtly suggesting Australian progress. 
Topics were designed to show, as Speight had intended, that Asia and Australia all struggled 
with common issues. A story titled ‘The Search for Australian Identity’ followed one called 
‘In search of Indonesian identity.’ Language, literature, poetry, music and philosophy were 
viewed through the lens of multiple countries, highlighting commonality. With the view that 
to most readers, Australians were the foreigners, articles describing the typical Australian 
family, social classes in Australia and urban society aimed to bring a measure of 
understanding to Australian culture. Sharing cultural experiences showed that all peoples 
faced challenges, and that the Colombo Plan community would help each other. As a 
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collaborative project, the camaraderie it fostered contributed to established foreign policy 
aims. In conjunction with the broadcasts of Radio Australia, Hemisphere gave a regional 
focus, and highlighted how Australia was an integral part of Asian development. It is difficult 
to know how many people read the magazine, but approximately 5000 copies were 
distributed each year. Hemisphere was aimed at the Asian audience, whereas The Seed of 
Freedom and ‘The Builders’ were created for the Australian audience. 
 
Figure 4.3: Teaching construction methods105 
The Seed of Freedom 
In 1961, after 10 years of contributing to and refining the Colombo Plan, the Australian 
Government sent prominent journalist Osmar White and photographer James Fitzpatrick on a 
tour of South East Asian countries, to report on progress. Designed as a promotional tour 
rather than an assessment of effectiveness, the pair toured fourteen countries participating in 
the Colombo Plan.106 They were shocked by the poverty they witnessed, the inadequacy of 
institutions and the desolation of the land. They were also ‘disheartened by the waste and 
neglect in Australian-funded projects and equipment’- on discussing their findings with 
Casey he replied that this was not unexpected in Asian countries, and encouraged the 
journalist to ‘emphasise the non-political nature of the aid.’107 
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As the tour progressed, White’s view of the plan improved, and together they reconciled what 
they saw with the aims of the Plan, and produced a short book and documentary of their 
journey. The Seed of Freedom (the booklet) and ‘The Builders’ (the film) were distributed to 
schools, libraries, government staff, community and student groups in Australia. Menzies 
wrote the prologue for the booklet, highlighting that South East Asian nations ‘must chart 
their own paths to progress.’108 The overriding message was that donor nations were not 
attempting to control or influence the political position of the governments or people, but 
were respectful of their sovereignty. He wrote that ‘the impetus that brought them to 
independence is inspiring them to economic and social progress,’ and that this progress was 
respectful of the ‘spiritual heritage built up by Asian civilisations over many centuries.’109 
Menzies set the tone for White’s story, which was that Australia was assisting fellow newly 
independent neighbours, that this was a long-term but not permanent project, and that 
Australia was respectful of the political and social implications of colonialism. 
While White may have seen his role as provider of an impartial assessment, the DEA saw the 
production ‘of good publicity as White’s principal function,’ and in 1960 the DEA funded the 
publication of 70,000 copies.110 In a book produced primarily for Australians, Fitzpatrick and 
White added the human element to the government data.111 White described the purpose of 
the Plan as reconciling ‘proper pride in national sovereignty with the advantages of 
international planning.’112 These newly independent states had rich cultural histories but 
needed to enter international markets in order to feed growing populations. The 
infrastructure, administrative institutions and human knowledge bases of these countries had 
to be developed at an impossible pace. White noted that it would be ‘an empty gesture to 
approve the emergence of Asian nationalism without helping to make Asian nationalism 
economically viable.’113 The former colonial governments, and by extension the 
Commonwealth, had a responsibility to ensure that the underdeveloped nations would 
prosper. 
White clarified the purposes for and reasoning of the Plan to Australian taxpayers, who were 
funding it. He enabled the reader to feel a part of the progress, part of the solution. He 
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described that the ‘causes and symptoms of poverty in South East Asia are as varied as the 
languages, customs, beliefs and skin colours found there’,114 explaining the diversity of the 
assistance. He emphasised that the Plan was not charity, but really ‘hardly more than a 
supplement to local effort’, and it ‘depends on interdependence as well as independence.’115 
This stress on international community and cooperation, and highlighting the efforts of the 
locals, was meant to set the context for the individual stories that followed. 
 
Figure 4.4: New technologies 116 
Farmers in South East Asia and Australia faced many of the same challenges, such as flood, 
drought and a rising salt table. The solutions sought were shown as relevant and logical, such 
as the building of dams, diversion of waterways, desert reclamation and construction of tube 
wells. All of these solutions required hard labour and heavy machinery. Australian farmers 
were encouraged to feel empathy for fellow food producers. Fitzpatrick’s photographs show 
human labour, and that the recipients participated in their development. White highlighted 
that the Plan was more than just of practical benefit, as those receiving modern skills would 
transfer their new knowledge to affecting other beneficial social changes. Sharing the 
experience and the solution enables cultural familiarity and rapport, as well as the objective 
of economic independence. 
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The booklet included pictures of armed soldiers guarding farmers in Burma, camels 
transporting feed for sheep, frontier tribesmen learning to operate tractors, and overcrowded 
tents with people jostling for space with cattle. Sharing normal cultural experiences and 
adding layers of specific foreign problems was a way of allowing Australian readers to 
understand the problems faced by Asian farmers. The farmers were humanised and the 
Australian public came to understand the individual challenges. White and Fitzpatrick 
brought understanding of the Plan’s progress over its decade of operation, and developed 
enthusiasm for continued support. This highlights how shared cultural experiences were used 
as a tool to garner support for a diplomatic programme. 
The poor healthcare situation across Asia was also described in the text. White noted that a 
campaign for hospitals must be part of a wider strategy that included combatting the causes 
of malnutrition, overcrowding, polluted water supplies and poor sanitation.117 Plans to deliver 
clean water where it was needed most, the reduction of bacteria in the Bombay milk supply 
and screening for tuberculosis were steps taken within this wider strategy. White highlighted 
that Australian nurses shared their medical skills and also demonstrated administrative 
systems that allowed the new hospitals to be more effective.118 Australia supplied equipment 
for x-rays as well as washing machines, typewriters, refrigerators, sterilisers and baths. 
Modern stabling for dairy cattle and buffalo, standardisation of prices and production and 
instruction on how to make concrete water pipes were all instrumental in preventing disease 
and supporting new healthcare initiatives. 
Watching a child smile over the luxury of a bowl of clean water prompted White to label 
Pakistan’s water pipeline project a ‘pipeline of hope.’119 The gift of £2,000,000 of wheat to 
the Pakistani Government both staved off famine and allowed the proceeds of the sale to fund 
the construction of water pipes. White also described that the governments of New Zealand, 
Canada and the US contributed to the provision of equipment, raw materials and technical 
knowledge, in order to bring the project to fruition. This highlighted to Australians that the 
burden of assistance did not rest solely on their shoulders—or finances—and that this was a 
project of international importance, in which they played a vital role. Further, Australia was 
helping foster economic stability to its north, and thus securing its borders. 
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Stories in The Seed of Freedom projected education as a seed of future development. Nepali 
chemist Purna Prasad Lamsal, a former Colombo Plan scholarship student to Australia, had 
returned to Nepal with new knowledge to help its government improve its sugar industry. He 
declared: ‘my Government is planning for the future and my years of study in Australia were 
part of the plan.’120 White highlighted the value of the scholarships from an educational, 
technical and social perspective. Lamsal said of his Australian education: ‘I was equipped 
tremendously with knowledge of the sugar industry and my life has been enriched by the 
many good friends made inside and outside the industry.’121 The Seed of Freedom asserted 
that ‘the paramount objective [of the Colombo Plan] is to equip the under-developed nations 
to reach and maintain equality by the skilled exploitation of their own natural resources.’122 
The importance of literacy skills and communications was also emphasised. As the content of 
books became accessible, people became enlightened to modern sciences, replacing primitive 
superstition with logical beliefs and enlightened social codes. Communities exposed to radio 
broadcasts in local languages had already shown signs of social change. It was believed that 
these social changes would help form stable governments, industrial development and a way 
of life beneficial to all citizens. By exchanging knowledge and skills, participants shared 
personal and cultural experiences. As skill sets grew and developed, lives improved. This was 
a vital step towards achieving the policy aims of the Plan. 
Colombo Plan students were important cultural diplomats. They both educated the Australian 
community they lived in and took Australian stories and ideals home. White noted that a high 
proportion of the Plan’s students returned home and took positions as leaders, or were 
involved in assisted productive enterprises. Others brought greater skill to essential routine 
responsibilities, with knowledge of new tools and techniques. That international peace can be 
achieved through transnational understanding and mutual respect between people of different 
cultures was a vital aspect of the Plan, and is a foundation of modern theories of cultural 
diplomacy. Local community groups such as Apex, Rotary and the CWA, combined with 
universities and host families, all influenced these envoys, and became Australian 
ambassadors themselves. White argued that success was ‘measured by the number who 
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complete prescribed courses and by the friendships so many young people from Asia 
continued to have with Australian fellow students, their families and friends.’123 
The Colombo Plan students often contributed to Australian development activities while they 
were studying. One student developed an inoculation technique for pasture plants that 
increased crops in north-western New South Wales; another helped breed pigs suited to 
tropical areas (benefitting both Australia and South East Asia); another made developments 
in the fight against rust in wheat crops. ‘These are merely a few random instances’, White 
noted, citing several other examples of distinction in radiophysics, biochemistry, architecture 
and other fields within Australian universities.124 Australians saw great value for their 
investment, and could appreciate Asian students as individuals. 
The Australian financial contribution over the first 10-year period, according to White, was 
equivalent to six shillings a year per person. This is a tiny amount compared to the benefits it 
brought. The Plan was not designed to be a handout, but rather a seed to be planted. It was 
not to challenge political attitudes, but to foster a sense of independence. The readers were 
informed that while there were stories of waste regarding equipment and materials, the 
importance lay in the fact that donor governments worked with recipient governments on 
holistic, long-term solutions. The Plan was needed precisely because the structures designed 
to minimise waste and increase industrial efficiency were not in place.125 These messages 
were complemented by the short documentary ‘The Builders’. It is important to examine 
these works when trying to understand how the Plan worked as a tool of cultural diplomacy, 
as they focus on personal stories of individual, neighbourhood and national friendships. 
‘The Builders’ 
‘The Builders’126 accompanied The Seed of Freedom. It illuminated the Colombo Plan, 
showed examples of Australia’s contribution and explained that ‘only a generation ago these 
were the far away places’ and that ‘today the world is smaller, there are no faraway places 
anymore.’127 The viewer was told that no-one could afford to ignore their neighbours, ‘or the 
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path they choose to travel’, which served as a reminder that there were security and political 
reasons for the Plan. 
This film showed audiences the before and after visions of how irrigation was the most 
significant issue facing almost every nation that received assistance. The issue was very 
familiar to Australia, and likely to receive the most empathy. Some areas had an abundant 
supply of water that they needed help storing, while others faced drought conditions. 
Australians were familiar with both. The different schemes resonated with the viewers, and 
using this issue as the introduction to the film was a clever way of immediately showing the 
relevance of the struggle, and why Australian technical assistance was valued. It presented a 
shared experience and common human struggles. 
The narration enthused that ‘stronger nations undertook to help the weaker’, placing the 
Australian audience in a superior position, one from which it would have been difficult to 
argue against giving the necessary money for the Plan. Many areas of Asian life would have 
been uncommon to Australians—religion, cuisine, language and political structure—but by 
highlighting the similarities, this documentary provided a cultural link between the donor and 
receiver communities. The subtle message was that it was preferable to make the South and 
South East Asian countries productive and capable of supporting growing populations, thus 
avoiding a mass migration that Australia was ill equipped for. The consequence of ‘700 
million people’ to Australia’s north was repeatedly stressed throughout the film, as well as 
the fact that so often people were hungry. New food production methods that used irrigation, 
fertilisers and mechanical harvesting could feed the increasing population. This was coupled 
with the new roads, railways, airfields and ports required to ship goods for domestic use and 
international trade. These developments would lead to improvements in living standards that 
would, it was hoped, promote political stability in the region. 
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Figure 4.5: Training nurses in modern methods128 
The film showed new, Western style hospitals with staff being trained by Australian nurses, 
including tuberculosis screenings and vaccination programmes and support for victims of 
disease and physical injury. Such hospitals would only be of use to the community when 
nutrition was improved and disease could be controlled. It was as important to have nurses 
and doctors, just as it was to have food technicians, irrigation engineers, road builders, 
administrators, forestry managers, truck drivers and architects. Journalists and teachers were 
especially important to the Plan. All of these professions would contribute to improved 
standards of living. 
Australian technical instructors were sent to trade schools and universities, and worked in the 
field. Teachers supported local staff in schools, teaching English and following a Western 
education system. Narrator Don Crosbie stated that ‘No part of the Colombo Plan is more 
vital than the support it gives to schools’. The ‘builders of tomorrow’ had to be educated by 
modern methods. For those areas in which there were not adequate local facilities, 
scholarships were awarded to bring students to Australian universities. This was Australia’s 
most significant area of contribution. Formal Western education allowed Australia to expose 
Colombo Plan students to Australian culture, whatever the setting. Students who learnt 
English could be influenced by Western propaganda in newspapers, radio broadcasts and 
television programmes. As with The Seed of Freedom, publicity was a motivating force 
behind specific programmes. Plaques and signs were prominently displayed on all donations, 
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with the wording placed within a map of Australia to ensure that even the illiterate 
understood the message. The film showed the plaques at least four times within 30 minutes, 
highlighting Australian generosity. 
 
Figure 4.6: A gift from Australia129 
‘The Builders’ showed all Asian peoples working hard physically. Their homes and manner 
of dress may have appeared primitive and novel to the Western audience. Students and nurses 
were dressed in Western clothing and were shown in Western-style buildings. The film 
contrasted the modern and the traditional, Western and Eastern. The Colombo Plan donors 
were respectful of Eastern cultures, but added the best Western technology to it. For both the 
Australian audience and the Asian recipients of aid, the aim was to show an understanding of 
‘their’ culture and the benefits of ‘ours’. 
Evoking Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, ‘The Builders’ closed with the assertion that Australia 
were helping Asia ‘build this future of freedom’, the freedom to seek understanding and 
tolerance of human differences’, ‘freedom from wants’, ‘freedom to enjoy earned leisure’, 
‘freedom from fear’, ‘freedom to worship’, ‘freedom to rest and be content’, that ‘we and our 
neighbours’ are building these freedoms for all Asian peoples, allowing them to enjoy the 
‘earth’s beauty, the common inheritance of all men.’ This positive ending used inclusive 
language, promoted commonality and reduced Australian fear of 700 million Asians, turning 
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them into a team working together to solve challenges for the benefit of all. It was a subtle 
reminder that the ‘freedoms’ of the first world might be challenged by communism to the 
north, the Colombo Plan’s role in preventing that and reminding the audience of the foreign 
policy aims behind the stories of cultural experience. One benefit of cultural diplomacy 
programmes is the ability to promote political and cultural ideologies, as they allow a long-
term relationship that other forms of diplomacy may not. 
Both the booklet and the film used understandings of Asian and Australian cultures to create 
an aid programme beneficial to both. Only with such a broad programme could the Australian 
Government influence so many people on numerous levels. The provision of transport, 
infrastructure, communication systems and government institutions would affect the nations 
well into the future. The relationship between Australia and Asia was firmly established, and 
whatever political changes might occur in the future, there was a deep cultural understanding 
upon which to base further relations. 
The foreign policy aim of the Colombo Plan was to provide economic and social 
development and stability in South East Asian countries, in an effort to stem the spread of 
communism. The Australian Government established exchange programmes to share skills, 
ideas, knowledge and the Australian way of life. Australians learnt about various South East 
Asian cultures, and this sharing of cultural experiences was a deliberate programme of the 
DEA, in pursuit of foreign policy. While the focus for Australian participation in the 
Colombo Plan was on training, the journal and film highlight the breadth of the programme. 
Summary 
Balancing political aims and immediate needs was a feature for both donor and recipient 
countries. During the first decade of Ceylonese independence, the government and people 
were not concerned with the battles between the West and communism as they were more 
focused on their own immediate domestic needs. Ceylon, like many other Asian countries, 
sought assistance from both the West and the communist countries.130 They participated in 
the aid and development programmes offered by other nations based on their own needs, and 
were not highly affected by the political aims of the donor countries, which was a clever 
balance for them to strike. 
                                                          
130 Wriggins, Ceylon, pp. 414, 457. 
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Cultural diplomacy initiatives can be viewed from multiple perspectives. Money and 
propaganda attempted to win over peoples and governments. Personal relationships were the 
tool that enabled effective and direct communication of ideas and sympathies, with the 
greatest power to affect political influence. South and South East Asian governments were in 
a difficult position, balancing Western and communist objectives, and to show favour to 
either would have suggested a political allegiance. Acceptance of the rights of the states to 
govern themselves, and declaring respect for the independence of the new democratic 
governments, was an important aspect of the Colombo Plan. While bilateral agreements made 
it possible to deal more frequently with some countries than others (for example, Malaya), the 
Australian Government wanted to be seen to encourage all countries within the Plan.  
 
There is an important story in The Seed of Freedom which relates to a journalists’ travel 
through Tibet.131 Travelling in a jeep, they encountered a Hindu man hurrying up the road. 
He asked for a ride to Kathmandu, and while they travelled he entertained with recounting 
tales (through their interpreter). When they asked him why he was in a hurry to get to 
Kathmandu, he replied that he was a very holy person, and that it was his business to 
‘observe the inscrutable ways of God. There was to be an election in Kathmandu and he 
wanted to see democracy working.’132 White commented that a Buddhist monk riding in a 
jeep with Westerners and a democratic election in Nepal highlighted a changing Asia- and 
possibly a shift in political thinking and influence. 
White also noted that there were three simple components to development in South and South 
East Asia. The region possessed rich natural resources that could be exploited by modern 
technology. The locals did not currently possess the equipment or skills to take advantage of 
those resources. And finally, ‘while they remain handicapped by poverty and ignorance they 
will remain disturbed, discontented, and a hazard to peace.’133 It was in the best interests of 
other nations to assist South and South East Asia help themselves out of dire poverty. 
Education and training programmes were vital, and the Australian Government prioritised 
this. 
                                                          
131 White, The Seed of Freedom, p. 31. 
132 ibid. 
133 ibid, p. 7 
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The Colombo Plan treated wellbeing as the priority, with irrigation, health, food production 
and education the key areas to target. While products exported by South and South East 
Asian countries were likely a welcome addition to the market, the states now owned the 
resources, not the former British Empire. As people became empowered and were raised out 
of dire poverty, they were able to control and expand their economies. The exchange of 
people, both to and from Colombo Plan participant countries, opened the way for 
development, aid, trade and growth, which would have been impossible without external 
influences. 
The Colombo Plan exchanges allowed relationships to extend beyond conventional 
boundaries. They necessarily involved professionals, but the most important effects were on 
the ground: the landladies who gained a better understanding of, and sympathy towards, 
South and South East Asia; the villager whose child was cured by an Australian nurse; the 
Australian tractor factory whose business was boosted by the contract for machinery sent 
overseas. In each of these relationships, the intersections, transactions and exchange of ideas 
made this programme such a valuable example of cultural diplomacy. Collaborative projects 
bring greater understandings and benefits than imposed ones, and show that when political 
demands may be made in the future, this common understanding is more likely to receive 
positive acceptance, bringing to mind Lukes’ theories on power and consent to domination. 
As Asian nations participated in development programmes with representatives from donor 
countries, both groups shared cultural experiences and understandings. As the feedback was 
received by the External Affairs Department, projects were adjusted. The published stories 
show that Australia was seen as a good neighbour,134 which was a consistent objective of 
Australian foreign affairs policy. 
The Colombo Plan created a situation in which millions of people were affected by 
Australian culture through soft power enterprises. People are unlikely to forget assistance 
feeding their families or educating their children, and this is why the Plan was an example of 
what today would be called cultural diplomacy. The goodwill that this type of endeavour 
engenders can last for generations. Technical and educational exchange programmes 
anticipated that the relationships formed would positively affect the relations of the nations 
involved, as was seen in the scaffolding story in chapter 1. As an aspect of the diplomatic 
                                                          
134 The restrictive immigration policy was explained as necessary because of the limitations on natural resources 
and infrastructure. 
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programme, the Colombo Plan initiated by Spender, and its maturation under Casey, used 
understandings of culture to create a positive view of Australia around the world. 
Sporadic and inconsistent assessment of the Colombo Plan within official circles resulted in 
undue emphasis on abject failure or glowing success according to Daniel Oakman.135 He 
comments that this tended to obscure any underlying pattern of efficacy. Using this project to 
‘chart a quiet but persistent path through seemingly intractable regional disputes,’ became an 
important feature in Australian diplomacy.136 Oakman explains that the Plan as a whole ‘did 
little to alter the trajectory of South and South East Asia’s economic revolution,’ however it 
did serve to identify Australia separately from Britain and the United States.137  
As the Colombo Plan was being established, another great enterprise of Australian cultural 
experience was being organised. This was a singular event on Australian soil. The Olympic 
Games came to Melbourne in 1956, and were an entirely different way of sharing cultural 
experiences with an international audience and supporting other foreign policy goals. 
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137 Ibid, p. 244, 272, 273 
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So long as a man lives, he has no Greater Glory than what he wins with his feet or his hands 
in the Games. Homer, The Iliad.1 
The Olympic Games is another tool in the cultural diplomacy toolkit. By looking at the 
organisations, media, stories of the participants and political manoeuvring surrounding the 
Games, we can see how governments influence sports, sports influence governments and 
international reputations are established. Governments and corporations can use the Games to 
make a political stand or affect opinions, meaning that sport is part of power/cultural 
diplomacy programmes. This is evident in both the Ancient2 and the Modern Games. 
Boycotts, the Olympic truce, the bid process of hosting and sponsoring the games and other 
organisational aspects have been used to promote political beliefs. The cultural exchange 
integral to the Olympic Games targets foreign policy aims, including tourism and trade, as 
well as the ideals of fair play, sportsmanship, integrity and equality. Sport is commonly used 
for five main political purposes: as a vehicle for propaganda, to promote nationalism, as a 
vehicle for change and as a socialising agent.3 The advertising of political ideologies, the 
increase (or decrease) of national reputations, the joining together of millions of people in a 
common enterprise, the initiation of a shift in social norms or perspectives and the inclusion 
of people in one aim will all be discussed in this study of the 1956 Melbourne Games, and the 
events leading to it. 
Sports hold an important place in Australian society. To be ‘sporting’ is to be generous, 
honourable, decent, honest, even-handed and fair. These are the qualities expected from 
sports: the organisation, rules, participants, spectators and supporters. Governments who 
involve themselves in sports both associate themselves with these qualities and position 
themselves for scrutiny along these same criteria. To hold or participate in an event such as 
the Olympic Games, governments are held to these high principles.4 In examining the 1956 
Games, it is evident that the Australian Government was conscious of this obligation, and 
presented a nation that complied with the Olympic ideal. The Games were deliberately used 
to promote a national objective, which was the projection of Australia as a ‘good sport’, a fair 
and honest player and a skilful team.  
                                                          
1 As seen in David C. Young, A Brief History of the Olympic Games, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 7. 
2 In this chapter, Ancient refers to the period of the Olympic Games, 776 BCE to 384 CE. 
3 Unnamed author, British Library, ‘The Bloody Olympics Down Under—Sport, Politics and the 1956 
Melbourne Games’, Sport & Society: The Summer Olympics and Paralympics Through the Lens of Social 
Science, www.bl.uk.sportandsociety  
4 This is the idealised goal, in modern tenders much is made of the corruption and underhand deals made as the 
commercial and political benefits of hosting the games is great. 
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This chapter will explore why sport is an important cultural phenomenon, and how it has 
been used by governments. The history of the Olympic Games will illuminate the power of 
participation in the ancient tradition. Discussion of the Melbourne Games follows, with a 
focus on why they were important as a tool of cultural diplomacy. Sports are a shared cultural 
experience as language barriers are eliminated and the rules universal. The Olympic Games’ 
long history of political involvement means they are ideal for inclusion in cultural diplomacy 
programmes. Generations have been exposed to the ideals of the Games and the cultural 
integration that goes with them. All nations are invited to attend. The Games are held in a 
different city every four years, so the spectacle is accessible to audiences worldwide, and the 
Games’ ideology of international competition and mutual respect and understanding are 
visible. 
Sport Matters 
Sport is extremely important because it can help encourage fundamental values among 
young people…So sportsmen [sic] have a responsibility: they must make of sport an 
occasion for meeting and dialogue, beyond any barriers of language, race and culture.5 
These are the words of Pope John Paul II, in a call for sports to be used as a tool to promote 
understanding and peace. Sports permit participation regardless of language, race, religion, 
financial status, gender or age. Participation comes in various forms: as players, umpires, 
coaches, supporters, spectators, club members, commentators and reporters, organising 
committees, fundraising groups, caterers and even governments. Sports are part of most 
societies, from a group of five-year-olds participating in a Saturday-morning Little Athletics 
meeting, to international sporting festivals such as the Olympic Games. J. A. Mangan, Boria 
Majumdar and Mark Dyreson claim that for many, ‘sport has replaced religion as a source of 
catharsis and spiritual passion.’6 The appeal and values sport brings to an individual can be 
likened to religious worship. As the Olympics evolved as a festival to celebrate religious 
worship, the link is not surprising. 
                                                          
5 Quote of Pope John Paul II, found in Roger Levermore, ‘Sport’s Role in Constructing the “Inter-state” 
Worldview,’ pp. 16–30, in Roger Levermore & Adrian Budd, Sport and International Relations: An Emerging 
Relationship, New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 27. 
6 J. A. Mangan, Boria Majumdar & Mark Dyreson, ‘Foreword’, in Steven J. Jackson & Stephen Haigh (eds.), 
Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World,  New York, Routledge, 2009, p. vii. 
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Sport is often among the earliest childhood memories, so infiltrates national and personal 
characters. A family picnic at the horse races, sitting on dad’s shoulders to watch football, 
running in a race and being cheered on by your parents and friendly rivalries at school 
swimming sports are common experiences for Australian children. Sport builds enthusiasm 
and loyalty, enables bonding with others, facilitates team membership, helps form alliances 
and promotes fantasies of participation. Some of the most famous Australians are 
sportspeople, and arenas have become international travel icons. Don Bradman and Pharlap 
are two of Australia’s most important exports. Sport is part of Australian culture, with the 
‘great outdoors’ and fabulous beaches prompting engagement in sporting activity. Such 
experiences are shared by people across the world, although the form that sport takes differs.7 
Roger Levermore and Adrian Budd edited a collection of essays that highlight the 
relationship that sport has with international relations.8 While this is a recent compilation, the 
theory is as relevant to the 1956 Olympic Games and even earlier sporting competitions. 
Levermore and Budd consider that while sport does not provide an answer to understanding 
international relations, it provides an access point to understanding.9 
Sport is accessible to almost all people. Rules are universal and game-specific; acceptance of 
these rules is often the only qualification for participation. Nelson Mandela observed that 
‘sport is probably the most effective means of communication in the modern world, 
bypassing both verbal and written communication and reaching directly out to billions of 
people worldwide.’10 The rules of the game are applicable to and accessible by all 
participants, regardless of nation, gender, language or religion. As a means of 
communication, they can be manipulated by event organisers, especially when on the scale of 
the Olympics. 
Over the last century and a half, sport has developed into a rule-bound, competitive affair. 
Barbara Keys has noted that where there was once a ‘rich diversity of traditional games and 
                                                          
7 It has been well documented that industrialised nations are more likely to focus resources on sports. See Joseph 
Maguire, ‘The Social Construction and Impact of Champions,’ pp. 142–156, in Ramón Spaaij, The Social 
Impact of Sport: Cross Cultural Perspectives, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 144. 
8 Levermore & Budd, ‘Sport and International Relations,’ pp. 6–15 
9 ibid. 
10 Peter J. Beck, ‘The Most Effective Means of Communication in the Modern World? British Sport and 
National Prestige,’ pp. 77–92, in Levermore & Budd, Sport and International Relations, p. 77. 
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contests based on varied body cultures…modern sport now occupies a near monopoly.’11 
Modern sport developed out of the quantification and standardisation of games. Participation 
focused on creating a concrete, measurable result. The modern world demands more of sports 
than just athletic participation; it also involves venues and organisation of events and 
participation in international tournaments. Sport has become big business, and international 
reputations revolve around the skills and success of hosting such events. Keys states that 
during the 1920s and 1930s, sport ‘became a mass phenomenon throughout Europe.’12 A 
heightened concern for physical fitness and public health sparked government funding for 
physical activity programmes, and as spectatorship grew, stadiums followed. She adds that 
‘like music, art, film, and other forms of culture, sport joined the repertoire of traditional 
diplomacy in the 1920s’ when governments promoted international competitions ‘as a way of 
publicizing national cultural achievements.’13 As sport offered a universal standard of 
achievement, victories ‘became a barometer of a nation’s overall power and prestige.’14 
Performance could produce a measurable result, just as export sales could. Politicians realised 
that international sporting competition ‘had much greater visibility than other forms of 
cultural propaganda’, with millions already following international soccer by the 1930s.15 
Membership of an international sporting organisation supposes submission to the dictates of a 
global authority, and an acceptance of the philosophical and moral values that accompany 
modern sport. Keys explains that particularly during the Cold War, entry to the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) ‘became a portal to international recognition and legitimacy for 
new nations.’16 Socialism, communism and capitalism have all been claimed as the reason for 
an athlete’s success. International sporting contests provide an arena for the ‘direct 
comparison of athletes representing different societies,’17 by spectators who understand the 
common rules of the sport. Conversely, the rules of culture may differ.18 Those who play 
unfairly tend to be marked as villains, as do athletes who bring political enmity to the contest, 
or those who seek an unfair advantage. The hero is the athlete who succeeds honestly despite 
                                                          
11 Barbara Keys, ‘The Internationalization of Sport, 1890-1939,’ pp. 201–219, in Frank A. Ninkovich & Liping 
Bu (eds.), The Cultural Turn: Essays in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, Chicago, Imprint Publications, 
2001, p. 201. 
12 ibid, p. 208. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16 ibid, p. 209 
17 Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin & Andrew Strenk, Sport and International Relations, Champaign, Illinois, 
Stipes Publishing, 1978, p. v 
18 ibid. 
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challenges. Fair play, which is not often met in other areas of life, is essential in the sporting 
arena. By capturing all of these ideals and ideologies for a limited time, audiences are able to 
judge the heroes and villains of the international arena by the behaviour of their athletes. 
Spectators become targets for deliberate ideological comparison, and are the target of 
propaganda.19 
International people-to-people relationships are encouraged by sports, and are a forum for 
introducing cultures to the masses. Steven J. Jackson and Stephen Haigh claim that sport is 
perhaps the only endeavour in which labourers are ‘recruited as citizens specifically for their 
short-term potential to enhance the nation’s international standing.’20 The trend of importing 
players from other nations or states highlights the universality of sport,21 and some players 
have been granted citizenship purely on the basis of their agreement to play a sport for a 
particular team.  
Modern media is full of sports reporting, commentary and debate, reflecting the influence 
that sport has on society. Records of the ancient world also portray sporting contests with a 
similar level of social significance. The Ancient Greeks decorated vases and bowls showing 
athletes in action, Homer wrote of athletic contests in his poetry, and the popularity of 
athletic sculptures prove the importance of sporting contests. Nowadays, supporters wear 
scarves in team colours, pin up posters of players and watch matches from their lounge or the 
stadium. Hosting an international event or supporting a popular team can immediately sway 
an audience towards, or away from, a particular nation, depending on the team’s behaviour 
and perception as heroes or villains. 
Athletes have become icons that transcend national boundaries. They are often glamorous, 
wealthy, healthy and deified.22 Nations employ individuals and teams as symbols of political 
and cultural supremacy. The example of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games highlights this, as 
does the Melbourne Games. The ability of sport to capture the popular imagination, to infuse 
a common commitment in the outcome of a contest and to provide a mutual dialogue are all 
important. A national team is seen as a representative for the nation, and its behaviour can 
turn the event into a political statement. These events can promote ideologies. If the team 
                                                          
19 Lowe, et al., Sport and International Relations, p. v 
20 Steven J. Jackson & Stephen Haigh, ‘Between and Beyond Politics: Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing 
World,’ pp. 1–10, in Jackson & Haigh (eds.), Sport and Foreign Policy, p. 3. 
21 Levermore, ‘Sport’s Role,’ p. 27. 
22 J. A. Mangan et al., ‘Foreword.’ 
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displays unsporting behaviour, the nation can be tainted. Joseph Maguire has written that 
national champions are used to promote the values and status of a nation, and to foster what 
he calls ‘soft diplomacy.’23 He explains that sports offer a symbolic dialogue: there are strict 
requirements regarding how the dialogue is conducted (the rules), which involve a ‘dramatic 
representation of who we are and who we would like to be.’24 Sport’s rules and codes of play 
allow for a fair contest and a true test of ability, which is not the case in other areas of social 
life. In real life, class, race, gender and religion ‘interfere and rig the game of social life and 
its outcomes.’25 International sporting competitions are seen to level the playing field. 
Spectator sports are dramatic displays for the entertainment of the audience, and as in all 
dramas there are heroes and villains. 
1.1.2 Sport as Cultural Diplomacy 
Australian public records are light in the political motivations for the Olympic Games, 
questioning the objectives behind the Melbourne Games as part of a cultural diplomacy 
program. From the United States, however, the journal of Diplomatic History, highlights 
many examples of the use of sports as an avenue for cultural diplomacy focusing on the 
1970s. Sports as cultural diplomacy are more complex to plan, as the private stakeholders are 
often very powerful and influential in their own right. As with investigating aid as a form of 
cultural diplomacy, the stakeholders here are likely to be international organisations and not 
controllable by any one nation or political ideology. 
The introduction of the journal volume advises ‘sport, as a social phenomenon, cannot be 
contained by the narratives set out by politics and diplomacy,’ so while political agencies are 
aware of the potential for ‘both generating and thwarting goodwill,’ they cannot set the rules 
of the games, nor how the participants could act or be used for other motives. As the 
examples in the journal show, ‘sport provides another valuable window onto the changing 
position of the united States within the international flux,’ and how ‘by accident or design, 
public and private authorities tried to make use of its potential in alliance-building, image-
making, and norm-transcending ways.’26 
                                                          
23 Maguire, ‘The Social Construction,’ p. 154 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
26 Hallvard Notaker, Giles Scott-smith, and David J. Snyder, ‘Sport diplomacy forum introduction,’ pp. 807-
809, in Diplomatic History, Vol 40, No 5, Nov 2016, Oxford university Press, North Carolina, p. 809 
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Anne M. Blaschke writes ‘Olympians had affected U.S. foreign policy since 1945. As 
celebrities and cultural politicians, athletes compelled presidential administrations to consider 
their power to cast abroad positive impressions of the United States. Presidents fostered 
connections with athletes who supported their agendas, and avoided contact with Olympians 
they disliked.’27 She notes that President Ford’s administration ‘depended on multiracial 
athletes, male and female, to communicate nuances in foreign policy.’28  
In a commentary of the case studies looking at sports as avenues for cultural diplomacy, 
Mario Del Pero writes ‘the relevance of sport as a medium of cultural diplomacy,’ and ‘the 
function of sport as an instrument of patriotic mobilisation or, even, national identity 
building,’ cannot be denied.29 Often private interest drives these sporting events, and 
politicians and diplomats make use of them. The Olympic Games is driven by private 
stakeholders. He notes that huge imbalances in documentary evidence can often leave these 
stories imbalanced, and stimulate questions of the opposing viewpoint. This does not negate 
the importance of studying sport in relation to cultural diplomacy, but highlights that more 
work should be done to challenge the current limitations of the scholarship.  
Ekecheiria: The Olympic Truce 
Whether we consider the asceticism of training, the ideal of balanced personality, the sense 
of justice implicit in obedience to rules, or the brotherhood of classes, races and peoples 
evinced on the field in spectator sport, these major ethical values are sustained in our 
modern civilization by sport more than by anything else. I know of no social, ideological or 
intellectual movement able to bring home the gamut of these basic values so directly to the 
young, to every class and, overcoming political barriers and differences of race and 
language, to all peoples of the world.30 
Here, Renè Maheu—French philosopher, Professor of History and Director General of 
UNESCO 1962-74—acknowledges that there is nothing like sport to bring together diverse 
people under one goal. The reputations of individuals, teams, states and nations are all 
dependent on one game, race or tournament. 
                                                          
27 Anne M. Blaschke, “Running the Cold War: Gender, Race, and Track in cultural Diplomacy, 1955-1975,’ pp 
856-844 in Diplomatic History, vol 40, No 5, Nov 2016, oxford university Press, North Carolina, p. 826 
28 ibid 
29 Mario Del Pero, ‘Commentary,’ in Diplomatic History, Vol 40, No 5, Nov 2016, Oxford University Press, 
North Carolina, p. 885 
30 As seen in Jennifer Hargreaves, Sport, Culture and Ideology, Volume 4 of Routledge Library Editions Sports 
Studies, Routledge, NY, 2014, p. 56. 
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The Ancient Olympic Games were considered ‘struggles’ rather than ‘sports’. The nucleus 
and mainstay of the Modern Olympics—track and field sports—arose from a conscious 
imitation of Ancient Greek practices. Children naturally compete over who can run the fastest 
or throw a stone the furthest, ‘but the Greeks differed from other ancient…cultures in making 
resolutions to these questions a serious activity for grown men.’31 David C. Young has 
explained that many features of modern culture have evolved from the Ancient Greeks—such 
as drama, democracy and medicine—‘yet it seemed that we have revived no other Greek 
institution’ besides the Games.32 Modern societies have revived the need to measure and 
celebrate athletic achievement. The Games are such a high international priority that it is an 
honour to host and participate in the event. 
Victory at the Ancient Games was highly valued. The most powerful states in the ancient 
world believed that an Olympic victory brought great honour to the State, ‘therefore a 
conqueror usually had immunities and privileges conferred upon him by fellow citizens.’33 
Records of the winners of the short foot race were kept. The Games were, to the Greeks, a 
tribute to the god Zeus, and were held since 776 BCE. The Romans banned the games in 426 
of the Common Era (CE) in an effort to stamp out paganism. When the proposal of a revival 
was presented to the Greek Foreign Minister in 1856, he replied that athletics was simply not 
done in the modern world.34 At the time, athletics was not practiced anywhere. While some 
Greeks were keen to revive the Games, it was Englishman W. P. Brookes who held a 
successful revival of the Games in Athens in 1859.35 Though these did not continue in Greece 
for various reasons, Brookes eventually organised a ‘National Olympic Games’ in London in 
1866, which attracted 10,000 spectators. 
In 1870, the Greeks tried again, excavating the Panathenaic Stadium and attracting 30,000 
spectators. Both amateur and professional athletes competed. After numerous meetings, 
deliberations, rejections and considerable persistence, the international Olympic Games were 
held in 1896, and were an ‘astonishing success.’36 Brooks’ efforts show that sports were 
hugely popular with citizens, but it took a while for governments and organisers to see their 
                                                          
31 Young, A Brief History, p. 4, 
32 ibid, p. 138 
33 Keith Donald & Don Selth, Olympic Saga: The Track and Field Story, Melbourne 1956, Sydney, Futurian 
Press, 1957, p. 17. 
34 Young, A Brief History, p. 142 
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alternative uses in soft power and diplomacy. Once they did, they were happy to provide 
resources and to encourage international sporting events. Pierre de Coubertin is said to be the 
founder of the Modern Olympic Games.37 As an educator, he believed that the competition 
might inspire both patriotism and peaceful internationalism, and that athletes would 
participate both for ‘the glory of their country’ and ‘develop a mutual understanding’ that 
could be an ‘indirect factor in securing universal peace.’38 At a keynote address to the first 
Modern Games, de Coubertin announced that ‘it is important that we should preserve in sport 
those characteristics of nobility and chivalry which have distinguished it in the past, in order 
to contribute to the education of peoples of today.’39 These ideals of mutual understanding 
and universal peace remained relevant to (and beyond) Melbourne at the 1956 Games. 
The organisers of the Modern Games had the example of the Ancient Games to follow. The 
prototypes of modern sporting arenas are the stadiums and hippodromes of Ancient Greece. 
Many followed the pattern of Greek theatres, with seating cut out of the hillside.40 The arenas 
were designed for the ‘pursuit of human excellence.’41 The stadiums for all successive Games 
reflected the original arena for the pursuit of human excellence, linking all Games (and 
sporting contests) together. The ancient and modern stadiums are tourist attractions that link 
the present to the past, help provide an anchor for the future and provide a reference to a 
cultural experience that people can share, regardless of language or political persuasion. 
Integral to the Ancient Games was the concept of ekecheiria, or the Olympic truce. This was 
the time either side of the Games in which competitors and visitors ‘were to be granted safe 
passage to and from Olympia.’42 This did not mean that wars stopped, but does suggest that 
the Games held at least equal status to political conflicts. In modern times, the ideals of the 
Olympic truce have inspired ceasefires in war-torn areas, allowing aid workers to help 
civilians.43 Spaaij argued that the truce ‘reminds us of the power of idealism and its capacity 
                                                          
37 Young notes there were really five men instrumental in this task. ibid, p. 157. 
38 Keys, ‘The Internationalization of Sport,’ p. 207. 
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to inspire a new generation at a time of diminishing confidence in political institutions.’44 The 
Olympic Games is a gathering of people from almost every country in the world, not of 
political leaders or commercial giants, but of young men and women, people who take home 
an appreciation for the achievements of their equals across the world. 
There is no official point scoring system in the Olympic Games. Baron de Coubertin’s dictum 
was that the Games be revived so that the ‘spirit of international comity should be advanced 
by chivalrous and peaceful contests.’45 While certain countries or individuals have gained 
reputations for being successful in certain sports, the spirit of the competition is the focus. To 
be able to participate in the Games and to be a member of the IOC, a nation must accept the 
principles associated with it, including ‘universalism and equality of opportunity under the 
conditions of competition.’46 All participating nations have had to satisfy the committee that 
they adhere to these ideologies, and will put this to the test when the spotlight is on the 
athletes- participation and adherence to these ideologies is now a part of the international 
political power play of the participating nations, and in its own way, highlights the countries 
who might choose not to participate. In 1956 Melbourne, and by extension Australia, claimed 
these ideologies as part of its culture. 
The Olympic Games are a sporting event that encourages the exchange of cultures and 
cultural experiences. As it is an international event and often backed by significant 
government funding, it must also meet some political objectives. The principles of the 
Olympic ideal have had some interesting manifestations in the history of the Modern 
Games.47 The 1936 Olympic Games held in Berlin are the most important in understanding 
the power of sport as a cultural experience deliberately and obviously designed to promote a 
policy ideal. That the Nazi regime could so easily tap into the ancient philosophy of the 
Games and alter the ways that people thought about sport is reflective of the power of the 
Games as an ideal and the possibilities of using this forum to promote a political ideology and 
state a claim for power in the international arena. Treated as a glorification of the physical, 
the ‘belief in the centrality of struggle’ was prioritised in the Berlin Games. The ‘anti-
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intellectual’ sporting contest provided a forum for asserting power on an international stage.48 
The Nazi’s efficiency and flagrant politicisation of Olympic ideals led not only to the 
Nazification of the Olympics, it also saw Nazi ideology ‘sportified,’49 with sports being given 
the essence of Nazi ideology. 
The Berlin Games introduced the torch relay, which is now an integral part of the Olympics. 
‘[A]s a way of linking this event to the glory and prestige of classical Greece,’50 the German 
organising committee decided to relay the Olympic flame from Olympia to Berlin. Carl 
Diem, principal organiser of the 1936 Olympics, combined the metaphor of ‘passing the 
torch’ of traditions from one event to another with the actual Olympic flame that had burned 
throughout the 1928 Amsterdam Games.51 Diem was inspired to use the flame from the 
original site of the Ancient Games and literally bring it to Berlin. This innovation brought the 
power of the symbol to the Modern Games, drew attention to the Games before they began 
and legitimised the Modern Olympics by linking it with the Ancient Games. It highlighted 
the connection of the Nazi regime to the glorification of discipline, the ‘struggle’ that was the 
impetus for the first Games and made a clear link to a glorious and powerful ancient 
civilisation. Its prime success lay in the fact that the relay has only increased in importance 
for all subsequent Games, and is a persistent symbol of German innovation, thought and 
influence- one of those examples of power being most effective when least observable.52 
Using ancient history to anchor the future is often done by international exhibitions, and is an 
effective way of legitimising ideas. German efficiency and organisation has become almost a 
brand, it has become so successful and well-known. Hosting an event such as the Olympics 
cements national qualities in international history. The torch relay is a modern tradition, and 
the Modern Games would not be the same without it. The foreign policy objective of 
marketing German culture to an international audience was achieved. 
Citius, Altius, Fortius 
The Olympic Games are held every four years, and assemble sportspeople from many nations 
in fair and equal competition, under conditions that are as near perfect as possible. No 
                                                          
48 Keys, ‘The Internationalization of Sport,’ p. 212. 
49 ibid. 
50 Marcus Marsden, Carrying the Torch; 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, Fitzroy, Marsden Publishing, p. x. 
51 Young, A Brief History, p. 167. 
52 Lukes, Power: A Radical View, p. 1 
Pitching Australia 
125 
discrimination is allowed against any country or person on the grounds of colour, religion or 
politics.53 This is the edict of the IOC, a group formed at the beginning of the Modern 
Olympic Movement, designed to regulate and promote the competition. 
Australia’s ‘extravagant addiction to sport’54 is part of a reputation earned through countless 
international sporting events, many hosted in Australia, and culminating in hosting the 
Melbourne Games. Bruce Howard described the Melbourne Olympics as a ‘birthday party to 
celebrate the coming of age of our nation’, ‘the world on parade’ and ‘the biggest shop 
window in the world.’55 Writing in 1956, Howard relayed the excitement felt by participants. 
The prestige associated with hosting a successful international sporting event was no doubt as 
important to the organisers as the athletics themselves. Only 10 years after the end of World 
War Two, Australians were still recovering and rebuilding- economically and emotionally. 
Food rationing and material shortages contrasted with developments in new technologies; 
these were the first games in which television would play a role. Howard highlights the 
power of sport as a unifier through recounting a story of the lack of ‘national’ concern of the 
German cyclists, for when the German bicycles were damaged the Australian team loaned 
them theirs without hesitation to ensure the German team to continue competing.56  
Television was introduced to Australia just in time for the 1956 Games. People often 
crowded around television shop windows to watch news broadcasts at that time, as few 
owned their own sets. The time delay in shipping film to international audiences 
unfortunately reduced the visual impact of the Games to international audiences. However, 
film is a useful resource for looking back at crowd reactions and commentary of the Games. 
Olympic Glory: The Golden Years suggests that very few people were interested in the 
nationality of the athletes, as athletic skill was paramount.57 Venues filled, even when no 
Australian was participating. The film shows the end of the marathon, and the athletes who 
had finished clapped and encouraged others. 
The 1956 Games were not free from international controversy, and the organising committee 
had to deal with political intrusions. The Olympics was used by some nations to make 
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ideological comments and highlight political allegiances. This was the first Games at which 
countries chose not to send athletes in order to make a stand on political issues. Seven 
countries boycotted the Games over three different issues, demonstrating the connection 
between sport and politics.58 One such incident involved the US retracting funding for the 
Aswan Dam in July 1956, which was being constructed at Egypt. In response, the Egyptian 
Government nationalised the Suez Canal, restricting international use. French and British 
politicians understood it to be significant to their shipping trade, and fearing the loss of this 
route, planned to invade Egypt. The Israeli Government made similar plans, invading Egypt 
on October 29, 1956.59 Menzies had led negotiations with the Egyptian Government earlier in 
the year. Among other things, the episode resulted in Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq boycotting the 
Melbourne Olympics.60  
Other international troubles also affected the Games. Political enmity between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Chinese in Taiwan intensified. Disputes over state legitimacy cost 
thousands of lives, and no resolution was in sight. When the Peoples Republic of China learnt 
that the Taiwanese (Republic of China) planned to send a team to the Melbourne Games, the 
former withdrew. Conflict in Europe also led to countries making a political stand through 
sports.  
The third political issue which cause a boycott of the Melbourne Games involved Eastern 
Europe. The Hungarian Revolution was sparked when students unhappy with the communist 
regime called for a democratic government and the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Hungary. The students brought down a statue of Stalin, and the Soviet forces imposed martial 
law. In November 1956, just before the Games opened, Soviet troops seized control of 
Budapest and deposed the government. While athletes from both Hungary and Russia 
participated—as they had been en route when fighting began—Spain, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands did not send their athletes, in order to protest the Soviet response. 
The Games themselves were not the place to conduct political struggles. This is reflected in 
the reaction of the crowd to and the commentary on a water polo match between Hungary and 
Russia, known as the ‘blood in the water’ match.61 Many competing athletes were concerned 
                                                          
58 Uncredited author, British Library, ‘The Bloody Olympics.’ 
59 Which, it later emerged, was with active encouragement and agreement from the British and French 
governments.  
60 ibid. This is an extremely simplified version of the incident. 
61 Olympic Glory. This is the match referred to in the interview with Raymond Smee, Chapter 1. 
Pitching Australia 
127 
about their families back home. Violence erupted in the pool. As this was filmed, the match 
commentary referred to the political struggles. Five players were evicted and the police called 
to intervene. There was a ‘frenzy of protest’62 by the crowd. Whatever the crowd thought of 
the political conflict, they did not consider that this was the place to air grievances. The 
narrator states that this was ‘violent proof that if war was the extension of politics by other 
means, then sport, despite the Olympic ideal, can be the extension of war by other means.’63 
 
Figure 5.1: The ‘blood in the water’ water polo match between Hungary and Russia64 
Only some of these political issues had a negative impression. Generally, participation in the 
Olympics sends a positive foreign policy message of friendly international competition and 
participation. The Melbourne Games were the first since World War One which saw East and 
West Germany compete as one. This was considered a positive and progressive move, but it 
did not last.65 
The Melbourne Games made Olympic history with an important change to the closing 
ceremony. On the suggestion of Chinese Australian student John Ian Wing, the organising 
committee encouraged the athletes to march together as one body, regardless of nationality, 
in ‘a fiesta of friendship’66 and celebration of universal participation. ‘This action became a 
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symbol of international unity,’67 and was a fitting end to the Games. As President of the 
Melbourne Games, Menzies commented on the change in proceedings. He wrote that on the 
first day of the Games, athletes marched as competitors, preserving their national identity, but 
‘on the last day they went around the arena as men and women who had learned to be 
friends.’68 
Living, eating and competing together helped break down some barriers of language and 
prejudice. The crises faced by athletes were made more real to other athletes and spectators. 
Newspapers reported the international events with a heightened significance, as people from 
those nations read the papers, stayed in the city and visited the pubs, shops and beaches. 
Melburnians and visitors were shocked into a collision of sympathies and antipathies. People 
from across the world had come together in a forum in which they faced the struggles of 
people that they might never normally consider. These face-to-face interactions made the 
issues more real and the solutions a global and personal concern. Using the Games to 
promote a political ideal, display unity or show solidarity was a way of establishing the issues 
in international history. It solidified the political climate and position of nations; brought 
public awareness to issues and consolidated nations’ positions. The boycotts linked with the 
Suez crisis, the Hungarian Revolution, and the dispute between China and Taiwan, along 
with the celebration of athletic unity at the closing ceremony, are inextricably connected to 
the mid-20th century, Melbourne and the international significance of the Olympic Games. 
The linkage of sport, war and politics recalls the Olympic truce, the glorification of the 
‘struggle’, the encouragement of athletics as a way of ensuring that nations have healthy 
potential soldiers at the ready, and the maintains the reputation of ‘great sportsmen as 
peaceful warriors.’69 The efforts to re-unite Germany and the closing ceremony celebration 
that united all athletes regardless of nationality further established the link. When sport is 
linked to politics, it becomes a tool of cultural diplomacy. Melbourne has always been a 
sporting city, and modern cultural diplomacy agendas clearly state that sports diplomacy is a 
priority.70 In hosting the Games, Melbourne—and Australia—were establishing an 
international reputation as hosts of premier sporting events. The country was able to promote 
the ideals of competence and fair play, teamwork and athletic prowess. These are the kinds of 
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ideals that are difficult for diplomats to address, so need an inclusive cultural diplomacy 
programme to achieve. 
The Friendly Games 
The bid for the Melbourne Games had been officially announced in 1946, when the Victorian 
Olympic Council decided to pursue enquiries about holding the Games in Melbourne.71 
Community leaders including Sir Frank Beaurepaire72 (businessman and former Olympian), 
Sir Keith Murdoch (newspaper magnate), Sir Harold Luxton (retailer, former city councillor 
and IOC delegate), Premier John Cain Senior, Sir Raymond Connolly (Lord Mayor and 
businessman), Edgar Tanner (ex-Olympian and former prisoner of war) and Kent Hughes 
(AIF veteran and ex-Olympian) were all involved in the bid process. They flew to London 
with hampers of Australian produce to lobby delegates still enduring food rationing at home. 
The delegation had commissioned a 13-minute film of Melbourne’s attractions to accompany 
their presentation at the IOC meeting in Rome in 1949. This was as unique as the 
accompanying gifts of food hampers, and would have made them stand out. Their proposal 
was accompanied by the signatures and support of leading Melbourne citizens who 
represented various sectors.73 This allowed Melbourne to promote its status as a profitable 
and successful entity capable of hosting a large international event. Davison states that the 
bid for the Games was a ‘bid for international recognition […and] also a bid by the city’s 
new business elite for social recognition.’74 The city and its supporters entered the world 
stage. In putting itself forward as the host of such an event, Melbourne was inviting the 
spotlight and scrutiny of the international audience. Geographical distance insulated 
Melbourne from any significant recognition and criticism from US and British journalists, 
although by mid-century, the speed of travel and introduction of new technologies was 
closing the gap. Simon Plant considered that at this time, Melburnians had begun to look 
outward ‘for broader definitions of themselves’,75 confirming Davidson’s assertion that the 
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nation Australia was to become was ‘fashioned as much by our desire to please others…as it 
is by the desire to please ourselves.’76 
The Games provided a focus for a visual and cultural turning point that symbolised a social 
shift. The Olympic Games symbolically drew a line ‘between the grey austerities of post-war 
life and a brighter, prosperous and more modern future.’77 Victorian verandas were stripped 
from buildings in the name of modernisation, and Melbourne’s streets were festooned with 
bunting.78 Local and major daily newspapers carried stories about the Games, the Olympic 
Village, the expected tourist influx and other general preparations.79 The Australian Women’s 
Weekly ran an article stating that ‘Melbourne goes gay’ with festivities. Shop displays were 
designed to entice visitors and houses wore Olympic colours, to ‘dispel forever the legend the 
Melbourne is a grey city, of dull dignity and extreme conservatism.’80 A dance was held at 
the traditionally men-only Melbourne Club, bands played continuously and music and arts 
festivals held. Private homes accommodating international visitors were spruced up, with one 
resident installing ramps when she learnt that her international guest was wheelchair-bound.81 
The famous Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG) was chosen as the main stadium, and was 
given a significant upgrade to make it suitable for an international audience. A triple deck 
stand would increase the spectator capacity by half again.82 New dressing rooms and medical 
facilities made participation easier for athletes and other users, and a new cafeteria and bar 
made the space more attractive to visitors. Following the design of ancient stadiums, 
Melbourne brought its facilities into the 20th century. The Olympic Village was constructed 
in Heidelberg, a ‘desolate tract of land’ north of Melbourne.83 This was an innovative concept 
for the Olympics, and making the athletes feel welcome and comfortable was meant to allow 
contestants to give their best performances. Commandant of the Olympic Village, Philip 
Miskin, noted that it was a matter of national and international importance, as: 
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we are to be hosts to the young men and young women of about seventy nations, without 
distinction of race, colour, politics, and creed. We have to provide their accommodation and 
training facilities and their performance will depend on the quality of what we provide.84 
Miskin was conscious that food and living conditions be the very best, as ‘when they 
[international visitors] leave us, we want them all to be good ambassadors for Australia.’85 At 
an estimated cost of £2 million, the Victorian Housing Commission worked with the Olympic 
organising committee to provide comfortable accommodation for guests and a functional 
neighbourhood. This allowed the public, who would occupy the houses in the future, to 
become a part of Olympic history. 
On 5 November, 1956, the flame was lit at a ceremony in Olympia, and the torch began its 
long journey to Melbourne.86 The final runner was to arrive at the MCG at exactly 4.33 pm. 
The organisers estimated a mile run of between six and seven minutes for over 3000 
Australian runners, who followed 350 Greek runners carry the flame, which was symbolic of 
the link between the Ancient and Modern Games.87 
 
Figure 5.2: Ron Clarke lighting the cauldron88 
The greatest quantity of archival resources regarding the Melbourne Games relate the 
concerns of the organising committee of the Games which ranged from the installation of 
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showers at sporting stadiums, landscaping, replacement of an electric sub-station, supply of 
flood lighting, dredging of lakes and construction of grandstands, to feeding athletes with 
strict dietary requirements. They also had to build sporting facilities that would service 
Victorians well after the Games ended. Funded by the Commonwealth and State 
Governments and the Melbourne City Council, each sub-committee had to maximise the 
results of their projects. These political bodies all recognised a range of political, economic 
and other non-sporting benefits that could arise from hosting the Games.89 From early in the 
discussions, it was argued that the Games could be used to develop tourism, generate income 
through ticket sales and be an opportunity to gain national and international prestige and 
attract global visibility. 
Melbourne newspapers announced to the public that the city would be the host of the 1956 
Olympic Games as early as 1950, and advised the city to begin preparations.90 Menzies 
confirmed Federal support of the event with an offer of financial support. Recognising that 
the ‘Commonwealth was interested in the success of the games,’ the Federal Government was 
pleased to be involved in discussions with the organising committee.91 Former serviceman, 
Deputy Premier of Victoria and Olympian, Federal Minister Kent Hughes, was appointed 
Chairman of the Organising Committee, brokering a relationship between the 
Commonwealth, State and local governments. Lieutenant General William Bridgeford 
returned to public service to take up the post of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Games. 
The organising committee established smaller sub-committees to look after each area. 
Finance, building and publicity were the busiest of these, and their records show the 
complexity of hosting the Games. 
The building sub-committee was concerned with providing world-class venues, within 
budget, that would be useful to the city after the Games. The MCG was chosen as the main 
stadium, but as this was already a well-used and valued institution, the Games organisers had 
to consider the needs of the existing users. Olympic Park became a new centre for various 
sports, with the construction of an indoor swimming and diving pool, a new velodrome and a 
soccer field.92 The nearby Exhibition Building (completed for the 1880 international 
exhibition) was used for wrestling and weightlifting. The organisers went further afield for 
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other sports: the road cycling race was held around the suburb of Broadmeadows, clay pigeon 
shooting at Laverton and other shooting events at Williamstown. Port Phillip Bay saw the 
yachting events and Lake Wendouree in Ballarat hosted the rowing and canoeing. In this 
way, the organisers used some existing resources, ensured more Victorians would be 
involved in the Games, spread resources across City Councils and allowed visitors to see 
more of the State. 
The Press and Publicity sub-committee of the organising committee was formed in May 
1955.93 Commercial Consultants, a division of J. Walter Thompson, offered to act for the 
committee free of charge. At various times the sub-committee was joined by representatives 
of each of the major newspapers and press associations, the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission (ABC), the Australian National Travel Association and banking groups. As the 
Games were a short-term project, it made sense to use existing organisations, their staff, 
infrastructure and equipment. The Australian Army Signals Branch and the Australian Post 
Office supplied invaluable assistance.94 At the first meeting of the new sub-committee, the 
Managing Director of the Australian National Publicity Association suggested that the 
planning of an international publicity campaign should be ‘on a selective basis to reach the 
people most likely to be interested in coming to Australia for the Games.’95 The twin aims 
were to impress the international audience that the Games would be well-organised, and to 
generate local enthusiasm. The Managing Editor of Australia United Press expressed ‘that the 
first job was to advise on facilities necessary for local and overseas press.’96 It was early 
recognised that the world press would play a vital role in promoting the Games and 
Melbourne, and the rules of the IOC provided that adequate arrangements be made.97 The 
international publicity of the Games would affect attendance as well as future visitors and 
investors. 
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One of the most significant concerns of the organisers was the accommodation of ‘pressmen,’ 
especially international reporters, with an understanding that these journalists could make or 
break the international interpretation of these Games. Concerns included the suitable supply 
of work desks, provision of clocks showing international time zones, stenographers, 
transportation and ensuring that cafés and bars would be open around the clock. Reserved 
seating for sporting events had to be placed around the stadium, to give journalists full 
coverage, and good access to ‘finish line’ seats had to be available.98 Coca-Cola ran their own 
publicity campaign in conjunction with the Games, constantly servicing the 1000-strong press 
contingent by supplying them with cold soft drinks.99 
 
Figure 5.3: The press room at the MCG, 23 November 1956100 
Members of the Australian Journalists Association met visiting press at the airport, and 
guided them to the Press Administration Office and various arenas.101 The professional 
network allowed the Australian journalists to present a positive environment so that the 
visiting journalists could promote Australia and the Melbourne Games. The writers had an 
ideal circumstance in which to explore cultural exchanges and tell stories that would affect 
audiences. While there were political pressures upon editorial teams, journalists also 
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commented on the political reasons for the boycotts, thus highlighting a link between cultural 
experience and foreign policy. These reporters had a unique position- while local press would 
highlight successes to the local audience, the international reporters would tell of 
Melbourne’s rise to modernity, its attractiveness to investors, its stability, security, 
allegiances, and could either rise or dash the city’s hopes to be one to the major players as an 
international centre for business and influence. 
The organising committee had been supplied with the ‘Postal and Telecommunications 
Facilities’ report from the 1952 Helsinki Games.102 This noted that both the 1948 London and 
1952 Helsinki Games were underequipped with cabling and wiring, which was frustrating for 
the press, and the Melbourne committee used this information to provide adequate facilities. 
It was highlighted that ‘apart from any other consideration, the national prestige abroad will 
depend to a very great extent on the nature of press and radio reports,’ and that failing to 
adequately accommodate the press would have ‘unfortunate results.’103 Journalists had 
become an essential feature of international sporting events—almost as important as the 
athletes themselves. The publicity efforts of the Press and Publicity sub-committee were 
assisted by a large number of self-styled correspondents in those recently arrived European 
migrants to Melbourne.104 They appointed themselves Olympic correspondents for European 
journals, and provided valuable commentary to an international audience. This group of 
journalists understood the cultural expectations of their audiences, so were more informative 
and entertaining. 
Financial constraints necessitated a careful publicity programme. A poster campaign was 
considered an ‘indulgence’, but adding ‘strips’ to existing billboards was acceptable, 
‘provided no charge was made for the hire of hoardings.’105 As airlines and box office agents 
promoted their package deals, the Olympic organisers were relieved of this cost and 
obligation. The committee did not seek advertisements in theatres or on trains, but did 
encourage advertisers to mention any Olympic involvement. The co-ordinators of the new 
Moomba Festival106 incorporated an Olympic Games float, providing yet more free 
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advertising. They encouraged journals which already had international distribution to include 
Olympic stories- articles were prepared for Australia Today, the Rotarian International 
magazine and the journals of the Lions Organisation, the Melbourne Harbour Trust and the 
Australia America Association.107 This highlights the wide reach aimed for by the sub-
committee, and the astute ways that they used existing entities to extend their budget. 
The sub-committee hoped to convince manufacturers to add logos to their products, at their 
own cost. They suggested firms incorporate wording such as ‘We supplied competitors 
with… for the Helsinki Olympics’108 in their own advertising campaigns. The Education 
Department added the Games into their programmes, and the requests the organising 
committee received for educational materials attest to the popularity of this programme with 
teachers. The sub-committee aimed for saturation of the Olympic message: ‘It is more 
essential to get people talking Olympics, faced with the words “Olympic Games” wherever 
they turn.’109 Radio interviews with Olympic athletes on commercial radio stations prior to 
the Games were considered an ‘important factor in stimulating public interest.’110 Half-
minute announcements with a fanfare preceded news bulletins, and broadcast in various 
languages. Commercial stations were encouraged to provide similar celebratory 
announcements.111 Amalgamated Wireless (Australia) Limited recorded Olympic messages 
for commercial stations and recorded the opening ceremonies- they offered materials, 
services and staff without charge, with the Olympic organising committee only responsible 
for distribution costs.112 Radio Australia, while being a cultural diplomacy-style programme 
in its own right, used its resources to promote other projects to the regional audience. It 
produced a series of six half-hour sessions to be aired weekly, under the title ‘Olympic 
Games: A look through the program.’113 This was sent to partners in Singapore, Sarawak, the 
Philippines, British North Borneo, Hong Kong, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan and the US. 
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Interviews with various Olympic athletes, past and present, were included within the 
broadcaster’s regular sporting programmes.114 
Commercial televising of sporting events was a new phenomenon at the time, and the press 
sub-committee decided to prioritise the information media in order to ‘give the Melbourne 
Games the fullest publicity throughout the world’115 rather than enter into a profitmaking 
contract. While this move has been criticised as a missed publicity opportunity, it must be 
remembered that protocols had not been established for the committee. Their decision 
confirms the focus on the Games as an athletic and international celebration, rather than an 
opportunity for monetary or commercial gain. 
All visitors to Australia were seen as potential ambassadors, so the organising committee and 
the Press and Publicity sub-committee paid special attention to their needs. A ‘Pocket 
Compendium’ was produced as a publicity handout.116 The committee supplied over 65,000 
copies to airlines, travel agents, tourist bureaus, the New Zealand High Commission, 
American Express, news agencies in London, New York, Paris, Tokyo, Cologne, Lausanne, 
Rome, South Africa and the Hague. The booklet described Melbourne as a ‘busy seaport and 
industrial metropolis’, ‘an important financial and trading centre’ and ‘a modern, well-
planned city of 150,000 people.’117 The city had a reputation for friendliness and quality 
theatres, hotels, restaurants, art galleries, libraries, electric railways and (impressively) 230 
square miles of suburbs.118 The Olympic Games provided an opportunity for Australia to 
build a carefully coordinated advertising campaign, sending images of Australia to domestic 
and international audiences. 
Australian airline Qantas was a Games ambassador, agreeing to hand every outgoing 
passenger an Olympic envelope that contained a booklet on the Games and a personal letter 
from General Bridgeford, asking them to act as unofficial spokespeople for the Games.119 
The Press and Publicity sub- committee recruited the public as international PR personnel, 
acting as the ‘citizen diplomat’, a contentious issue in cultural diplomacy theory that 
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highlights the role of citizens in the cultural diplomacy process. As the people of Melbourne 
and its suburbs mixed with visitors in restaurants, trains and trams, the development of the 
Australian ‘Olympic conscious’ became a diplomatic tool, supporting the theme of the 
Friendly Games, and promoting Australian culture. 
As the first Games held in the Southern Hemisphere, the Melbourne Games shifted the focus 
to the Asia Pacific region.120 The journal Pacific Neighbours commented that interest in the 
Melbourne Games is ‘particularly high in the countries of South-East Asia.’121 The lower cost 
of sending an Olympic team from South East Asia to Australia would undoubtedly affect the 
size of Asian teams- with a predicted six-fold increase on the Helsinki teams according to 
Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador to the United States.122 Pacific Neighbours proposed 
that this would grow an ‘enthusiasm for sport generally and for the ideals of amateurism will 
be spread more widely among the youth of Asia.’123 The Melbourne Games were the first to 
bring together a ‘more even cross section of the Olympic world,’124 giving greater 
opportunity than any Games before for the youth of different cultures to mingle freely. This 
opened up the audience, and Radio Australia broadcast interviews and almost instantaneous 
event results to Asian listeners.125 
A 1955 article in the Argus supported the use of sport in encouraging friendships with 
Australia’s Asian neighbours,126 and referred to Baron de Coubertin’s aim of bringing the 
youth of the world together for the benefit of the world. Journalist Ken Moses encouraged 
engagement with Asian athletes, and noted that some had formidable sporting skills, often in 
areas that Australia did not typically excel in. He highlighted the existing exchange of 
sportspeople, and ended with the assertion that ‘goodwill fostered with neighbors [sic] who 
could prove very handy friends, could never be estimated in cold cash.’127 Such media 
coverage shows that the public was aware of the diplomatic benefits of positive face-to-face 
interactions, and that sports were a valid forum for connections. The Melbourne Games 
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coincided with Australia’s increased presence in South and South East Asia through the 
Colombo Plan, Radio Australia and other media, and it is likely that this contact amplified 
excitement for the Games in the region. 
Another important area in which the Games encouraged cultures to mingle freely and to get 
to know one another was the Olympic Village. Housed in this £2 million housing project 
were six thousand athletes.128 Shared facilities encouraged athletes to socialise. The 
communal aspect had been appreciated by athletes at the 1952 Helsinki Games, with John 
Treloar commenting that ‘at meal times we were able not only to indulge in marvellous food 
but to fraternise with athletes from every corner of the world…which enabled us to appreciate 
fully the ideals of Baron de Coubertin.’129 
 
Figure 5.4: Olympic Village scene130 
Marvellous Melbourne 
As the Duke of Edinburgh announced ‘I declare open the Olympic Games of Melbourne 
celebrating the sixteenth Olympiad of the Modern Era,’ thousands of pigeons were released 
into the air. Symbolically, the birds were ‘winged messengers carrying to the world the 
message that the peace of Ekecheiria…had descended on Olympia.’131 Reporters noted that 
the crowd cheered all athletes and all nations, with no hint of partisanship. A milk bar near 
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the MCG became a miniature UN, as members of international teams bought drinks there.132 
Melbourne has always been a sporting city. The Melbourne Cricket Club was founded in 
1845, only 10 years after the city itself.133 By the 1950s, crowds of 100,000 at sporting events 
were not uncommon. The city was presented to the international media, and to the rest of 
Australia, as the sporting capital. It is in this context that both international and domestic 
audiences came to understand the Australian culture- should the Games be a success, then 
Australia would consolidate a position as one of the centres of influence and its standing in 
the international political community. 
Prior to the Games, the sporting community in Melbourne sorely lacked world-class 
venues.134 Hosting of the Games encouraged the Federal Government to invest in sporting 
venues for Victoria, ‘elevate Melbourne to world city status,’135 and attract tourists. There 
was considerable negative debate around investing such a significant sum of money in the 
Games when there was a dire housing shortage in the city, and the organising committee 
cleverly combined the proposed athlete’s village with a public housing project, which was 
partly funded by the State housing department. 
As an opportunity to stake a claim in the world tourist trade, the Games were a valuable event 
for the hospitality industry. Newspapers announced that ‘staging the Games in Australia 
should certainly put us on the tourist map.’136 Concerns arose that ‘nothing could do us more 
harm than to disappoint our visitors after undertaking to play host at the 1956 Games.’137 
Anxiety over inadequate hotel facilities and early public bar closing times due to local laws 
was often expressed in the newspapers, as Melburnians anticipated international scrutiny. 
Such statements reinforced the importance of the opportunity that Australia and Melbourne 
had: to use the 16 days of the Games to increase and establish an international reputation as a 
modern, cosmopolitan city and meet policy objectives.  
In ‘Welcoming the World,’ Graeme Davison discussed the challenges facing Melbourne in 
hosting such a prominent international sporting event as the Olympic Games. He highlights 
that particularly in mid part of the 20th Century Melbourne ‘exemplified the Fordist paradigm 
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or urban growth- high investment in manufacturing … high levels of immigration, high levels 
of home ownership and high levels of government intervention in the provision of 
infrastructure.’138 Melbourne had become the ‘main beach-head’ of American influence, and 
the leading centre of modernist innovation in art, architecture and design.139 The Olympic 
Games would be a chance to show this off to the world. 
The games were ‘pivotal to the process of self-definition,’ and there were two factions eager 
to present Melbourne at its best. One faction, ‘entrepreneurial, futuristic and international’ in 
outlook was led by Sir Frank Beaurepaire, and the other, led by Sir Kent Hughes, was the 
‘official guardian of the Olympic spirit [and] were more militaristic, traditional and imperial.’ 
What the world would think of Melbourne was of primary concern, and was a ‘powerful 
weapon in the hands of local modernisers,’ who pointed out that simple washbasins and 
linoleum floors in hotels would be an embarrassment to American visitors who were used to 
central heating and prompt room service. The imagined foreign visitor had shifted from the 
English gentleman to the American expert, and Melbourne had to shift to keep up with these 
new expectations. 
Davison notes that the Opening Ceremony program presents this juxtaposition of Melbourne, 
highlighting American style supermarkets and drive ins, ‘an ideally English roses and 
lavender setting of home and garden,’ the Grecian glory of the Shrine of Remembrance, and 
the ‘city of the future’ whose great buildings of ‘steel and concrete, bronze and glass’ would 
dominate the landscape. 
International media coverage of the Games was disappointing, even by standards of the day- 
Melbourne had sought the Games in order to impress the rest of the world, but as Douglas 
Wilkie observes, ‘it is now clear that what the world may gain from adjusting itself to 
Melbourne is nothing compared with Melbourne’s gain from adjusting itself to the world.’140 
Davison has also written of the ‘imaginary grandstand’ to which Melbourne was performing 
as hosts of the Olympics.141 The imaginary grandstand is the audience to which Australia 
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promoted its culture and identity, and was more for the benefit of the participants than the 
audience. During the 1950s and 60s, it was important for Australians to create something 
with which they could identify and belong. Performing to this grandstand allowed them to 
create a cohesive message. One of the most important messages was that Australia was a 
nation of superior sportspeople. Early in the Australian story, cricket test matches ‘were 
much more than a trial of strength between rival teams; they were also a test of colonial 
character.’142 They allowed strength, resolution, cooperation and other desirable traits to be 
proven to an audience. That audience was occasionally international—the Ashes being the 
most famous such forum—but the audience was more often Australian. The spectators saw 
the teamwork, commitment, endurance and sportspersonship, especially of the Australian 
teams, and extend the values to all Australians and Australian actions in international politics. 
The focus on the Australian audience was highlighted by the decision not to undertake 
overseas advertising campaigns for the Games. Supporting Davison’s theories on the 
imaginary grandstand, local publicity was aimed to promote ‘awareness of the international 
significance of the Games among the Australian public.’143 Internationally, the Australian 
News and Information Bureau and the Australian National Overseas Information Service 
worked with the local Olympic organising committee to ensure the highest publicity for 
Melbourne and the Games. They were attended by an estimated 100,000 spectators. Due to 
distance and expense, few private visitors were expected, although the organising committee 
did try to ensure that hotels and private accommodation met international standards. The 
eagerness of individuals to be part of the venture confirmed that the Australian public wanted 
to be included in this event. They wanted their hospitality to be recognised by the world, as 
well by as their neighbours. 
Published guides pointed out important sights for visitors to the city: parks, bridges, gardens, 
historic houses, the Shrine of Remembrance, Captain Cook’s Cottage, the Melbourne trams, 
St. Kilda Beach, the Dandenong Ranges, Healesville Sanctuary, Phillip Island and the 
mountains of Warburton.144 While international visitors were encouraged to explore 
surrounding areas, it is more likely that these guides were intended for local readers, as a 
reminder that Melbourne is as culturally significant and naturally beautiful as anywhere in the 
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world. This encouraged the locals to feel part of the great nation that was being promoted, 
and provided proof of the message to visitors. 
Just before the Games began, the Argus published some international articles showing local 
readers what the world was reading about Melbourne.145 Nat Fleischer from America’s Ring 
magazine was ‘much impressed with the cordiality of the people’ he met in Melbourne, 
noting that ‘nothing has been left undone to please visitors, the competing athletes and the 
army of newspapermen from all parts of the world.’146 The push for American visitors was 
assisted by the reports of Rose, sports correspondent for the American Associated Press, who 
commented that ‘[a]n American feels right at home here’ and that ‘the town is sports 
crazy.’147 An image was created of Melbourne as a fitting host. 
The menus of Melbourne restaurants started to offer exotic dishes from America, France, 
Holland, Hawaii, India, Indonesia, Italy, Poland, Russia and Sweden.148 Newspaper reviewers 
noted restaurants’ international flair, providing advertising along with confirmation that 
international visitors and local migrants fully approved the offerings. Dancing and tea 
ceremony customs were enjoyed, thus leading to the sharing of cultures. By using chopsticks, 
eating unfamiliar foods and participating in customs that appeared glamorous, Melburnians 
could experience other cultures and be reminded of their own culture, which they proudly 
advertised. The enthusiasm of Melbourne’s participation in this spectacle speaks to the ideas 
of Davison’s international grandstand: that the people displayed their cosmopolitan and 
modern selves as much for themselves as for an international audience. The city exhibited the 
best of its culture, in an effort to meet the foreign policy aims of increasing tourism, inviting 
trade and presenting a world-class city. 
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Figure 5.5: Myers Store decorated for Melbourne Olympic Games, Bourke Street, 
Melbourne, 1956149 
Following World War Two, ‘the Olympic ideal took on a new meaning, especially for those 
athletes who had survived combat and the degradation of POW [prisoner of war] camps.’150 
The Games important in providing a forum for patriotic virtues and encouraging a 
community of physically and mentally strong individuals ready to defend their country. This 
was coupled with the heightened need for cultural understanding. The organising committee 
noted that the financial outlay for the Games was insignificant ‘compared with the dividend 
in goodwill,’ not just in sports, but also notoriety, ‘in the hearts of men and 
women...everywhere.’151 Several of the staff of the committee were ex-service personnel, and 
this projected a level of military precision and discipline to these Games, as skills obtained in 
war created something positive. As noted by the Ancient Greeks, the Games were a form of 
‘struggle’ or ‘combat’, but one that they could be proud of competing in. Once the ‘struggles’ 
were over, all competitors celebrated their participation in a show of international 
comradeship. 
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Summary 
International sporting events are so important to societies because they provide a forum in 
which to present how things should be. An even contest with clear rules and boundaries, 
indisputable judgement and success based on effort and skill combine to create a transparent 
display of meritocracy. ‘Villains’, or anyone who tries to fool the crowd or play unfairly, are 
scorned, ostracised and stripped of their rewards in a way that often does not happen in other 
areas of life. While hosting and participating in an international sporting event is of 
significance in itself, it is the perceptions of the host, the athletes and spectators representing 
the host nation, which are shared with the world which can have longer lasting effects on the 
international political arena. Behaviours, attitudes and the spirit of fairness and good 
sportsmanship shown on the field are often associated with a country’s political spirit too.152 
This lifts a simple sporting event to the level of international power play.  
Sport has the potential to convey many messages, allows an examination of dominant power 
structures and questioning of inter-state world views.153 It exposes young people to 
international governments and the complexities of international organisational bodies. 
International power struggles saw the Ancient Games cancelled. The Modern Games have 
suffered almost from their inception from international political disagreements. International 
conflicts have determined the participation of some nations’ athletes, and spectators with no 
interest in political or foreign affairs are drawn into conflicts when their favourite athletes or 
sports are involved. The 1956 Melbourne Olympics were styled as the ‘Friendly Games’ 
because this was the image of the sporting event and the nation as a whole that was projected. 
The cultural experience mirrored the political objective of welcoming visitors and traders and 
establishing an international reputation. 
International sporting festivals are a meeting place where ‘prejudice and ignorance could be 
overcome’ and an understanding of other cultures achieved.154 Ramón Spaaij wrote that such 
events were an opportunity for international understanding, where global human solidarity 
could be promoted. The Melbourne Games, and especially the closing ceremony, proved this 
point. The Friendly Games were hosted in the friendly nation. Davison explained that ‘part of 
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the attraction of international sport is that it provides a test of national prowess rather less 
lethal than armed combat.’155 In the 20th century, sport became ‘an almost universal language 
of national identity’ and nations now look to their ‘sportspeople rather than their soldiers and 
businessmen to defend their honour.’156 National representation, Davison explained, is ‘a 
question of both patriotism and national promotion.’157 This was as relevant to the 1956 
audience as it is today. Sportspeople are aware that they represent a nation, and in the absence 
of war, sport is the forum for demonstrating physical prowess, where ‘faster, higher, stronger’ 
is combined with a strict code. To place such an importance on the business of sport is to 
confer upon it a status that is tied up with international politics and diplomacy. 
As an international event on home soil, the Olympic Games allowed Melbourne the chance to 
present Australian culture. The domestic and international media portrayed a city ripe for 
tourism and trade, a city that was optimistically recovering from the challenges of war and 
swiftly becoming a modern metropolis; this was exactly the message that the Government 
hoped the Games would send. The DEA continued to organise and promote successful 
international events, both at home and abroad. Creative art and performance tours, along with 
Royal and celebrity visits, continued to display Australian culture through the following 
decade. Ten years later, Australia was again preparing a cultural presentation for an 
international exhibition: Expo 67 in Montreal. The following chapter looks at international 
exhibitions, the Australian Pavilion and shows yet another aspect of government activities 
that focused on highlighting the national culture in support of foreign policies. Australian 
culture had to be chosen, boxed and shipped to foreign shores, so the challenge became how 
Australia would be packaged. 
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Figure 5.6: Olympic athletes march together during the closing ceremony of the 
Melbourne Olympics, MCG, 1956158 
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Expositions are the timekeepers of progress. They record the world’s advancement. They 
stimulate the energy, enterprise and intellect of the people and quicken human genius. They 
go into the home. They broaden and brighten the daily life of the people. They open mighty 
store houses of information to the student. Every exposition, great or small, has helped this 
onward step.1 
These words were spoken by US President William McKinley in 1901. Before television, the 
internet or air travel, World’s Fairs or International Exhibitions were the culmination of 
advancements in knowledge, technology and progress. Organising exhibitions was expensive, 
displaying at one was logistically challenging, and attending required an effort in travel and 
economics. Nevertheless, corporations and governments were eager to organise such fairs,2 
and the public flocked to attend. As collaborative events, with organisers from various 
countries and cultures involved, organisational success required working together. 
When Australia presented at the Great Exhibition in London in 1851, the contribution was ‘a 
motley collection of uncoordinated items’ representing the small colony of Van Diemen’s 
Land.3 Kate Darian-Smith notes that from these modest beginnings, Australia embraced the 
international exhibition as a marketing tool for trade, migration and tourism, and used 
international displays to ‘define us to ourselves, as citizens of Australia and of the world.’4 
Expositions, or expos, are a forum for a global audience to share multiple and varied cultural 
experiences in a limited time. Governments want to highlight progress, resources and 
ideology as well as improve tourism and trade opportunities. As a cultural diplomacy activity, 
modern expos allow for the portrayal of a carefully chosen national identity- and a chance to 
shift or challenge impressions of power in the global theatre. The following discussion of 
international exhibitions—a study of the Universal and International Exhibition in Montreal 
1967, and Australian participation—will explore commonalities between this forum and ideas 
of cultural diplomacy. It will be demonstrated that international exhibitions are a valid tool 
for cultural diplomacy programmes, through analysis of the effects of such displays in 
context with cultural diplomacy theory, and their effectiveness in promoting national identity. 
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The word ‘fair’ derives from the Latin feria, holy day. In a discussion of early World’s Fairs 
in the US, Robert W. Rydell claimed that they resembled ‘religious celebrations in their 
emphasis on symbols and ritualistic behaviour.’5 The ritual affirmed fairgoers’ faith in the 
institutions and social organisation displayed. Rydell explained that fairs were so influential 
because of the social status of the organisers and sponsors, and that ‘intellectual leaders 
offered these ideas as the proper interpretation of social and political reality.’6 As these fairs 
became part of the national story, attending them and collecting souvenirs became a way for 
the public to belong to a greater entity, and to be part of the creation of political and social 
development. Rydell explained that historically, the World’s Fairs were arenas for the 
assertion of moral authority, but that displays of military exhibits suggested that there was 
force to back up these ideals.7 While pavilion descriptions for Montreal’s Expo ’67 do not 
mention military might, they certainly celebrate technological advances during the space 
race, in agricultural machinery, and in media technology. This machinery, rather than 
weaponry, could be seen as the ‘hard power’ that supported the softer power of cultural 
ideals. 
Exhibitions are full of symbolism, and displays are chosen carefully. Katherine Smits and 
Alix Jansen explain that exhibit criteria included items that ‘suggest a grounded and 
legitimized past, and an enduring future for technological prowess.’8 They claim this is 
‘explicit in the concept of nation branding’ and ‘reflects the marriage of nationalism and 
corporate promotion.’9 It is important for the nation and its commercial enterprises to 
establish a historical story that will ground them and place them in context, while advertising 
their longevity and prospects for the future. Other nations and corporations will thus be 
encouraged to enter relationships based on both trust and hope. This cultural exchange is an 
important aspect of diplomacy. International exhibitions allow a forum for cultural 
understanding, which can be used as a basis for diplomatic programmes. 
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Exhibitions as Diplomacy 
World Fairs and International Exhibitions have been studied from the perspective of their 
architecture, spectacle, trade and tourism advantages, connections with memory and 
challenges of international image. This study will look at these aspects as well as focusing on 
cultural representations and understandings of Expo 67, in order to examine Australian 
deployment of what is now called cultural diplomacy. International expos are designed as 
public spectacles. They are celebrations of nations, peoples and cultures, and are a spotlight 
on time and space, representative of humanity’s story. Museum curator David Anderson has 
explained that expos convey ‘the culture, hopes and desires of people of the era, and the 
political voices of nations.’10 The combination of people and cultures in an international 
display, at a specific moment, make them an ideal case study of cultural diplomacy. 
The earliest exhibitions were organised for educational purposes.11 In the largely illiterate 
society of industrial northern England, mechanics’ institutes and artisans’ schools employed 
the principle of learning by observation, to display progress and innovation. As literacy 
increased, so did the method and scope of such exhibitions, leading to the Great Exhibition in 
London in 1851.12 This is often considered to be the beginning of the modern expo, and was 
the first exhibition that invited the participation of other nations.13 
International exhibitions are not concerned so much with trade than with the representation of 
culture.14 Numerous countries are invited to present a pavilion, a miniature ‘world’ in which 
to display themselves. The guides and programmes highlight the architecture, art, technology, 
leisure, food, music and people that comprise a country’s character. Moreover, visitors are 
encapsulated in the atmosphere of a country’s story within the pavilion. Representations are 
highly contrived and deliberately designed. Details are agonised over, from the nature of the 
external building to the mannerisms of the staff, all designed to present a cultural story. 
Organisers of such events seek the participation of all nations, and the success of the Expo is 
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14 Davison, ‘Festivals of Nationhood,’ p. 158. 
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generally based on both the ‘quality and quantity’ of the participants.15 National governments 
are involved, and this effectively turns the display into an exercise in diplomacy, thus 
creating an expectation that other governments will respond. Maurice Roche described expos 
as ‘mega-events,’ and discusses their importance as key elements in official versions of 
public culture.16 He argued that they allow understanding of ‘structure, change and agency in 
modern society,’17 and can help pinpoint the interpretation of culture in a specific time and 
place. 
Inspiration 
Even with eyes protected by the green spectacles Dorothy and her friends were at first 
dazzled by the brilliancy of the wonderful City. The streets were lined with beautiful houses 
all built of green marble and studded everywhere with emeralds. They walked over a 
pavement of the same green marble, and where the blocks were joined together were rows 
of emeralds, set closely and glittering in the brightness of the sun.18 
When the World’s Fair of 1893 opened in Chicago, author L. Frank Baum was amazed. 
Electric streetlights made the buildings ‘sparkle like diamonds,’ and the world’s first Ferris 
wheel and prototype motion picture camera all fed his imagination. The ‘spirit and substance’ 
of the World Fair found their way into his novel, The Wizard of Oz.19 Baum thought that the 
white city—built of wood and painted to look like marble—was a fabulous fake. He saw both 
the grand illusion and the impermanence, and noted them as important lessons. He recognised 
the magic of technology in film, photography and electricity, and wondered how he could use 
this in his own work. Baum was fascinated by the world and constantly sought inspiration. 
Attending a World’s Fair, a place in which marvels were focused and on display, was a time 
of intense inspiration. The Emerald City in Oz was inspired by the White City in Chicago. 
While this is the most famous example of a World’s Fair inspiring an author, it confirms the 
value of the events as fora for cultural exchange, and the breadth of the audience that can be 
reached. 
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Sharing cultural experiences, food, costume, trade, innovation, knowledge, ideas and heritage 
helps visitors understand their place in the world, and to appreciate the cultures of others. 
There are few fora in which so many cultural experiences can be shared in such a short time, 
with so little effort. The purposes of trade and the promotion of political aims (relationship-
building, reputation) underlie the displays, and clever choices for a nations presentation can 
tell a clear message about a nation. Extra benefits of hosting such expos can be improved 
infrastructure, innovative architecture and increased tourism.  
International expos are essentially a cultural display, and can be viewed like a museum. Once 
inside the miniaturised world, visitors are guided to experience the world in a specific 
context. Michel Foucault defined this situation as a ‘heterotopia’, a place in which ‘all other 
real sites that can be found within the culture are simultaneously represented, contested, and 
inverted.’20 He explained that this idea of accumulating a general archive that encloses the 
whole of a society in what is effectively a time capsule is a modern idea. Within this capsule, 
observers experience the product of contemporary society in which the story was created, the 
story as told by the inhabitants of the culture and the particular cultural constructs specific to 
the time in which it was created. Visitors see which parts of the past, present and hopeful 
future are important to contemporary society, positioning the display at a particular point in a 
nation’s history and political ideal, and within an international setting. Individuals collect 
souvenirs and tell stories. And children read fairy tales inspired by the extravaganza. 
As exercises in cultural diplomacy, expos provide a way of viewing a deliberately-told story. 
As every item is deliberated upon—with teams of people designing, costing, and 
transporting—every detail is indicative of the ideal being portrayed. Journalist Robert Fulford 
noted that expos are not so much an opportunity to present reality, but to present the way 
organisers would like their nation to be seen.21 Organisers are restricted by the theme of the 
exhibition, the available space and what is offered for display. They must carefully consider 
the story they are trying to tell. Are they portraying a rich and proud history? A bright future? 
The ravages inflicted upon a landscape? A focus on human enterprise or mechanical reliance? 
Does the space available allow full-scale examples? Are performances a viable medium, or 
would film or photographs be more appropriate? Is there concession for audio or only visual 
representation? And importantly, who is paying for the display and what is the motivation? 
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The projected image is only fully understood when cultural assumptions allow for this. For 
example, mood music or particular scents have culturally symbolic meanings that do not 
always translate.22 Parts of a display may be dismissed if they do not fit an audience’s 
understanding, especially items of magic, religion or legend specific to a culture. Curators 
must be sure to tell the story in a simple way, while highlighting what makes that nation 
different. Complexity could overwhelm an audience, especially when attention is shared with 
many other nations’ pavilions, and the audience may explore a dozen varied cultures in one 
day. This is why this study examines more than one display or pavilion, in order to 
understand the messages of each in the context of the others. The most successful displays at 
expos are not necessarily those with the best items, but those that best tell the story of a 
nation creating an image as a favourable international partner. Nicholas Cull explained that 
the ‘clearing houses for international image-making in the second half of the nineteenth 
century were the great World’s Fairs’, and that ‘the abstract desire for prestige and the 
concrete quest for trade intertwined.’23 This story is further disseminated through the media. 
At an international exhibition the media are both local and international, each with their own 
prevailing world view (and readership) which colours their coverage. 
Roche has described the benefits of hosting an expo in the form of tourist consumerism: all 
participants, from builders to snack vendors, diplomats to entertainers, visitors and staff, had 
to travel and become tourists to attend.24 All participants are exposed to forms of 
consumerism and political ideology outside of their culture. There are elements of virtual 
tourism as participants are exposed to other cultures not only through static objects on display 
but also the staff, diplomats, entertainers, lecturers and international visitors. Each 
participating country must be aware of the image they are projecting at every level in order to 
show the best cultural experience and support their foreign policy aims. 
The introduction of foreign cultures necessarily affects the worldview of the host city, just as 
the host city is determined to show their personality. The host city typically uses the 
exhibition to promote its status and position in the world order. At the World’s Fair in 
Brussels in 1958, on Canada Day, Senator Mark Drouin announced that Montreal would seek 
                                                          
22 Rhona Richman, & Johanne Sloane (Eds.), Expo ’67: Not Just a Souvenir, Toronto, University of Toronto 
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Diplomacy, 1945-1989, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 3. 
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to host the Universal and International Exhibition of 1967 (Expo ’67). Supporters lobbied for 
funding, which was sourced from the Canadian, Quebec and Montreal governments. In 1962, 
Montreal was officially awarded the honour of hosting the fair.25  
Australians are good at linking national history with prospects for the future and the Montreal 
Expo highlights this. The organisers took great care to understand the message they wanted to 
project, the prospective audience, and the trade and diplomatic goals they desired. This 
following discusses how and why Expo ’67 was an important part of Australia’s diplomatic 
programme.26 
The Australian Contribution 
The Australian Pavilion was fitted with high-quality, hardwearing wool carpet; the windows 
were covered with sheer wool curtaining; staff were dressed impeccably in wool suits; and 
‘sound chairs’27 were upholstered in robust wool fabric. Merino sheep and rams were 
displayed, and the skills of Australian sheepdogs were on show. Australia was branded as a 
producer of fine raw materials, and sheep in particular had been responsible for considerable 
national and personal wealth, so the production of superior animals was a source of national 
pride. Technological developments demonstrated what the nation could develop from wool 
and other raw materials, both confirming a national reputation and stimulating future trade 
opportunities. While in the planning stages, Menzies had hoped for a ‘greater international 
awareness of Australia and its opportunities.’28 After, Westminster Carpet Sales 
representative Bevis Walters, working in Canada, confirmed that the Expo had ‘brought 
notice’ to the quality of Australian goods, and was likely to increase sales.29 These before and 
after comments suggest that Expo ’67 was a significant opportunity for ‘international image 
making,’30 and would successfully stimulate trade. 
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retrieved 6 May, 2014 
26 This event was decided upon by Menzies, planned while he was in office and conducted during the period that 
is generally referred to by historians as ‘the Menzies Era.’ Therefore, it fits in the time frame of this study. 
27 Will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
28 Information Paper ‘Australian Participation at Expo,’ Prime Minister’s Department, Cabinet Secretariat 
C3973, 19 April, 1968, Australian Exposition Montreal 1967, NAA, 65-1499. 
29 Bevis Walters, Letter to Sir Valsten Hancock, 15 November, 1967, Department of Works Australian 
Exposition Montreal, 1967, NAA, 65-1499. 
30 ibid. 
Exhibiting Australia 
156 
Some Expos are used to commemorate an occasion, which is a chance to inscribe local or 
national history into ‘the primary narrative of world history.’31 Many Australians attach their 
own bicentenary of nationhood with Expo 88; the Canadian people will connect their own 
Centenary of Federation with Expo 67, even if they are unlikely to remember the historical 
date. Other historical events are more easily placed in relation to international events such as 
the moon landing or significant political upheaval. Fashion, too, can be connected with 
international events. For example, the reporting of Expo 67 commented on the prevalence of 
the miniskirt, thus placing the fashion in context with the era. The media also marry 
situations, events, commentary and architecture, and the combination is remembered.  
While expo architecture is designed to be temporary, there are examples that have become a 
permanent fixture and thus a site of pilgrimage in their own right. The Eiffel Tower was built 
for the Paris World Fair of 1889 as a salute to industry, and is still one of the most popular 
tourist destinations in the world. The Atomium in Brussels celebrates the 1958 World Fair 
held there, and is a common tourist attraction and a permanent reminder of significant 
scientific development at the time of the Fair. These structures help consolidate the past and 
provide a platform from which futures can be launched, thus functioning as an important 
aspect of creating and maintaining national identity. This is crucial for cultural diplomacy 
programmes. 
For Canada, who placed their Centenary of Federation on the world stage, the ‘67 Expo was a 
‘coming of age’ in the world. Smits and Jansen claim that ‘Expos not only reflect the nation, 
they actively shape history, culture and identity.’32 The previously little-publicised nation 
received international acclaim. In the planning stages, the government was challenged to 
create an event on a larger scale than ever before, revise and develop infrastructure and even 
create a new land mass.33 However, as one journalist noted, citizens took personal ownership 
of the event. Citizens became excited about their individual place in national and 
international history. The achievement of hosting a successful international event is still a 
source of national pride. 
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Expos are a form of modern pilgrimage, and souvenirs offer an authenticity of experience, 
just as pilgrimages to holy places once had.34 The importance of souvenirs in challenging the 
impermanence of fairs is discussed by John B. Zachman.35 He noted that while other 
materials documenting fairs are often scarce, there is a wealth of material memorabilia.36 By 
comparing the type and quality of souvenirs, the values and interests of the era can be 
explored. Which souvenirs are purchased highlight what types of objects visitors are willing 
to part with money for, on an already expensive day, so as to take part of the experience 
home.37 We can also see which objects were understood as suitable for production in 
conjunction with the telling of the national story. In ephemera such as brochures and tickets, 
we see the value placed on attending the event or a specific venue. Souvenirs from Expo ’67 
were kept in Canada but also had an international audience, thus connecting both domestic 
and international audiences to this place and time. They remind and educate about a country’s 
culture and history in an entertaining way. Smits and Jansen consider this a ‘crucial example 
of the emergence of “Edutainment”.’38 This is the phenomena whereby media and film 
technology are used as an educational medium. The use of new technologies has a double 
effect: they can add detail and context to educational materials not experienced before, and 
the new medium itself makes the lesson more memorable. It is particularly effective because 
the message is perceived through more than one sense.39 As expos are essentially a 
competitive arena, with each nation attempting to get as much attention as possible, the 
introduction of technologies was a practical idea. Edutainment is an apt descriptor for this 
event. 
Edutainment is characterised by its use of technology. At Expo 67, most pavilions used audio 
recordings and film to display some part of their story. Complemented by working models of 
local inventions, machinery and tools—the traditional learning by observing—displays had 
with a modern technological edge. Examples include the film display in Britain’s Cave of 
History, cinemas in the US Pavilion, and the Soviet Union’s Cosmos Hall which provided a 
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35 John B. Zachman, ‘The Legacy and Meanings of World’s Fair Souvenirs,’ in Rydell and Gwinn, Fair 
Representations, pp. 199–217. 
36 An online search confirmed this. It is often easier to find research materials on a World’s Fair or international 
event in the form of memorabilia than in libraries. 
37 A quick internet search reveals guide books, flags, ashtrays, key-rings, dolls, mugs, pins, and travel bags are 
the most popular souvenirs from this particular event. 
38 Smits & Jansen, ‘Staging the Nation,’ p. 181.  
39  Michaela Addis, ‘New Technologies and Cultural Consumption—Edutainment is Born!’ European Journal 
of Marketing: 2005, Vol. 39, No. 7/8, 2005, pp. 729–736. The Expo also hosted an amusement park, La Ronde, 
as drawing crowds to the exhibits required an attraction. 
Exhibiting Australia 
158 
simulated journey to outer space. As edutainment is particularly characterised by interactivity 
between audience and technology, Australians openly took advantage of this with their 
‘sound chairs.’  
These innovative chairs incorporated a headset into the design and played a recording as 
visitors sat down. Recordings about the Australian way of life were narrated by various 
Australians, and were both informative and entertaining. They were covered in eucalyptus-
coloured wool. A quarter of the chairs played recordings in French, and these were 
distinguished by desert-orange-coloured cushioning. Sixty chairs focused on the four main 
display themes: science, national development, the arts and lifestyle. Encouraging the visitor 
to remain static and receive the Australian story made the Pavilion appear calm and ordered. 
The activation of the recordings being at the control of the visitor, the quiet atmosphere and 
the subdued display all signalled respect for the visitor, and seemed to say ‘when you are 
ready, we will tell you our story’. Tables also dotted the space, ‘bearing books on Australian 
society and ashtrays of modern Australian design,’40 further contributing to the relaxed 
atmosphere. By promoting the lifestyle and values of the Australian people, and by using 
regular citizens (pavilion staff and visiting entertainers) rather than formal diplomats, the 
exhibition became more real. There was no attempt to coerce or make profit, no obvious 
infiltration of the audience’s culture or belief system, no obvious attempt to make diplomatic 
gains. It was simply an offering of experience. 
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Figure 6.1 Photograph of the sound chairs at the Australian Pavilion, Montreal Expo 67 
41 
Ambitious projects often lead to great technological developments. As part of a competition 
to create the world’s first truly large-screen experience at Expo 67, a small group of 
filmmakers came together to design a multi-screen film. Syncing nine projectors, they created 
a spectacular installation, and went on to form the IMAX Company.42 Now seen by millions 
across the world, this is a noteworthy legacy of Expo 67. 
 
Several studies have been conducted on the promotion of cultural diplomacy immediately 
after a significant conflict, both domestically and internationally. The formation of the Soviet 
Union, shifting international relationships after World War Two and the political 
restructuring of South East Asia were significant turning points for nations, and resulted in 
the wish to create ‘new’ national identities. For Australia in the 1950s and 1960s there was no 
such turning point, but they were dealing with a move away from Britain and towards their 
Asia Pacific neighbours: reinvention of national identity and establishing a revised position in 
international politics was prompted by sending troops to Vietnam, political instability to the 
north, the increased cultural diversity of new immigrants and changes in leadership. As a 
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geographically isolated nation, this period saw Australians looking outward for a broader 
definition of themselves.43 
Australia played a significant role in the UN and other world affairs, and also felt a sense of 
responsibility to their South East Asian neighbours. However, a government-commissioned 
survey of Australia in the 1960s noted that for the most part the people had ‘ideals and 
aspirations [that] are in tune with those of the people of Great Britain.’44 It claimed that the 
relationship with America was ‘strategic, economic and social’ and was leading to 
increasingly closer ties, but overall ‘it is [the Australian] desire to strengthen all 
Commonwealth relationships while living in amity with other nations.’45 While this attitude 
shifted throughout the decade, it was a starting point for the motivations for attending Expo 
’67. The report records that ‘not so long ago’, Australia did not have edible grains or seeds, 
fruit or vegetables, nuts or fibres of any note, ‘hooved animals,’ an unreliable water supply, 
unworkable timbers and scant evidence of mineral resources.46 It explained that the 
population was augmented by men and women who were ‘venturesome and imaginative’, 
with ‘initiative and enterprise’,47 and praised the great courage and pioneering spirit that led 
to all manner of food being produced to perfection, minerals sourced and water harnessed. 
Like a proud parent, the account praised artistic, music and sporting achievements, a success 
out of proportion with the small population. The report dismissed suggestions that the 
population had become ‘Americanised’, and highlights an ‘ingrained affection’ for British 
forebears.48 Air travel had helped ‘close the gap’ culturally, and it states that the modern 
Australian (of the time of writing) was significantly more ‘sophisticated’ than in the 1920s. 
This is relevant because the Expo, which occurred just five years later, showed incredible 
technology to the world and a determinedly forward-looking nation. To have objects, music 
and people on display and interacting with an international audience was an opportunity to 
tell a national story. The Australian displays did not attempt to overtly criticise or contrast 
any other political regime or nation,49 and this resulted in the transfer of cultural ideals in a 
gentle and almost subversive fashion.  
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Expo 67 was not just a government or commercial exercise because the general public were 
major stakeholders. The government put in the initial financial investment, but the public 
paid to attend. The government and general public were both contributors and audiences. The 
government had the chance to influence the thoughts and opinions of millions of individuals, 
heads of state and diplomats from at least 60 other nations, and countless representatives of 
commercial interests. 
A unique experience, Expos are both formal and informal, structured and loose. They are an 
example of a formal setting in which audience members decide meaning. At Expo 67, 
Australia’s simple pavilion design, the relaxing but informative sound chairs, the calm and 
clear displays and the lack of fuss all imply that doing business with, or travelling to, 
Australia will be a simple, relaxed and uncluttered affair. The diverse offerings—from raw 
materials to high-tech machinery and varied cultural entertainments—suggest that 
Australians can overcome adversity and then produce almost anything. This subtle message 
would have influenced visitors, and was repeated in the media. While not quantifiable, the 
effects of an international exposition on its audience cannot be underestimated. Exposure to 
new ideas and technology can spark various reactions in the visitor. One visitor explained 
that attending had prompted a change in career trajectory, from the corporate world to that of 
design.50 It can open up markets for some manufacturers, excited others to travel and inspired 
yet others to write. This is why the planning of what to display and then how to present it is 
so important for an expo, and particularly when part of a cultural diplomacy style strategy. 
Organising any display is necessarily a challenge of choice. As in a museum, the displays are 
out of context and some meaning must then be added to them. A radio telescope indoors is an 
oxymoron, but when placed next to a painting of the night sky, it is again in context and its 
message can be understood. Overall, there appeared to be few reported disappointments, and 
the Australian Government could be quite confident that it had achieved its aims. 
The Australian Pavilion 
Participating at the Universal and International Exhibition allowed the Australian 
Government and people to understand how they fitted into the world. It was a public display 
of technological advancement, grounding history, expressions of cultural interest and ideas. It 
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brought the world to the attention of domestic media, and presented Australia to the attention 
of international media. Importantly, it provided a forum for Australia to discuss the self-
image of the nation. Australia was able to position itself as a middle power in world affairs, 
as influential but not intimidating. The Pavilion and displays at the Expo echoed this. The 
pavilion was not large or showy, but small, comfortable and uncluttered. There were no 
displays of military might or connected to the space race; there was agricultural machinery 
and telescopes. Art displays were interesting but subdued. The sound chairs displayed 
innovative technology and allowed visitors to control the conversation. Exploring the 
contents of the Pavilion and Australian participation at Expo 67 in detail helps illustrate how 
international exhibitions act as a forum for cultural diplomacy. 
The gradual shift in political alignment and identity in the post-war decades saw Australia 
independently exhibiting in Montreal at Expo 67.51 As the exportation of raw materials to 
Britain declined, Australian trade and enterprise began to highlight scientific and 
technological advances. The progress of local designers and architects was highlighted in the 
Pavilion itself.52 An emphasis on Australian character, culture and productivity was presented 
in a compact exhibition- a shift for Australia publically, away from a dominion of the British, 
and towards an identity as a middle power in the world forum. 
In 1964, Minister for External Affairs Barwick acknowledged that Australia was a middle 
power in international affairs, claiming that it was ‘at one time a granary and a highly 
industrialised country.’53 The objects displayed at Expo 67—including the artwork, 
technology, entertainment and history—all contributed to this message. From an open-cut 
mine and Merino sheep demonstrating how the nation harvests raw materials, to the radio 
telescope and sound chairs, which highlighted technological advancement, Australia 
straddled two worlds. Situating the displays in a quiet, constructed oasis of calm above a 
natural bushland setting, the world was shown to be a combination of created urban spaces 
and raw landscape. As the nation was part of the British Empire and also exploring the Asia 
Pacific region, these contrasts are fitting. Participation in Expo 67 allowed Australia to 
express this cultural ideal to an international audience. More importantly, it created a forum 
for this cultural ideal to be analysed, debated and recognised domestically. Forced to 
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condense the national culture into one pavilion in a foreign space for six months provided a 
valuable opportunity to discuss cultural identity and promote it as part of a diplomatic 
programme. 
Initially, the Australian Government rejected the invitation to exhibit in Montreal. The 
expense was deemed in excess of the expected benefits, with ‘little trade, tourist or publicity 
grounds’ to warrant the cost.54 Hasluck, at the time Minister for External Affairs, determined 
that most visitors would be from Canada and North America, and advised that this audience 
was not a ‘primary target for information activity.’55 He considered that it would be difficult 
to compete for attention with the other larger, richer countries, so the cost would not be 
justified. However, on 19 July, 1964, Menzies argued that Australia could not afford not to 
attend.56 Curran noted that the deliberations swung from economic advantage to the 
‘imperative of cultural diplomacy and national self-definition.’57 Three days later, Cabinet 
formally announced that Australia would participate in Expo 67, ‘being commemorative of 
federation’ and in regard to the ‘Australian/Canadian relations and terms of Commonwealth 
relations’.58 It was most likely that the appeals to ‘the Commonwealth’ that the Canadian 
Prime Minister Lester Pearson used eventually swayed the decision-makers. In a submission 
to Cabinet, Menzies wrote that as this was an event designed to celebrate Canada’s centenary, 
a ‘refusal to participate may result in some loss of Canadian goodwill.’59 He disagreed with 
Hasluck, and explained that the Canadian and North American audiences were a ‘very 
important target’ for information efforts, highlighting that the press coverage provided by 
these groups would be extensive. Menzies noted that ‘an imaginative exhibit could therefore 
be somewhat of an image builder.’60 Although the budget would be tight, consideration 
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would be given to the fact that ‘Australia would have to stand comparison with other 
countries,’61 and the government would have to be a little flexible regarding costs. The aim 
was to create an image of a new Australia. 
The advisory committee was comprised of prominent Australian academics, professionals 
and businessmen.62 Kenneth Slessor was joined by Campbell from the National Gallery in 
Adelaide; Judge Adrian Curlewis from Sydney; the chairman of Fairfax, Warwick Fairfax; 
the Commissioner of the Snow Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority, Sir William Hudson; 
Professor La Nauze, a Melbourne University historian; Sir Maurice Mawby of Rio Tinto; 
Seppelt of Seppelt and Sons; Simpson of Simpson Pope Holdings; and Souter from the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) in Melbourne. These men came from various 
occupations and from across the country. They were selected because they brought varied 
experience and perspectives which enabled them to present a relevant national cultural ideal. 
In an Information Paper submitted to the Cabinet, it was acknowledged that ‘our effort at 
Expo 67 is in an intensely competitive field with each nation seeking to show its best and 
achieve maximum publicity.’63 It is to the credit of the government and organising committee 
that they were not overcome by this challenge, but saw it as an opportunity. 
While acknowledging that there were other countries with interesting history and more 
glamour, the organisers set out to show what made Australia unique. To comply with the 
overarching theme of ‘Man and his World,’ they decided to focus on adventure: the country 
was promoted as the foremost ‘land of adventure.’64 Public Relations Officer Mel Pratt 
announced that ‘the basic theme is adventure and the ways in which adventure still attracts 
and impels Australians today—in the arts, in sport, in science, in industry and in other 
fields.’65 The designers and collaborators began to create a new definition of Australia for the 
post-war, post-imperial era. Curran wrote that this was a chance to promote a ‘new face to the 
world: distinctive, mature, and culturally sophisticated.’66 For a country at a cross-road, this 
was a unique opportunity to examine cultural ideals, to inform both national and international 
                                                          
61 Submission 947, NAA. 
62 See Appendix A: Montreal World Exhibition: Australian Advisory Committee, Statement by the Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, in ‘Australian Exposition Montreal Part V, 1967, 65-1499,’ NAA. 
63 Information Paper, ‘Australian Participation at Expo’67,’ Prime Minister’s Department Cabinet Secretariat, 
C3973, 19 April, 1967, in ibid. 
64 Kenneth Slessor, ‘Synopsis,’ attached to a letter from W. R. Carney to the Prime Minister, 19 October, 1965, 
in ibid. 
65 Mel Pratt, Press Release, dated November 5, 1966, in ibid. 
66 Curran, ‘Australia Should be There,’ p. 75. 
Exhibiting Australia 
165 
audiences. It was to be a forward-looking enterprise. Ten years after hosting a world-class 
Olympic Games, Australia was showing that not only had it modernised to a comparable 
level to other leading places, but that it was a serious innovator and leader in numerous fields. 
Commentators including Donald Horne and Stuart Ward have discussed the difficulties that 
Australian identity faced at this time: including the ‘decline of the British framework’ 
produced a feeling that Australia needed to begin again.67 The subsequent ‘scramble for a 
national culture’68 meant the organisers saw the Expo as an opportunity. While they knew 
that the audience expected a traditional and familiar Australia, with a harsh landscape with 
peculiar flora and fauna, it was time to show that the people had come a long way, from ‘the 
Stone Age to the Space Age.’69 This became the motto for the Australian Pavilion. Displays 
about exploration in Antarctica, Nobel Prizes for medicine, technological invention and the 
establishment of cultural institutions all highlighted that Australia was no insignificant 
backwater. When asked to propose the theme for the displays, Kenneth Slessor suggested that 
‘the picture of Australia which we wish to leave […included] the challenge of adventure, set 
in the present and future and offering opportunities.’70 Organisers wanted to acknowledge the 
difficulty of the Australian landscape for its inhabitants. The planning team agreed that the 
displays must easily be understood by an international audience, and would essentially be ‘a 
sideshow at a public fair for the purpose of advertising Australia’ to an audience that would 
vary in age and experience, and ‘whose interest and imagination must be aroused by the first 
hit.’71 Themes that were too specifically Australian would not be displayed, such as the 
legend of Ned Kelly or the exploits of the earliest explorers, as it was too difficult to explain 
these stories without context.  
For the first time, Australia exhibited in its own purpose-built space, and not as an annex of 
the British Pavilion. Architect James MacCormick designed a floating square box: 
The broad concept of the exhibition is that the open air and under croft areas are devoted to 
a representation of the Australian background. The native trees, plants, and animals and 
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mineral resources—while the pavilion proper on the raised level is devoted to a survey of 
what man has done with this part of the globe.72 
The exhibits reflected human achievements contrasted with a distinctive homeland. The 
exterior of the building was decorated with four large painted panels.73 Created by prominent 
artists, these were meant to be informative and original. The first, ‘Australia in the World,’ 
was a map, and placed the continent in the centre to highlight Australia’s relationship to 
neighbouring countries and oceans. The second, ‘The Australian Land,’ was a landscape 
indicating geological and mineral characteristics. The third, ‘Australia and North America,’ 
was another map that compared the geographical mass of the two nations. Finally, ‘Pacific 
Communications’ highlighted the cabling, sea lanes, air routes and satellites between 
Australia and the US. They repositioned Australia as geographically Asiatic, and highlighted 
the close relationship with the US. 
After reviewing various scale models for the pavilion, ‘scheme A’ was decided upon, which 
was a ‘floating box.’ This had two walls of glass that provided natural light, and was 
determined to be ‘exciting without being freakish’.74 Architect Robin Boyd reported that the 
aim was ‘to have the most luxurious and civilised salon at Expo 67’.75 Although the 
architecture discouraged dramatic staging or numerous exhibits,76 Boyd used the light and 
openness as a display in itself, creating the atmosphere of calm and refuge from the bustle of 
the rest of the Expo. The Pavilion’s design was a clear and focused way of promoting a 
national message; the approval of Boyd’s design is reflective of the message the government 
wanted to send the world. 
The Pavilion may not have been as grand as some others, but organisers noted that the staff 
played the most important role in presenting Australia.77 Twenty-two hostesses ushered 
visitors and explained the displays. The desert orange uniforms were often commented on in 
the press. Six hosts assisted, dressed in eucalyptus green suits. Staff were at least bilingual 
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and tertiary educated, and were trained to have a thorough knowledge of the exhibits.78 This 
focus on the people who represented the country was important, as it showed that while what 
visitors saw and heard was carefully chosen, it was the Australian people, their culture and 
way of life that was prioritised. 
 
Figure 6.2: A hostess looking at artwork at the Australian Pavilion, Expo 67, Montreal79 
A significant feature throughout the Pavilion was the use of wool, from the carpeting, sheer 
curtaining and upholstery to the staff uniforms. This highlighted the versatility of Australian 
products and design. It was a modern display of a traditional reputation: Australia’s success 
rode ‘on the sheep’s back.’ Development and innovation meant that the nation not only 
exported raw materials but also designed and manufactured high-quality goods. 
Also on display was a scale replica of the radio telescope at Parkes, New South Wales 
(NSW), which had played an important role in recent astronomical discoveries.80 As the 
space race was a predominant feature in the Pavilions of the US and Soviet Union, Australia 
showed that it was progressing in the same technological areas. Tracking spacecraft, cosmic 
radio sources, discovering magnetic fields and determining the positions of quasars were 
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among the achievements of this relatively new equipment.81 Above the telescope hung a 
painting of the Australian night sky. While putting the telescope into context, this was also 
relevant, as most Northern Hemisphere visitors were not used to the Southern Hemisphere’s 
astrological arrangements. 
 
Figure 6.3: Model of the dish radio telescope at Parkes, NSW, at the Australian Pavilion 
at Expo 67, Montreal82 
Scale models of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric scheme, and also of the newly built 
capital city of Canberra, highlighted the change from wilderness to a civilised, industrial, and 
modern culture were displayed. Aboriginal bark paintings were shown along with a collection 
of contemporary art, and a series of photographs depicted other developmental projects, 
agricultural progress, architecture and modern living. While the Australian Pavilion did not 
have a restaurant like some others, part was a designated VIP dining area that provided 
Australian fare.83 Direct trade was not part of the Expo, but retailer David Jones did host the 
‘Australia Boutique,’ the only place where Australian merchandise was available. The stock 
was recognisably Australian, and ‘would present a good fashion image.’84 Charles Lloyd 
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Jones, who represented the retailer, noted: ‘we are undertaking this as a national venture to 
put Australia in the best light at the exhibition.’85 
On Australia’s special day, 6 June, various attractions were organised, all recognisably 
Australian. A popular music concert called ‘Pop Goes Australia’ featured Bobby Limb, Rolf 
Harris, The Seekers, and Normie Rowe. A boomerang-throwing exhibition, mock sheep dog 
trials and a wood chopping competition were organised, as well as a lawn tennis tournament 
with champion players. Events were telecast directly to Australian audiences, the first direct 
international telecast for the nation. 
Australia was asked to sponsor sections of the themed pavilions at the Expo. These were not 
hosted by any one nation, but included exhibits on a particular theme. Sponsorship was not 
possible due to limited finances, but Australia did make display contributions.86 To the 
pavilion called ‘Man the Explorer’ Australia loaned a scale model of the Antarctic Base, 
Aboriginal artefacts and opals. To the ‘Man in the Community’ pavilion they sent a film on 
surf lifesaving, information on Australia’s Royal Flying Doctor Service and the School of the 
Air, all of which highlighted the enormity of the country. They contributed to the ‘Man the 
Producer’ pavilion demonstration models of unique agricultural equipment, a scale model of 
a coal dredge and a film on the Yallorn open-cut coal field. Merino sheep were displayed in 
the ‘Man the Provider’ space, illustrating wool and meat production. Lectures were also 
given by Nobel Prize winners Sir Macfarlane Burnett and Sir John Eccles. 
The Canadian Expo organisers staged the World Festival of Performing Arts, which 
showcased various entertainments from across the world. Australian performers included the 
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Central Band, the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra and 
the Australian Ballet. This festival included premier performers from across the globe, and 
the Australian contingent performed alongside long-established acts such as the Bolshoi 
Ballet, Vienna State Opera, Concertgebouw Orchestra of Amsterdam and The Supremes.87 
The official documents and press releases recorded the official intentions of the exhibition, 
but it is the opinions of the general public and social groups that determine the success of 
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cultural diplomacy-style activities. Therefore, it is important to consider such opinions after 
experiencing the event, to acknowledge public understandings of official messages. 
According to the Australian Exhibit Organisation Staff Manual, the primary communication 
aim was that ‘the visitor to the Australian Pavilion at Expo will come away with the 
knowledge that Australia is no longer an isolated wilderness but a sophisticated, self-reliant 
nation equal to any in the world.’88 The articles in newspapers, magazines and journals would 
confirm whether the scheme was successful. 
Aerial photographs of the site were published in newspapers, highlighting the positioning and 
size of the Australian Pavilion.89 Journalists commented on Expo visits by celebrities, wrote 
with wonder at the spectacular Soviet and US Pavilions and commented on the juxtaposition 
between traditional and modern architecture that used expensive, exotic materials. The 
thoughtful planning of the whole site—which included parks, lakes, canals, rivers and 
transport systems—was admired. The external architecture was written about before the 
exhibits opened. This was a show of buildings ‘with architects from all over the world 
expressing…their country’s story,’ with few participating nations using the ready-made 
spaces provided by the local government.90 The pavilions themselves were capsules in which 
visitors were embraced and educated, so were a significant investment. The Australian 
Pavilion was generally praised by architects and organisers, but there were some negative 
comments from the media, who called it a ‘small black box,’ ‘squat’ and ‘smug and overly 
comfortable,’ with displays that were ‘dull and undistinguished’.91 The pavilion was not 
competing with the more glamorous structures. One local correspondent disagreed however, 
noting that ‘visitors appear unimpressed with the verdict of the critics,’92 and that long lines 
of visitors quickly formed to see inside the Australian Pavilion. 
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Figure 6.4: Interior of the Australian Pavilion at Expo 67, Montreal93 
Visitors to the Australian Pavilion were warned by a plaque at the entrance: ‘The mood of 
this pavilion is a deliberately relaxed one, offering, we hope, a moment’s rest from the bustle 
of the outside world’. This aim seems to have been achieved, as an article in The Montreal 
Star stated: ‘There’s nothing in the Australian Pavilion to astound, excite, confuse or exhaust 
the visitor—only the feeling of space and tranquillity borrowed from the vastness of its 
country.’94 Its location en route to the most popular exhibits was also unexpectedly 
beneficial. This prime location contrasted with the calm atmosphere inside the pavilion, 
which became the most popular reason for visiting. 
During the planning stages, the Australian public were excited by the entertainers that would 
be sent to the Expo, with the newspapers and magazines in Australia proudly reporting those 
selected. The artistic designers of the Australian Ballet were delighted to have been chosen, 
along with those from the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra. The Ballet was a fairly new 
troupe, and to be performing in the same arena as the Bolshoi Ballet was an honour. After the 
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performance, the tour manager for the Orchestra enthused: ‘the standing ovations we got for 
our concerts mean we have “arrived” in North America,’95 and hoped that more overseas trips 
would result. This optimism was confirmed by the Canadian newspapers, which praised the 
performances, claiming the young troupe had ‘developed a distinctive style,’ and praising the 
‘solidly classical’ performance with ‘lavish costumes and décor,’ and soloists who had played 
for European audiences.96 The Symphony Orchestra and soloist Marie Collier were described 
as fresh and striking.97 
In Australia, the Australian-Canada Society celebrated the opening of the Expo on 28 April, 
1967, with fireworks over Lake Burley Griffin in Canberra.98 Headlines such as ‘10,000 see 
pavilion’99 helped build Australian enthusiasm for the event. On the eve of the opening the 
Prime Minister delivered a statement that highlighted the natural bush setting and unique 
fauna, the displays of traditional Australian activities planned for the special day and 
commented that Australia’s national image was well represented.100 The organisers were 
proud of the Australian cultural experience they had presented to the world, were satisfied 
that the government’s aims of encouraging trade and tourism would be realised and that 
domestic media coverage assured the public that money had been well spent. 
As the Expo progressed, the Australian Women’s Weekly published an interview with some 
of the hostesses, noting the general admiration for the bright orange uniforms that had been 
designed by Zara Holt, wife of the new Prime Minister. Skirt length was a big issue; British 
hostesses wore their skirts very short, and while some of the Australian hostesses shortened 
theirs, they noted that ‘we aren’t entering any competitions,’ and were pleased with the 
‘striking but not too flamboyant’ colour.101 The women interviewed spoke of the higher cost 
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of living,102 and compared French Canadian, British Canadian and other North American 
men. They were surprised by some ignorance of Australia, even from fellow Commonwealth 
countries, and recalled: ‘When we visited the Ceylon pavilion we were complimented on our 
good command of English.’103 The hostesses enthused: ‘where else would we ever get the 
chance to meet and work with people from just about every country in the world?’104 
dismissing reports that they were unhappy with their wages or accommodation. 
There was some debate in the newspapers regarding the absence of any Aboriginal staff. 
Advisory council member R. P. Greenish believed that such a presence would ‘show the 
world that we had at long last learned to respect equality and not discriminate,’ as well as be 
‘a step towards ending racial discrimination and improving Australia’s world image.’105 
Anthony, Minister for the Interior, noted that they could not specially select Aboriginal 
women as staff, as a decision had been made to select Australian hostesses who would 
already be in Canada for the duration of the Expo.106 All hostesses had to meet the 
employment criteria, and if the government were to make exceptions on the basis of race, this 
could send a negative or confusing message. This reveals just one of the struggles over race 
and immigration of the 1960s. While immigration laws had broadened to included non-
European migrants, and the displays at the Expo showed Aboriginal artefacts, the Expo staff 
reflected a youthful, white Australia. 
On 6 June, Prime Minister Harold Holt attended the particularly ‘Australian’ celebrations, 
stating that ‘the Australian image had been well presented.’107 In The Canberra Times Holt 
was shown holding a kangaroo and beaming proudly, noting that it had been ‘a wonderful 
day.’108 The Canadian newspapers reported that while Australians had a reputation for 
courage, stamina and sporting skills, ‘the Australian contribution to Expo also revealed 
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successes in the realm of arts.’109 This day was also a highlight for Australian technology. 
When Canberra television stations broadcast the programme, it was ‘the first direct telecast 
from another country seen by Australian viewers,’110 and many woke especially early to be 
part of the event. 
In an interview with Australian entertainer Bobby Limb, Women’s Weekly readers had been 
introduced to the plans for the ‘Pop Goes Australia’ concert. While Limb had been honoured 
to have been asked to work in America (‘for the first time the quality of Australian show 
business has been recognised and performers sent abroad to represent their country’111), he 
turned the offer down in order to work for his home country.112 Limb was very proud to be 
working with traditional Aboriginal musical instruments, and planned to play them ‘in a 
modern band combination.’113 He noted that this would create a ‘real Australian sound, a new 
combination of primitive and modern,’ which was entirely new and unique; he hoped the 
international audience would agree.114 However, Canadian reviewer Joan Irwin seemed 
unimpressed by this concert, claiming that some of the performers were ‘only pale imitations 
of current North American, British and French rock-and-roll stars.’115 Hope for the 
entertainment industry appeared in the form of The Seekers, who were certainly in the same 
league as the major folk-singing groups of North America, ‘although they do not show much 
imagination.’116 Irwin did not mention Limb’s ‘real Australian sound,’ as the significance of 
this composition was possibly lost in cultural translation. 
At the half-way point of the Expo, staff reported to the Australian Government that visits had 
far exceeded all estimates, and that there had been high praise for the internal exhibition of 
the Australian Pavilion. The sound chairs were reported as ‘novel and informative—an 
effective way of telling the story.’117 The inch-thick wool carpeting was holding up to the 
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greater than expected traffic, and The Montreal Star recorded that a baby kangaroo was born 
on site; it was promptly named ‘Expo.’118 
At the conclusion of Expo, there was disappointment that the Pavilion would not return to 
Canberra as an exhibition hall.119 The prohibitive transport costs were cited as the primary 
reason for leaving the building in Montreal. The Mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau, asked 
that the Pavilion be left in his city when the Expo ended in October.120 The Pavilion was 
gifted to the City of Montreal, and the plaque read: ‘This building, the Australian pavilion at 
Expo ’67, is a gift from the Australian people to the City of Montreal and stands as a symbol 
of the lasting friendship between the peoples of Canada and Australia.’121 North American 
architects had been enthusiastic about the Pavilion, and the Canadian Government determined 
that the ‘small smug black box’ was better suited as an exhibition centre than the more 
flamboyant pavilions. 
Expo Commissioner General Pierre Dupuy told Holt that ‘without your presence we could 
not have called it a family party,’122 confirming the thoughts of Menzies when considering 
whether to attend. As a fellow member of the Commonwealth, attendance at a significant 
family birthday party was essential. The Canadian newspapers reported that there was much 
disappointment that New Zealand had decided not to attend, and reports gave ‘prominence to 
the fact that New Zealand is the only member of the “old Commonwealth” not 
represented.’123 On 19 May, three young New Zealanders visiting the Expo noted ‘an obvious 
gap in Expo’s international line-up,’ and set up a ‘New Zealand Pavilion’ near the Australian 
Pavilion’s kangaroo pit.124 The makeshift pavilion, at which the hosts toasted with 
champagne and performed an ‘authentic Maori War Dance,’ stood for 20 minutes before 
security guards arrived and dismantled it.125 That the youths chose the Australian Pavilion to 
do this at shows the close bond between the two nations shared. This anecdote suggests that 
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the general public saw significant value in having their nation’s story told and preserved in 
international history. 
Menzies was no longer Prime Minister by the time the Expo was staged, although he toured it 
in October as an honoured guest, and was one of the 20 million people to visit the Australian 
Pavilion. There were over 50 million paid admissions to the Expo, not including the 
dignitaries, performers and staff who were the primary witness to the spectacle, and countless 
others who experienced the event through the media. Curran noted that the design of the 
Australian Pavilion ‘showed that the tensions between its past and its future, its bush myth 
and its urban reality…were not to be easily resolved.’126 The issue the organisers had was in 
combining displays that were familiar and comfortably ‘Australian’ with an advertisement 
that the country was cosmopolitan, ‘cultured’ and a leading member of the Commonwealth. 
By displaying the inescapable landscape and unchangeable heritage within the modern 
Pavilion, organisers highlighted the foundation upon which all else was built. This was a 
clever way of displaying the contrast of Australian culture; it played on the tensions and 
contradictions as an inescapable fact, and one that the nation chose to celebrate. The 
Australian Pavilion was described by Anderson, Federal Director of Chambers, as ‘a 
portrayal of Australia’s three million square miles, of its history and achievements.’127 The 
varied geography was equalled by the variety of human endeavour the country had seen in its 
relatively short history of European settlement. By displaying the tension in the culture, and 
by highlighting the progress in all ‘modern’ areas of human enterprise, the organisers showed 
Australian character and culture to be diverse and contradictory, energetic and accomplished. 
By presenting what was important to Australians, the Expo invited the world to judge the 
nation and to understand what sort of country they were dealing with. 
The World in 1000 Acres128 
Examination of some of the other pavilions at the Expo helps contextualise the ‘small black 
box.’ The Pavilions of the US, Great Britain, Soviet Union, host nation Canada, the UN and 
other international organisations put Australia’s efforts within an international framework. 
While the US and British presentations were superior in terms of budget and international 
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reputation, they were the two major powers that were significant in establishing Australia’s 
international place. Canada was a fellow Commonwealth country that was similarly young in 
its nationhood, and comparable to Australia in its development. It is interesting to examine 
the Soviet Union’s Pavilion in the context of the Cold War and also as a republic with a 
newly established political ideology. Pavilion design had evolved over the century since the 
first Expo in 1851. The 1878 Paris Exposition was the first at which dedicated national 
pavilions were erected.129 Prior to this, exhibits were held in a shared space. With this 
development came the opportunity to create not only a display that would describe the 
national culture, but an enclosure that would encompass the story, present national identity in 
one neat spectacle and show a whole culture as one experience. A quick tour of Expo 67 will 
help demonstrate why the Australian Pavilion was so successful. 
Several pavilions celebrated the people and regions of Canada. Each province was presented 
independently, but the central exhibit was the Katimavik, an inverted pyramid, named from 
an indigenous word for a gathering place. Outside visitors were enthralled by a fire-breathing 
Uki (a two-headed monster) in the lagoon, or watching an icebreaker rescuing a trapped 
freighter.130 A six-storey stylised maple tree could be climbed by patrons, and 500 of its 1500 
shimmering leaves contained portraits of Canadians. There were also five theatres, a 
meditative sanctuary and a super-computer. A map of Canada was marked with 128 
geological and mineral samples.131 
The official guidebook for Expo ’67 described the overall concept of the event. Themed, 
national and corporate pavilions would present displays exploring ‘[m]an and his ideological, 
cultural and scientific relationship to his environment.’132 The themed pavilions were 
sponsored by various countries, either financially or with exhibits, and were fundamentally 
concerned with the activities of humanity rather than nation. National pavilions provided fora 
for lectures and displays. As well as numerous public spaces, Expo ’67 had more corporate 
and private pavilions than national exhibits.133 For example, visitors could experience the 
Polymer, Brewers, Air Canada, Christian, Jewish and Canadian Kodak Pavilions. Quebec 
Industries celebrated over 100 different industries in its Pavilion; the Canadian National 
Transport Corporation highlighted ‘Time and Motion’; the Pavilion of Economic Progress 
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told the story of competitive enterprise; the Steel Industries and Pulp and Paper Pavilions 
celebrated raw materials and innovative products; and the scouting movement gave youths 
the opportunity to assist celebrations while highlighting the movement’s achievements. 
The Place des Nations was an open-air arena for use by any nation or organisation. It was the 
starting point for all national celebration days, where VIPs were greeted, parades and 
concerts were held and bands played. The calendar of events for this arena combined 
government organisations and NGOs, small and large countries. International celebratory 
days— such as Children’s Day, the World Red Cross Special Day, the Scout Jamboree and 
International Agriculture Day—were celebrated by the global community, and the opening 
and closing ceremonies of the Expo were also held in this neutral space. Princess Christina of 
Sweden declared during her visit that the Expo was ‘a look on the world of today and a 
projection of tomorrow.’134 Grounding themselves with traditional objects and historic 
culture, most pavilions told the story of their past while announcing their plans for the future 
and their role in the world. It appeared that showing how a country had progressed as a 
civilisation lent authority to its visions of the future. This was a common theme through the 
national, corporate and private pavilions. 
The displays in each pavilion were determined by their expected audience. For host nations, 
the expectation was that the audience would mostly be domestic, so their exhibitions were 
primarily educational and entertaining. For visiting nations, the focus was on foreign visitors, 
particularly those of the host country.135 Political and cultural ideals had to be considered, to 
ensure that the story was told and received as desired. International organisations celebrated a 
unity of human purpose and a confirmation of global bonds. The UN Pavilion was a circular 
construction surrounded by the flags of 122 member nations.136 A 330-seat theatre showed 
films, and an international restaurant served food from around the world. Exhibits included 
the UN Charter and displays of the work of UN agencies around the world. The purpose of 
the Pavilion was to ‘reflect the desire and determination of ordinary people to see that their 
governments use the U. N. to help bring order, justice, peace and decency into the affairs of 
mankind.’137 An award-winning documentary was shown in the in-house cinema. The 
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Canadian Government allowed the UN to issue special stamps so that visitors to the Pavilion 
could mail letters and cards, making this international display unique. 
As the US was Canada’s nearest geographical neighbour, Canadians were familiar with North 
American ways of life through the media. To advertise this further at the Expo would have 
been a waste of effort and opportunity. Most of the audience were Canadian or North 
American, so the organisers of this Pavilion faced the challenge of displaying something that 
would inform those unfamiliar with the culture, and entertain those who were, while 
celebrating that which they were most proud of. Visitors were greeted with a giant eagle, with 
golden disks fluttering in the breeze, making it appear to shimmer. The displays comprised of 
various collections, including hats representing regions and occupations, musical instruments 
belonging to celebrities, presidential campaign memorabilia, dolls and Native American 
artefacts. Michigan Governor George Romney expressed disappointment at the display, 
explaining that it was ‘pretty on the outside, but full of trivia on the inside.’138 Other media 
claimed that ‘[t]his iconoclastic approach shocked many visitors, especially Americans, who 
found it too frivolous and in bad taste.’139 However, it seemed to delight the general public, 
as this was one of the most popular Expo destinations. These contrasts suggest that the sense 
of national identity the US public felt did not match what the global public saw.140 
The US displayed its innovation. The space observation deck highlighted the technologies 
that would be used in the planned lunar landings, the actual Apollo and Gemini capsules, 
audio recordings of spacecraft launches, a photographic display and scale models of 
equipment. The art exhibition comprised large, colourful modern art. Abstract expressionism, 
pop, hard edge and geometric art were on display. The film industry was also celebrated with 
movie posters, props and short films shown in mini-theatres. These were accompanied by 
visits from film stars that created a flurry of media attention.141 The 20 storey US Pavilion 
was enclosed in a metal-framed biosphere. It was the only enclosure to straddle the monorail, 
which was the fastest way to see the interior.142 It highlighted several facets of a forward-
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looking nation, and the exploration of progress through collections is a theme that provides 
insight into the national story. Visitors saw a bright, diverse, colourful display, full of speed, 
technology and national pride. While there was a nod to historical roots and tradition, the 
Pavilion’s message was of a nation moving forward. 
Visitors crossed a moat to enter the British Pavilion, reminding visitors of the nation’s island 
heritage. It told the story of a disparate people who became a great nation, and who ‘helped 
shape the history of the world.’143 Visitors entered the Pavilion through the ‘Cave of History,’ 
where the story of kings and armies and the conquests of 10 dynasties was projected onto the 
walls. Moving through to the ‘Genius of Britain’ hall, a large jet engine was surrounded by 
portraits of Britain’s greatest men, with descriptions of their achievements. Following the 
theme of ‘The Challenge of Change’, the ‘Britain Today’ display presented the culture of the 
day, including Eton rowers, an elderly lady watching television, The Beatles and models 
wearing miniskirts. Circular illuminated signs and short soundtracks poked fun at everything 
British, and highlighted the contrast between a reputedly traditional and stiff culture with an 
ability to laugh at themselves. In the ‘Industrial Britain’ display, brief films and scale models 
of hovercraft, radio telescopes, nuclear power equipment, computers, the Concorde aircraft 
and The Queen Elizabeth II cruise liner highlighted the achievements of the industrial 
revolution and modern design. The area called ‘Britain in the World’ comprised 10, 18-foot 
tall aluminium nude figures, and ‘at their feet were exhibits showing the unifying influence of 
Britain’s language, governmental systems, laws and traditions on the world.’144 Organisers 
hoped that they could portray something quirky and fun in what had been a difficult time for 
the nation in the post-war, post-industrial, post-colonial world.145 
All the significant characteristics of Britain’s reputation were challenged and changed, and 
this display was an opportunity for reinvention and redefinition of cultural understandings. 
The organisers took a light-hearted approach, and contrasted a powerful past and a more 
collaborative future. Transforming the Place des Nations into a scale model of Trafalgar 
Square guarded by giant bulldogs with a miniskirted Britannia, the producer of Britain’s 
special day ceremonies wanted to bring amusement to the anachronisms of British history. By 
having the Navy march in to ‘We all live in a Yellow Submarine,’ the Roman invasion 
portrayed by centurions on roller skates, and the Norman Conquest recounted by squads 
                                                          
143 Bernard, Expo 67 Official Guide, p. 126. 
144 Stanton, ‘The United States Pavilion.’ 
145 Elizabeth Darling, ‘Britain Today: At Expo 67,’ p. 87, in Richman & Sloane (Eds.), Expo 67. 
Exhibiting Australia 
181 
roaring into the square on tractors, to the tune of ‘La Marseillaise,’ the British were showing 
that while they were proud of their cultural story, they could celebrate it with humour.146 
The main feature of the British Pavilion was a large tower with a jagged top, sealed with a 
three-dimensional Union Jack. This represented the fact that the British role in the world was 
unfinished,147 and that the UK was still under construction.148 This was a common theme, as 
many nations with long histories shifted politically to meet the demands of the era. 
The year 1967 was the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union. Moscow had 
bid for the honour of hosting the Expo, but had to withdraw due to financial reasons. When 
planning to attend in Canada, organisers had to present a broad image of the whole Soviet 
Union while dazzling visitors with technological achievements.149 A communist display in a 
capitalist host nation during the Cold War would be a challenge. Described in the Expo 
guidebook as having a scope of exhibits ‘on a scale commensurate with the activity of a 
dynamic country of 230 million inhabitants,’150 this exhibit was one of Expo’s most 
visited.151 The Soviet Pavilion was constructed from glass and aluminium. It had a sweeping 
roof representing the Union’s ‘take off’ into the future. The overarching theme was ‘all in the 
name of man, for the good of man,’, and comprised three major sections: the sea, earth and 
sky. As visitors walked in to the earth display, they were confronted with a giant portrait of 
Vladimir Lenin, who watched over all. This floor contained displays of raw materials, films, 
photographs, maps, models and machines, and all sought to demonstrate Soviet achievements 
across diverse fields. Down one level to the sea, and models of a desalinisation plant, the 
atomic icebreaker Lenin and a tank full of the famous caviar-producing Sturgeon fish were on 
display. On the mezzanine level, the space programme was celebrated with Yuri Gagarin’s 
fire-damaged space capsule. Cosmos Hall was a specially designed theatre that took visitors 
on a simulated ride to outer space.152 
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Interestingly for a communist nation, the Soviets advertised their souvenirs prominently in 
the official guidebook.153 A newspaper article reported that boutiques specialising in 
traditional food and hats were full of visitors making purchases.154 In an interview, the son of 
a Soviet staff member recalls that American department store mail order catalogues were 
such entertainment for young visitors that they were smuggled back home as souvenirs, as 
they provided a window to a foreign world.155 This particular exposure to the global 
community may not have been welcomed by Soviet officials, but it was a purpose of the 
Expo and increased international understanding. The Soviet Pavilion did not celebrate one 
specific ‘special day,’ but had many. Each of the republics within the Union staged a 
celebration within the Pavilion, allowing celebration to be a constant theme within the Soviet 
Pavilion and providing people with continuous reasons to visit. This Pavilion is particularly 
interesting as it represented a shared political ideology, and was a celebration of individual 
national cultural experiences. 
While nations were showing their best, they were also being seen. The Expo was an 
opportunity to examine displays and analyse culture, attitudes and behaviour. It was an 
opening for businessmen, diplomats and travellers to discover resources and opportunities, 
and a chance to judge and form opinions of nations in a compact space. The global media 
coverage was important, and some stories told more about the cultures of the nations than the 
individual events they described. 
On 30 May, a fire destroyed the interior of the Pavilion of the Republic of China (Taiwan). 
One hundred firefighters kept the blaze contained but the displays were all destroyed. 
Newspapers reported that other countries quickly offered help in rebuilding the pavilion,156 
and volunteers from the local Chinese community helped the Pavilion staff wash the 
blackened exterior. Government officials decided to ship the exhibition on display in 
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Vancouver to Montreal, and re-opened within a month.157 That this pavilion was rebuilt its 
display so quickly is testament to the nation’s resolve and efficiency. 
At one point in the year, a prankster swapped the passport stamping machines in the Algerian 
and Israeli Pavilions. Although there had been a diplomatic ‘deep-freeze’ since the 
Arab/Israeli Six-Day War in June, an Israeli Pavilion official telephoned the Algerian 
Pavilion to suggest they check their machine, resulting in officials exchanging machines. 
While a minor event, a news report noted that this managed ‘to get an Arab state to negotiate 
with Israel,’158 in an attempt to highlight the importance of person-to-person communication 
in international diplomacy. However, just one month after opening, Commissioner General F. 
M. Fahad Al-Sarawi announced that the Government of Kuwait had decided to close its 
Pavilion, in protest of ‘the West’s hostile stand against the Arabs in the Middle East crisis.’159 
Expo authorities worried that the international crisis might cause other Arab nations to copy 
this gesture. The Kuwaiti contingent formally left on 14 June.160 Using this very public forum 
to convey a political message was akin to boycotting an Olympic Games, and ensured 
worldwide media coverage. 
By the time the Expo opened in 1967, most of the 62 participating countries had their own 
national pavilions, with some hosting combined national and regional pavilions. For example, 
15 African countries came together in the Africa Place. Themed and industrial pavilions 
provided subject interest rather than a cultural focus. The largest manufacturers created 
pavilions, and coupled with retail outlets, restaurants, parks, international space, playgrounds, 
and practical amenities, the Expo covered 1000 acres. While separate from the world, the 
Expo was of the world. These ‘1000 acres’ were an opportunity to condense the best and 
most interesting aspects of the world as a snapshot of history, progress and hope. Pavilion 
size, location, and composition would quickly announce to visitors and the media of the place 
that particular nation occupied in international power relations. It was an opportunity to 
present an ideal national culture, and was funded by governments with various foreign policy 
objectives. The international media played the most important part, distributing messages to 
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the world and providing stories that would be immortalised in the archives. Visitors, hosts, 
diplomats and other staff would go on to confirm the media stories when they returned home. 
For the host nation, as was the case with Melbourne when hosting the Olympic Games, it was 
a chance to carve a space in international history. 
A sample of newspaper articles reveals national pride and camaraderie. Journalists 
commented that this Expo was the ‘greatest world’s fair in history’161 and that it gave all 
Canadians something to boast about, with attendance almost double what the planners had 
predicated. During preparations, the local media proclaimed that the major benefits of the 
Expo would be increased tourism and better foreign understanding of Canada, as 
international media had ‘spread knowledge of Canada as never before.’162 Canadians also had 
a chance to experience other nations in a ‘collection of foreign achievement one could 
otherwise never hope to see in a lifetime of travel.’163 The policy objectives of hosting the 
event were to increase awareness and interest in Canadian culture in order to improve 
Canada’s international image and encourage trade and tourism, while consolidating local 
culture to the domestic audience. 
For Canada in 1967, the Expo was a chance to stand out. A journalist working for the 
Toronto Star noted that all other great fairs had been in cities that already had an established 
international reputation. Montreal’s fair would change the world’ view of a quaint, out-of-
the-way city (and by extension, country) to a ‘city with an exciting present and a limitless 
future.’164 For the first time, Canadians saw themselves on US television and were praised in 
international newspapers.165 For one journalist ‘this mark[ed] the point where the nation’s 
maturity [was] recognised by her own people and by the rest of the world.’166 Expo 67 also 
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attracted a host of international celebrities, royals, and political leaders.167 The attendance of 
celebrities alone brought Montreal to the international media’s attention. 
Summary 
The Expo was significant on a local, national and international scale. It affected everything 
from local businesses and transport infrastructure to national reputations. It was also 
expensive and disruptive. Expo 67 was an excuse for Montreal to build a much-needed 
subway system and a public housing project.168 With the constructed islands, amusement 
parks and pavilions still in use, Montreal continues to enjoy the infrastructure and innovation 
developed for the exhibition. Expo 67 is still used as a reference point in news articles on 
various topics, and is always discussed with pride.169 
While the effects of cultural diplomacy are notoriously difficult to measure, it can be argued 
that the process of its creation and execution bring the real value in a case such as Expo 67. It 
was a chance to determine the story told to both domestic and international audiences. By 
being encouraged to select particular cultural aspects to advertise to others, the organisers 
chose to highlight the very best of their culture to their domestic audience. Another benefit of 
participation included becoming part of the story of international history. Being involved in 
significant international events signifies that nations also contribute to the international arena 
on a broader scale. International expos truly are ‘the world in 1000 acres’, a targeted forum 
for presenting a foreign policy objective in the guise of culture. The calm of the Australian 
Pavilion is still remembered by attendees, and colours their perception of the Australian way 
of life. Each pavilion highlighted the benefits of trade and tourism. The Australian Pavilion’s 
prioritisation of wool, manufacturing, the landscape of bushland and the Great Barrier Reef 
and an atmosphere of calm were cultural experiences designed to encourage the foreign 
policy objectives of increasing trade and tourism. 
All cultural diplomacy programmes need some way of promoting their message. Newspapers 
provided stories and images but they took time to prepare, print and deliver. Radio was a far 
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quicker method of information dissemination. The Radio Australia programme used local 
languages to tailor messages to the audience, and that announced Australian participation in 
regional and international events like the Expo, advertised the great works of the Colombo 
Plan and broadcasted the results of the Olympic Games and other sports almost 
instantaneously. Radio Australia was a forum through which the Australian Government 
deliberately promoted Australian culture in support of foreign policies, and as this function 
was the raison d'être for the organisation, it provides a fitting final case study to this work on 
cultural diplomacy in the Menzies Era. 
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Radio has a considerably shorter history than sports, expositions, international aid or student 
exchange, so is present in fewer cultural histories- there was no date for its invention, 
however by the early 1900s it was in regular use. As an Australian Government initiative, 
Radio Australia (created in 1939 and still broadcasting today) has a presence in the archives, 
although little has been written about it in the domestic press and its audience was primarily 
international. The effects of Radio Australia are difficult to ascertain, but the intention is clear 
and the methods were recorded. The acceptance of the programme by international audiences 
has been gauged by the letters received by the organisation and its continued popularity in 
polls. A history of radio and its development in Australia, and the conjunction of propaganda 
and radio, are addressed in this chapter, followed by an investigation into the archival 
material, to tell the story of Radio Australia’s role in the Menzies Era. The foreign policy 
objective was clearly stated in regards to Radio Australia, and particular interest lies in how 
the broadcaster used Australian culture to soften the foreign policy message and create a tool 
of diplomacy. 
The Progress of Radio 
Radio allows an extension of the powerful oratory that has been used for centuries to inform 
and influence the masses. John Potts tells us that ‘in all societies the control of sound is 
connected to power.’1 Public spaces have been formed into auditoriums to spread a leader’s 
words to a large audience. Towns and communities across the world use religious centres, 
town squares, assembly halls and fora as listening spaces. Potts states that for Plato, the ‘ideal 
size of a city was such that all citizens could hear a speaker,’ and regulation of the city was 
assured in an ‘aural zone of restricted size.’2 Contemporary societies have developed the 
capacity to record and reproduce sound, and this makes control and power more complex. As 
King George’s 1936 New Year Speech was broadcast to Australia, ‘it was celebrated by the 
broadcasting industry as demonstrating radio’s role as the unifying voice of the Empire.’3 The 
‘ideal size of a city’ stretches across the globe. 
The introduction of radio widened the aural reach of speakers, and conversely shrunk the 
aural experience. From listening in a public forum in the company of a community, people 
can now listen to speakers individually and privately, with nobody knowing what they are 
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listening to. As with all technology when it is first introduced, radio has been ‘considered in 
terms of cause and effect.’4 Does the technology change a culture? Or do changes in society 
lead to demand for the technology? Technology is undoubtedly an agent of social change, 
highlighted by the common practice of regarding historical periods in terms of the dominant 
technology of the time. Physical distance is no longer an impediment to communication, and 
people can simultaneously hear domestic and international news. From the initial experiments 
with sound waves, radio became one of the most influential media of the 20th century. 
Radio was not ‘invented’ per se, as it developed from the work of various thinkers.5 In 1895, 
Guglielmo Marconi sent a radio signal across the garden of his father’s home; two years later, 
he had increased the distance to two miles, and by 1907 ‘the Atlantic was alive with Radio 
telegrams between England and Canada.’6 Once developed, the technology proved incredibly 
popular, with professionals and amateur enthusiasts developing transceivers and receivers. 
Battles for the control of transceivers and the establishment of defined broadcasting stations 
saw the establishment of 131 such stations across Australia by the end of the 1930s, with 
approximately 310,000 receivers. An early radio enthusiast, Billy Hughes, commented that 
‘wireless is the Spirit of Civilisation made manifest.’7 As a carrier of knowledge, Hughes 
explained that it would ‘help all men to know one another, to understand each other’s point of 
view.’8 He believed that broadcasting would be a powerful tool for reaching out to distant 
parts of Australia, and could exert more influence than any other agency. From very early on, 
the government saw radio’s potential and acted upon it. Hughes did not work for a 
programme of cultural diplomacy, but he did see the potential of this medium to affect 
opinions and create relationships. Australian radio went on to serve two important aspects of 
cultural diplomacy: by broadcasting the successes of other Australian diplomacy projects, it 
reinforced the policies Australia supported; and international programming promoted foreign 
policy aims by projecting cultural explanations.9 
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In Australia, the government found that it needed to regulate the new flow of 
communications, tasking the Postmaster General with the responsibility in 192310 and then 
establishing the ABC in 1932.11 The public quickly saw the potential of this medium, and 
quiz and variety shows, plays, comedians, expert speakers and news bulletins were broadcast, 
along with live and recorded music. Sports reporting provided immediate results unavailable 
to newspapers, and horse racing was broadcast live from the late 1920s. Educational 
programmes, initiated in 1924 by the Education Department, proved very popular in remote 
areas, and the government committed resources to these.12 The best of Australian culture was 
consolidated and broadcast. 
In September 1939, Menzies made the most significant announcement in Australian radio 
history, and his words shook the nation: ‘It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially in 
that consequence of the persistence by Germany and her invasion of Poland, Great Britain 
has declared war upon her, and that, as a result, Australia is also at war.’13 This 
announcement immediately saw a shift in radio broadcasting, and brought to prominence 
radio’s value as an instrument of propaganda. The previously popular Italian tenors and 
Wagnerian Operas were banned from the airwaves in a show of patriotism. Commentary was 
careful to avoid any military details, in case broadcasts designed for domestic audiences were 
picked up by international transceivers. As Japan entered the war in 1941, more caution was 
exercised, and R. R. Walker noted that no mention of the state of the weather could be made 
on air,14 out of fear of giving the enemy information about local flying or shipping 
conditions. 
The Department of Information, created in 1939, began producing programmes for domestic 
propaganda: ‘Anti-Complacency,’ ‘Vegetable growing,’ ‘Absenteeism’ and ‘Anti-gossip’ 
were a few examples. These were complemented by advertisements for war bonds and armed 
forces recruitment campaigns. ‘Australia Calling’ was a psychological warfare project, 
broadcasting to international audiences in Japanese, Thai, Indonesian and Mandarin. When 
Curtin announced the project, he said its purpose was simple: as much of the propaganda on 
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Australia and Britain was incorrect, it was time for them to speak for themselves.15 Both the 
domestic and international scripts supported government objectives. 
The Australian Government funded Radio Australia, which was managed by the ABC, with 
advice from the DEA, throughout the Menzies Era. This created tension between the 
organisations, as the Department wanted more focus on foreign policy objectives, while the 
Commission wanted to be seen as independent professional journalists, focusing on the 
‘truth’ and integrity of reporting. Both sides had to compromise and the intentions were 
always to share ideas and information, to form long-term people-to-people relationships, to 
listen to audience needs and adjust the programme in a collaborative project and to promote 
Australian culture in the service of government policy. The story of Radio Australia is the 
story of an exchange of cultural experiences for the benefit of a foreign policy programme, in 
what would now be known as a cultural diplomacy programme. The struggle for Radio 
Australia is described by Errol Hodge in Radio Wars, which explores the aims and uses of the 
station.16 International broadcasts are most effective when local broadcasts are inadequate, 
especially in developing countries, where large audiences tune in to international broadcasts. 
Authoritarian governments and national crises mean that people look to international 
broadcasts for reliable news.17 Radio Australia’s news broadcasts combined those from their 
own correspondents and from other Western news agencies. 
Created in 1939, Radio Australia was from its conception a product of war and propaganda. 
The service was originally named ‘Australia Calling’ and was ‘immediately thrust into 
bureaucratic politics without a tradition to sustain autonomy.’18 By 1949, the executives were 
operating within the politics of the Cold War. Hodge noted that control of the service in 
Australia was a ‘perpetual struggle between the ABC and the DEA.’19 This is supported by 
archival evidence, with the Department’s view that Radio Australia ‘should be used 
sensitively in a way that supported Australian foreign policy.’20 ABC executives were loath 
to be controlled by a political entity. Guided by the BBC21, the ABC was determined to set its 
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own agenda. The international broadcasting service of the BBC was ‘an exercise in cultural 
imperialism in the literal sense of the words,’ with broadcasts designed to strengthen the 
cultural, political and economic bonds between Britain and its dominions, with close 
collaboration between the BBC and the Foreign Office.22 The Voice of America (VOA) radio 
programmes were known to be government-sponsored propaganda, with its messages directly 
dictated by the State Department. The BBC’s idea of ‘collaboration,’ as opposed to 
government sponsorship, suggested reliability of information but not government-
manufactured information, and the ABC benefitted from this reputation. 
Percy Spender was keen for Radio Australia to ‘make a useful contribution to the 
government’s policy,’23 especially regarding the encouragement of cooperation in South East 
Asia. He argued that this special overseas service had the ability to transmit Australia’s 
viewpoint and complement the political and economic policies designed to stabilise the area. 
Spender supported foreign-language transmissions, with news and commentaries designed for 
the region. He encouraged its expansion and collaboration with the BBC and the VOA, 
especially as the ANZUS Treaty was established and while the war in Korea escalated. Both 
the DEA and the Defence Department saw Radio Australia as an important tool in Australia’s 
security, and expected that it would provide ‘a link in the propaganda chain of the 
democracies.’24 Casey, Tange and Hasluck were all advocates of the American model of 
international broadcasting, in which there was little effort to conceal the connection to foreign 
policy. Hasluck stated in an interview that the service ‘was created and funds [were] provided 
to serve the ends of national policy. The programmes and especially the news broadcasts to 
Asia should be devised accordingly.’25 The ABC was less keen to be a government voice. 
James Darling, Chairman of the ABC, argued that the VOA ‘lacked acceptability’ in Asia 
because of its obvious political association, and he strongly resisted the Department’s 
‘attempts to bring ABC correspondents under the control of various embassies.’26 While he 
believed that Radio Australia should be an independent entity, consultation with the 
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Department provided information that may have prevented unsuitable or controversial 
broadcasts. Darling saw Radio Australia as the ‘brightest jewel in the ABC crown.’27 
From the ABC’s perspective, trust was the prime motivator for these broadcasts. Walter 
Hamilton, long-time MP in Victoria and South Australia, claimed that Radio Australia was 
listened to because it was trusted, particularly throughout Asia.28 At a seminar in Adelaide in 
1972, Hamilton said: ‘we simply could not agree to Radio Australia becoming a propaganda 
medium,’ and that he felt that the Department ‘could not understand that once we started to 
tamper with the news, people would stop trusting Radio Australia and it would become 
utterly useless.’29 The credibility important to professional communicators, and the 
propaganda motives of the Department, would see Radio Australia walk a permanent 
tightrope. Noel Goss, the Department’s Liaison Officer, walked this tightrope. The 
Department needed him to put forward a message of anti-communism, and his job was to 
encourage Radio Australia executives to do so. He proposed that communism be seen ‘as a 
new kind of imperialism,’ and that countries who had recently won their independence should 
be wary of the new threat.30 The message he delivered was not that communism is bad, but 
that democracy is better, using Australian successes under a democratic government as an 
example. 
Another purpose of Radio Australia was to establish contacts and relationships, and to further 
develop and install technology, all of which could be deployed in the event of hostilities; this 
was a direct instrument of Australia’s military security. By creating a reputation as a source 
of information separate from government, Radio Australia had the opportunity to establish its 
reputation as the ‘Voice of Australia,’ not a particular section of society or aligned with any 
specific party.31 This further increased its validity as a source for reliable information and 
friendliness, and indirectly increased Australian government standing against others 
attempting to gain control or power over the audience. 
Radio Australia publicised the activities of the Colombo Plan students. As part of this Plan, 
they also distributed radio transmitters to teachers and village leaders in some participating 
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countries.32 Casey noted that he made recordings on Colombo Plan activities to be broadcast 
on Radio Australia,33 and in 1955, Radio Australia considered using Colombo Plan students 
in Australia as staff, as their knowledge of audience culture would be invaluable.34 This 
shows two ways in which Radio Australia was used as a tool of what we would now call 
cultural diplomacy. By providing technology to selected countries under the Colombo Plan, 
the Australian Government ensured that communities heard messages they otherwise would 
not. As the provider of the technology was Australia, it is likely that the radios were tuned to 
Radio Australia. Listeners would hear of the adventures and accomplishments of local 
students studying in Australia, thus promoting both the Plan and the Australian way of life. 
 
Figure 7.1 Asian students take part in a Radio Australia broadcast, 195735 
Radio Australia also entertained its listeners- recalling the idea that cultural diplomacy efforts 
should be enjoyable.36 Recordings of Australian musical artists were sometimes 
complemented by other Western artists, as recorded music discs were limited at that time. 
Plays and serial shows were broadcast for both the domestic and international audience, and 
English language lessons were a popular introduction in 1959. Casey agreed that the 
entertainment component of Radio Australia was of high quality, but he regarded the 
entertainment merely as a ‘carrier’ for the political content.37 Recent studies show that music 
is invaluable to the retention of aural messages. Had Casey understood the importance of 
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entertainment in supporting information, he may have realised that this ‘carrier’ should be a 
priority. This limitation was acknowledged in planning the modern cultural diplomacy 
programme.38 
As it combined entertainment and support for foreign policy efforts, Radio Australia included 
sports reporting. This was especially popular for international matches, where results could 
be relayed almost instantaneously while promoting Australia as a ‘sporting’ nation in all 
senses of the word. Radio Australia also became an important agent for broadcasting news 
about the Melbourne Olympic Games. This was of particular benefit to South East Asian 
countries, who could not afford to send their own commentary teams to the Games. As the 
first Games in the Southern Hemisphere, this was the first at which there was significant 
Asian participation, and Radio Australia listeners in South East Asia were keen for news. 
The Department sent guidelines of the official government position on news items and 
international relations to Radio Australia staff. When Hasluck suggested in 1964 that Radio 
Australia move to Canberra, separating it from the ABC and placing it under Cabinet control, 
his reasoning was that service should be seen as an instrument of national policy. Patrick 
Shaw at the DEA felt that there would be considerable disadvantages if the entity became an 
obvious instrument of government.39 This suggestion made no real progress, but it highlights 
the tussle between the authorities for control of the valuable tool. Radio is an instrument of 
propaganda, and when funded by governments it would be expected to project the 
government’s messages. By using an external party to manage this, some distance was 
created.40 A little criticism of government decisions, a focus on social issues and a sharing of 
cultural experiences kept this service from being solely a propaganda tool. 
Radio Australia was born from the need for a government-controlled vehicle for propaganda. 
While the ABC management pushed their professional journalism, storytelling and priority of 
presenting unbiased programmes, it was Radio Australia’s purpose as an instrument of 
propaganda, meant to influence the audience about the government’s way of thinking, which 
kept the programme on air. Understanding the role of radio in propaganda, and judiciously 
steering content to be more acceptable to the audience, is what made Radio Australia a 
successful programme. 
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Radio, Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy 
Shortwave radio could spread news, and reactions to it, across the world quicker than any 
other medium. Radio is able to convey the sound of the human voice with inflections and 
moods, so is considerably more effective at raising emotions than print media. The Nazis in 
pre-war Germany were the first to see, and then develop, radio as a means of international 
propaganda, and used it as an extension of diplomacy. Joseph Goebbels even claimed that 
radio propaganda was ‘virtually a substitute for diplomacy.’41 There was no two-way 
communication and no negotiation: the government informed the public of policies on a mass 
scale, using impassioned speeches to excite them. And whenever there is propaganda, there is 
a struggle for power. 
Propaganda is defined ‘as any organized or concerted group effort or movement to spread a 
particular doctrine or…principle.’42 In German hands, the word propaganda became 
associated with deceit and corruption, whereas American efforts were portrayed as 
‘educational and informative.’43 There was no medium of appeal that the US Committee of 
Public Information did not use to encourage public support for entry into World War One, 
commandeering ‘print, radio, motion pictures, telegraph, cable messages and worldwide 
circulation of Presidential addresses, posters, signboards, and a volunteer corps of speakers 
who worked across thousands of communities giving short speeches.’44 Propaganda is 
intentional, advantageous to the sender, and usually one-way and informational. It is not two-
way, interactive communication, hence its relationship with radio. Walter Lippman noted that 
without some censorship, propaganda is impossible,45 as someone needs to decide what the 
propaganda message will be and what it will not be. Effective propaganda involves some 
barrier between the public and the event. Propaganda is more easily injected into the news 
from the inside than the outside, and between 1945 and 1970, the most valued Central Bureau 
of Investigation (CIA) agents belonged to big media outlets, passing as journalists, who 
shaped information to suit the government’s purposes. The challenge for most news media is 
that it has five audiences—the reporters, general public, target nation, enemy and 
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troops/emissaries/expats.46 Radio Australia did involve the injection of some propaganda 
elements from government agencies, but it also prioritised two-way communication by 
incorporating audience feedback. 
World War Two was a testing-ground for psychological warfare, and many nations used 
radio to promote their political programmes. This type of propaganda can be osmotic, with its 
influence ‘percolating into the mind persistently but painlessly,’ or it can be an ‘explosive 
weapon’ in a struggle for freedom or an aggressive diplomacy.47 The Nazis had determined to 
convince the masses of their cause as quickly as possible, in order to achieve specific political 
ends in a short time. At the opposite end of the scale, the BBC continued with a long-term 
programme of gaining trust and loyalty, and continued this throughout that war. The VOA 
and Soviet broadcasters operated in a middle ground, pushing propaganda messages less 
forcefully than the Germans but more obviously than the British. Radio Australia followed 
the lead of the BBC in these early years, focusing on gaining loyalty and a reputation for 
trustworthiness and using the knowledge of the audience to regulate messages. 
An understanding of the audience is essential for any international communications to be 
effective. Case studies have shown that the closer a programme is linked to a government or 
its agenda, the less legitimacy it has among its target audience.48 Gienow-Hecht and Mark 
Donfried explain that in general, ‘citizens of any country tend to dislike messages distributed 
by foreign governments,’ often associating them with propaganda.49 This is important to 
cultural diplomacy, as programmes are removed from specific policy objectives and become 
more aligned with national and individual relationships. It is not possible to win the hearts 
and minds of others without trust, and trust is based on good relationships and positive 
influences. The best way to influence an audience is through entertainment, as the principles 
of edutainment explain.50 A branch of cultural diplomacy that looks at musical diplomacy 
highlights the confluence of entertainment and information, which is through radio. Radio 
Australia promoted Australian artists in its music programming, and supplemented them with 
American and British performances. These decisions were based on availability and letters of 
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request. Music is easy to listen to and remember, and the combination of music’s broad 
appeal and its seeming political neutrality make it a special form of propaganda.51 
The jazz movement in America was a particularly powerful tool of cultural diplomacy. Lisa 
E. Davenport explores how the ‘cultural expression of one of the nation’s most oppressed 
minorities came to symbolize the cultural superiority of American democracy.’52 She writes 
that the US addressed the issue of race in a global context, and through this aligned its 
domestic cultural policies with the anti-communist agenda of the Cold War. America could 
not condemn other regimes while its own society allowed for segregation. This would be seen 
as hypocritical in any cultural diplomacy programmes that rely on the image of the 
protagonist. Ignoring this paradox would undermine its effectiveness in counteracting Soviet 
initiatives, and would seriously hamper US efforts to promote cultural understanding between 
nations if it could not do this at home. In order to belong to—and in some respects to lead—
an international community, some universal rules must be adhered to, such as human rights 
and equality. 
The effect of music and the relationships between musicians and their audience is powerful. 
Gienow-Hecht explores this in her study of music diplomacy, with a focus on German-
American relations in the 19th century. She argues that the emotions contained in non-verbal 
communication provide a more intense and enduring relationship than political encounters, 
creating bonds that have ‘surviv[ed] broken treaties, mutual alienation, and even several 
wars.’53 Cultural anthropologists argue that emotions are not just part of the psychological 
system but attain meaning through context: the music is given power because it is associated 
with the listener’s other physical experiences, such as location and company. This highlights 
the power that the emotion caused by music can have, and the ways that it can effect more 
formal political decisions. Gienow-Hecht discusses the effects of ‘emotional history,’ and 
how this can influence political decision-makers and cultural relations between countries. By 
the 20th century, radio broadcasts allowed a broader reach for musical exchange. A mix of 
verbal and non-verbal communication could produce a similar emotional attachment, and 
broadcast management teams manipulated this in programmes that supported foreign policy 
aims. 
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Figure 7.2: Teodoro Valencia presents Filipino records to Peter Homfray, Director of 
Radio Australia, in Melbourne, 195854 
While Radio Australia did not focus particularly on its musical selection, this does not affect 
its effect as a cultural diplomacy style programme. Radio Australia writers did include songs 
in their language programmes, showing that there were the beginnings of an understanding of 
the importance of sharing music in friendly relationships. Casey believed that the musical 
component was simply a carrier for political comment, so it is not surprising that there was 
little direct focus.55 Music was shared, and the above image illustrates the gift of Filipino 
music to Radio Australia. Without an archival record of music, we cannot know how 
influential particular selections might have been to audiences. A closer examination of 
musical selections would help understandings of the effects of music and entertainment on 
the reception of the more formal broadcasting messages. These modern music theories 
suggest that the insistence of ABC management to control programming and produce an 
entertaining broadcast may have been more successful than a propaganda-focused 
government offering. 
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As the primary intention of international radio is to inform rather than to entertain, music is a 
small part of broadcasting schedules. However, it helps to connect information to emotions, 
making it significantly more powerful. Radio Australia used music and entertainment as part 
of the programme of winning the hearts and minds of its audiences. The directives and 
communications in the archives clearly show that this was a propaganda machine, but that the 
methods used were meant to promote international friendships, educate and entertain 
audiences and promote the messages of the government. The newspaper articles and letters 
received by the station attest to its success. 
Australia Calling56 
Radio Australia had an estimated two million listeners in 1947, although ‘from a policy point 
of view’ the composition of the audience was more important than the quantity.57 In Western 
countries, all types of people listened to the radio, from blue-collar workers to political 
leaders. However, this was not the case in Asia. Government officials, teachers and 
merchants were most likely to have a transceiver, as well as be most likely to have some 
knowledge of English. Radio Australia broadcasts were often translated into local languages 
and re-quoted by newspapers and radio stations. These other media outlets soon relied on 
Radio Australia as the official source of news on Australia. 
In 1948, Robin Wood at the Commonwealth Department of Information presented a report on 
Radio Australia, with the purpose of examining the impact that radio was making on the lives 
of people throughout the world.58 He noted that broadcasting had ended isolation, and that 
people who had felt ‘separate and separated, now have a sense of belonging.’59 Broadcasting, 
which was seen as a vital instrument for realising democracy, was powerful. Its success as a 
tool of psychological warfare demonstrated the value of retaining a ‘properly organised radio 
division within the government’s control.’60 In peacetime it was considered vital to use the 
medium to familiarise Australia’s nearest neighbours of ‘our way of living, our commercial 
policies, our developmental undertakings, and our industrial and agricultural potentials, as 
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well as Australia’s aim to strengthen and help preserve world peace.’61 The volume of mail 
from listeners, coupled with a dedicated space for programme guides in newspapers, 
highlight the breadth of the audience and thus the possibilities of this forum. In a comment 
reminiscent of ideas about edutainment, Wood argued that while news and reviews were 
important, it was with the featured entertainment programmes that ‘we must endeavour to 
maintain the listener’s lively interest.’62 The ABC was able to obtain without cost some of the 
entertaining serials and music from commercial stations. As Wood stated: ‘all of these 
units…are an excellent medium for painting a picture of our national life.’63 The Amateur 
Hour was immensely popular with listeners. A weekly devotional service and sports reporting 
saw Radio Australia provide a well-rounded picture of Australian culture. Wood also noted 
that listeners included Australian Defence Force personnel serving overseas, who welcomed 
broadcasts from home. 
As early as 1948, Radio Australia was one of the most popular broadcasters in the Asia 
Pacific region. Wood’s account confirmed that this forum of communication, so important for 
war propaganda, had an equally important purpose in establishing a national picture of 
Australia and promoting its reputation of goodwill and friendship, in order to gain the 
sympathy and understanding of other nations. A similar letter from inside the Department of 
Information agreed that Radio Australia should ‘concentrate on building up a receptive 
listening audience until such time as we have a greater need,’ and perhaps a need to revert to 
political propaganda.64 While other countries still pushed overtly propagandistic programmes, 
and the best option for Australia was to differentiate its offerings, creating programmes that 
were more informative and entertaining, and less obviously political. 
In this period, Moscow also broadcast a special Far Eastern programme, with at least 15 
hours relayed daily over 20 stations.65 By far the greatest attention was given to the Japanese 
sessions, followed by Chinese and Korean. While the Russians invested in Japanese 
transmissions, Radio Australia transcriptions occupied up to one-quarter of the Japanese 
Radiopress bulletins to its own news agencies.66 The Japanese audience heard news and 
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views from the whole world. Radio Australia had two distinct advantages: it was the 
strongest signal in the region due to powerful transmitters, and it had a good reputation 
gained during the war as an ‘impartial and reliable provider of news.’67 In contrast to the big 
powers of the US and Russia, Australia was not seen to have any ‘particular axe to grind.’68 
The Department of Information kept Radio Australia informed about international events and 
relevant government policies. For example, a note from October 1949 reads: ‘We have 
received from the Office of our High Commissioner in New Delhi a suggestion that Radio 
Australia should treat news of the fighting in Burma with very great caution.’69 The 
Commissioner advised that the fighting was on a smaller scale than was being broadcast, and 
wanted to ensure that the accuracy of Radio Australia was maintained. This liaison between 
the local posts of the DEA and Radio Australia was vital. Similarly, a letter from the Head of 
the Australian Mission in Japan, Patrick Shaw, discussed the concerns that ‘ill-will towards 
our country engendered by enemy propaganda during the war should be perpetuated by our 
own news and publicity concerning administrative details.’70 By this he was referring to 
immigration policy, and that references to this policy had the effect of drawing attention to 
the exclusion of Asians from Australia. Shaw stated that the term White Australia 
‘exacerbate[d] the temper of Asians already ill disposed’71 towards this policy. In response, 
Radio Australia checked the transcripts of their international broadcasts and found very few 
references to this term. Further investigation raised the point that some of the ABC’s 
domestic broadcasts could be picked up by Asian transmitters, highlighting the need to be 
mindful of the wording of all broadcasts.72 In a draft letter to the Minister of Defence, P. A. 
McBride, Spender wrote that neither Radio Australia nor the Listening Post73 was in a 
position to meet any wartime needs. He felt that this could only be achieved ‘by the operation 
in peacetime of at least a skeleton of the larger organisation required in the event of war.’74 
The expansion of both entities was hoped for; one to broadcast Australian ideas and the other 
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to check reactions. In war time, Spender noted, ‘such a check on the results of propaganda 
and psychological warfare would be essential,’75 emphasising the need for listening as well as 
projecting. As Minister for External Affairs, Spender saw the importance of ensuring that the 
message was understood as it was intended, and that this was best gauged by seeking local 
opinion.76 
A memo to all Australian posts in Asia dispatched in April 1954 suggested that overseas 
posts could be of great assistance to Radio Australia if they would send information on 
special topics or events.77 The ABC and Radio Australia would also ‘find helpful any reports 
which posts might be able to provide with regard to the general atmosphere of the country in 
which they are stationed, what the people of the country are feeling and what they are talking 
about.’78 This background information on the general atmosphere would be useful to 
scriptwriters, and it did not need to be ‘of a formal nature and could be supplemented from 
time to time as it was thought appropriate.’79 The memo suggests the local activity of the 
Colombo Plan, any major achievements of the new democracies in the region and any events 
that may make clear the Australian point of view. Liaison is a valuable aspect of all 
collaborative projects, and that between the ABC and the Department was vital to Radio 
Australia’s success. 
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Figure 7.3: Two Indonesian students newly-arrived in Australia under the Colombo 
Plan are interviewed for Radio Australia in Melbourne, 195880 
The collaboration between the DEA and the ABC regarding Radio Australia was confirmed 
by the appointment of a dedicated liaison officer in 1950.81 The Minister of External Affairs 
would give his liaison officer an indication of policy lines, and they would then be 
responsible for drawing ‘the attention of the editorial staff to matters which appear to conflict 
with foreign policy.’82 The idea was to ensure that Australia’s image as a ‘good neighbour’ 
was maintained, and that there would be no confusing or contradictory messages. All formal 
decisions and responsibility would rest with the editor. Noel Goss was appointed to this post, 
and his communications discussed the reluctance of Radio Australia staff to accept 
Department interference.83 Goss understood that the job of the liaison officer was to ensure 
that the material broadcast would not have any adverse effects on Australia, or cause 
undesired reactions from listeners. This collaboration was not obvious or publicised. Radio 
Australia did work with the editors of Hemisphere magazine though, to share knowledge and 
stories.84 This association would be expected, as both were targeted at an Asia Pacific 
audience, and both encouraged audience participation in producing content. 
The Department provided suggestions as to how to treat news items and commentaries on 
particular international events that may have been contentious. In 1954, regarding general and 
specific concerns about the Middle East, the ‘over-riding objective [was to] be a reduction in 
                                                          
80 Neil Murray, NAA, A1501, A708/4, 8909186 
81 ‘Radio Australia—Weekly Commentary,’ 30 April, 1953, Series A1838, 570/1/2 Part 4, NAA. 
82 ibid. 
83 Noel Goss, to Owen Davis, ‘Liaison with Radio Australia,’ 1954, Series A1838, 570/1/2 Part 2, NAA. 
84 Letters between Selwyn Speight, C. C. Brammall, Robin Wood, Peter Homfray and others, Series A1361/1, 
50/2/6, NAA. 
Broadcasting Australia 
205 
tension’ with the broad hope that an outbreak in hostilities be avoided.85 Any judgement over 
right or wrong was to be sidestepped. Wording should be used that defence strategies were 
being arranged by the countries involved, and not that they were being ‘imposed’ on them by 
external powers (this would remove suggestions of interference by colonial oppressors and 
encourage ideas of independence in those nations). Regarding Egypt, although the Australian 
Government was not supportive of the actions of the military regime, it acknowledged a 
country’s right to determine its own political path, so advised that the Egyptian regime be 
viewed with ‘relative favour.’86 In general, Radio Australia was to broadcast favourably on 
the important ‘constitutional advances’ made by non-self-governing territories, to encourage 
them. The Australian Government wished to make clear its support of ‘Asian claims to 
independence and self-government,’ and wished to aid those countries in their struggle for 
freedom.87 This advice from the Department was not always adhered to, and there were some 
slips. Department of External Affairs (DEA) Officer Woolcott wrote to Radio Australia 
regarding the breakfast session by Russ Tyson.88 Tyson had a habit of including potentially 
offensive ‘Ah Too’ jokes, which could ‘imply an attitude of superiority’ and ‘could be 
offensive to Asian audiences.’89 These jokes were contrary to the image that Radio Australia 
and the Department were trying to project, and it was strongly advised that Tyson find a new 
subject of humour. 
The tussle of control between the ABC and the DEA was to continue through the decade, 
with the Department struggling for cooperation and the ABC resisting it. The Department did 
not want to establish a public relationship as Radio Australia’s independence was one of the 
primary reasons for its success.90 But as both organisations were working for the same 
national interests, a relationship of trust between them was essential. The Department was 
also careful to acknowledge that ‘there is a real and important distinction between the roles of 
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the ABC and Radio Australia.’91 The Department did not have control over the voice of this 
diplomatic tool, increasing the importance that they be acknowledged and consulted by Radio 
Australia executives. 
The Department was ‘keenly aware’ of the size of the audience Radio Australia attracted.92 
Woolcott was at pains to reassure Radio Australia that they appreciated its approach to 
overseas broadcasting, but were ‘concerned to see that due account is taken of our views and 
that Radio Australia does not broadcast material’ that might be harmful to Australian interests 
or may have run counter to foreign policy.93 A note in the file for June 1965 suggests that 
consultations had resumed.94 
In 1953, it was proposed that a series of commentaries be given immediately after the news 
broadcast, to support government policy ideals. These would be given by a small panel of 
speakers who were ‘willing to accept Departmental suggestions of policy.’95 University staff 
and other influential speakers comprised the panel, and were chosen because of their 
knowledge and authority. The debate over whether to have a panel of commentators 
(preferred by the ABC) or a single authoritative speaker (preferred by the Department) was 
continual. Charles Moses of the ABC wrote to Arthur Tange of the Department, stating that 
the listener: 
derives most of his confidence in “Radio Australia” from his belief that it comes from a 
country that is so free and straightforward that it is willing to put on all sorts of people and 
give them full reign to say what they thing about Australia and all the countries in the 
world.96 
Moses saw this as a particular selling point because none of the countries in the region had as 
much individual freedom as Australia, and this contributed to the policies of democracy that 
the government encouraged. A single spokesman, he warned, would come to be seen as a 
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‘spokesman for the government of the day,’97 negating the image Radio Australia was trying 
to project. Tange responded that the general education levels in South East Asia were at quite 
a different level to what the commentators projected, and this must be addressed.98 Moses felt 
that this was easily remedied, and the panel of commentators continued. 
The Department compiled a list of dates important to their international audience.99 By 
recognising various significant political and religious holidays, the Department and Radio 
Australia showed respect to their audience. Understanding the local situation could determine 
success or failure. A proposed broadcast to Indonesia between 1.30 and 2.30 pm local time 
would likely not be heard. When the broadcaster learned that the local meal hour lasts 
‘roughly from 1.30-2.30, the siesta from 2.30-3.30,’100 the programme was moved to a more 
suitable time. This local knowledge worked both ways, to provide the most effective 
programme for government policy. 
 
Richard Boyer wrote to Casey in 1953 that the response from Indonesian listeners to Radio 
Australia showed a very keen interest in Australia, its history, institutions and way of life.101 
He wrote: ‘I think we can claim some of the credit for the awakening and fostering of this 
interest.’102 This is somewhat confirmed in a 1954 DEA memo to all Asian posts, advising 
them that in Canberra they had had a number of visits from representatives of the US 
Embassy, ‘seeking information about Radio Australia’ and searching for transcripts and 
schedules.103 The Embassy officials stated that the reason for their interest was that so many 
of their own Asian posts had reported to them the effectiveness of Radio Australia. Letters 
from Indonesian listeners suggested that the audience had grown from the merchants, 
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teachers and government officials of 1947, to including shop workers, homemakers and 
farmers.104 
The success of the broadcasts continued to grow throughout the Menzies Era. In 1956 the 
DEA proposed that Wood, by now Director of Radio Australia, attend the SEATO meeting in 
Bangkok in order to boost the perception of Australia’s commitment to the group, and to the 
field of information and anti-subversion.105 One of the planned items on the agenda for the 
meeting was dealing with propaganda plans and programmes. As Radio Australia had a 
considerable audience in Asia, having its Director at these meetings would ‘show that we 
[were] prepared to make some effort to stimulate activity.’106 Wood had never travelled to 
Asia before, ‘and a visit…would give him direct knowledge of the area to which the bulk of 
his broadcasts [were] being directed.’107 First-hand knowledge of the listening audience 
would make this programme of cultural exchange more effective in supporting foreign 
policy. Also on the trip, Wood became a reality to the numerous Asians who wrote to him, 
and possibly stimulated more interest in Radio Australia.108 The opportunity of ‘making 
direct contact with the directors of broadcasting in Asian countries’ complemented the 
current correspondence exchanges. An overseas visit would ensure that Wood was able to 
help select new local staff, thus ensuring that a cohesive ideology was maintained. A 
representative stationed in Singapore would have the advantage of obtaining recordings of 
local events for broadcast, arrange ABC transcriptions for use by local stations and report on 
general requirements of the area ‘with a view to ensuring the maximum impact of Radio 
Australia programmes.’109 Wood’s input into the selection of these staff would ensure that 
government aims were met. 
At the conclusion of this tour, Wood submitted a comprehensive report.110 He found that 
listeners were ‘prone to accept the station with the clearest signal,’111 thus highlighting the 
importance of booster stations and powerful transmitters in ensuring that the Australian 
message was favoured. Not providing this risked the deterioration of reception, so a possible 
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decline in the audience, which could have left a forum for communist activities. Wood had 
had the opportunity to listen to lots of local music, and suggested that Australian orchestras 
might arrange some Chinese, Malay and Indonesian tunes that ‘appear[ed] to lend themselves 
admirably to Western treatment.’112 He thought that ‘such a programme of songs performed 
by our own orchestras and singers and devised in an interesting way might have a certain 
appeal for ABC domestic listeners apart from having high entertainment value for Radio 
Australia’s Asian audience.’113 This shows particular insight into music diplomacy theories, 
which were highly influential in creating social bonds and embracing emotional relationships 
between performers and audiences. While programmed music was rarely a topic of official 
discussion, because the entertainment aspect of the broadcast was valued by listeners it was 
certainly worthy of consideration.114 There is no evidence that this was acted upon, so it 
appears to have been a missed opportunity for cultural exchange and a possible collaborative 
project. 
Wood also noted that there was a lot of Asian interest in the forthcoming Melbourne Olympic 
Games, stating that ‘Radio Australia broadcasts on Olympic topics have been appreciated.’115 
Listeners wanted more of these, along with news of star athletes and overseas teams. The 
Melbourne Games brought the Olympic spectacle closer to the South East Asian nations than 
they had ever been before, and the viability of sending their own teams created great 
excitement. Radio Australia had an opportunity to capitalise on this event, using one cultural 
celebration to promote its own policy objectives of teamwork and friendship. 
When Wood met with the editor of the Times of Viet-Nam, Nguyen M. Thai, he was 
encouraged by the requests for material, ‘particularly of the literary type.’116 Thai offered to 
print the Radio Australia schedule regularly and free of charge. This friendliness was found 
everywhere Wood went, and is a testament to the reputation of the organisation. Wood 
suggested that broadcasts to Asia ‘could perhaps draw more attention to the similarities 
between Australia and Asian countries,’ particularly in ‘showing that we have much to learn 
from the latter, as well as much to impart to them.’117 This would be seen favourable, as 
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Asians—particularly the Chinese—disliked the ‘blowing of the national trumpet,’ so humility 
was more appropriate. Understanding local values was a key to success. 
In 1955, Casey wrote to Tange explaining that it was more important to ‘sell democracy’ than 
to ‘criticise communism.’118 Casey advised that it would be best for Radio Australia to not 
allow the day’s headlines to determine the content of the Daily Commentary too rigidly, as 
this forum allowed comment on less public events or other ideas that the Department hoped 
to promote. He also saw that making Radio Australia ‘a mouthpiece for Asian opinion would 
contribute to Australian reputation.’119 Casey used the same tactics as other successful media 
in allowing audience contribution, in order to remove any accusation of propaganda. 
The ‘Policy Guide for Radio Australia,’ was written in 1955, and noted that the dominant 
purpose of the entity was to increase understanding of Australia overseas, assist in external 
relations, ‘and generally create an atmosphere favourable to its policies.’120 This endorsed a 
very definite relation to modern theories of cultural diplomacy. It also suggested that overseas 
broadcasts ‘should provide a subtle counter to communist propaganda.’121 Broadcasts ‘should 
aim at building up the determination of uncommitted or friendly nations, particularly in Asia, 
to maintain their freedom in the face of communist menace,’ and imply that other ‘free 
democratic countries’ would support them economically and militarily in these aims.122 
Throughout, ‘it is a primary requisite that Radio Australia should maintain its reputation for 
integrity and accuracy.’123 The broadcasts must appear to function as a service to the listeners 
by providing entertainment, reliable news and informative talks. Moreover, Radio Australia 
had to avoid gaining a reputation as a propaganda station. 
The difficulty in converting confirmed communists was noted in the Guide, so instead it 
recommended appealing to those who were ‘wavering between the West and Communism, 
[were] mildly anti-pathetic to the West, or [were] with no opinions of their own.’124 
Audiences to be targeted in order of importance were the Indian listening public and the 
Indonesian audience, followed by other South East Asian audiences, including overseas 
Chinese, Japanese, Ceylonese, Pakistanis, overseas Indians, those in the British Dependent 
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Territories and the Chinese in China. The order of this list highlights areas where Australia 
already had friends, or thought it could make little impact. The Guide specifically noted that 
these broadcasts ‘must take into account of special factors affecting opinion in the area.’125 
The issues included fear of war and invasion, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, 
terrorism, ‘a substantial lack of any idea of mutual co-operation and interdependence,’126 low 
standards of living, a mixture of races and religions, a great degree of illiteracy and a desire 
to learn English. Asians do not generally fear communism, the Guide noted, except insofar as 
it is militarily powerful, and they tended to admire the achievements of communism in China. 
The audience commonly aspired to unrestricted political independence, desired economic and 
social development and appreciated individual liberties and freedom of the press. As a rule, 
the Guide advised, the Asian audience ‘desired to remain neutral in the East-West dispute,’ 
and wished to be ‘left in peace to work out their own destiny.’127 These are all themes and 
general ideas rather than specific tasks, and this is what made Radio Australia the perfect 
vehicle for this type of cultural diplomacy-style scheme. Careful programming would ensure 
that all of these themes were addressed, that the audience felt respected and that Australian 
policy goals were met. 
The members of the DEA had a flair for propaganda. The Policy Guide for Radio Australia 
stated that it was ‘possible to actively counter communism in the area.’128 The best way to do 
this was to ‘not necessarily refute communist theory directly or to criticise communist 
activities,’ but to use ‘the more subtle one of judiciously selecting and backgrounding of 
news items, and putting in a positive manner the views of the Free World in commentaries or 
talks.’129 These views, if at all possible, ‘should be presented as Asian views, where suitable 
statements by Asian leaders are available.’130 This is reminiscent of the Die Neue Zeitung 
programmed in post-war Germany, described by Gienow-Hecht.131 
Radio Australia promoted Australia as a ‘relatively small nation, not well endowed by nature, 
which should therefore neither be feared nor envied.’132 It was a champion of freedom, had 
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developed its own democratic self-government, overcome communist threats and was 
prepared and ‘eager to lay its resources in technical “know how” and equipment at the 
disposal of its Asian neighbours.’133 This subtly advertised that Australia would not ‘buy’ 
Asian friendship, but would share and help those countries who wished to grow in the same 
way that Australia had. Australia was non-threatening, independent and helpful. All letters to 
Radio Australia were answered, even technical ones. This maintained a close personal touch, 
and was important to Wood.134 
The idea for broadcasting English language lessons was raised within the Department in May 
1955, and this was likely the single most powerful act of the programme. Casey firmly 
believed that the English language was Australia’s most powerful weapon in the war for 
hearts and minds. Discussions with the BBC suggested that they would make available to the 
ABC transcriptions and booklets, significantly reducing costs.135 Initiated finally in 1959, 
Peter Homfray noted that English language teaching broadcasts ‘had excelled 
expectations.’136 The first series began in October, and by December the initial estimates of 
35,000 required booklets had risen to 85,000.137 
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Figure 7.4: Radio Australia announcer Corrie Mingkid with new announcer Miss 
Prahastoeti, Melbourne138 
Transcripts of the English language lessons provide an important insight into how Radio 
Australia used its domestic and international knowledge, combined with government policy, 
to create cultural diplomacy. Whether due to lack of funding or another unstated reason, 
lesson no. 104, broadcast in 1960, was the last session of the programme.139 Beginning with 
three voices—an English-speaking man and woman and an Indonesian speaker—listeners 
were welcomed to the show and asked to take out their workbooks. Learners were invited to 
repeat the English phrases as the Indonesian voice explained their meaning and purpose. The 
lesson moved on to a play, where students Jim and Betty have a party. They congratulate 
each other on passing their final exams, and say to one of the Indonesian students: ‘we’ll be 
very sad when you go home Hadi.’ They discuss with another Indonesian student, Jati, his 
progress in learning English over the course of his stay. He attributes his proficiency to 
practicing English with friends, and practicing listening to English in order to understand his 
lectures. He listened to the radio, had lunch with Australian students and ‘listened and 
listened.’ Australian student Jim asked Hadi what he would do when he went back to 
Indonesia: ‘What sort of job will you get?’ Hadi suggested employment in ‘some government 
department,’ and enthuses: ‘Oh, it’ll be good to be home again.’ 
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As Australian students Tom and Nancy join this group, they tell the others of their recent 
holiday in Indonesia, and Betty and Jim note that they also hope to holiday there. Another 
domestic student, Margaret, plans to go to and work in Indonesia as a journalist. To close the 
party they sing an English song they all enjoy: 
The more we are together, together, together 
The more we are together the happier we’ll be 
For your friends are my friends 
And my friends are your friends 
And the more we are together the happier we’ll be. 
The group laugh and confirm their friendship, then sing ‘Auld Lang Syne’ for Hadi who is 
leaving, explaining that English people everywhere sing this old Scottish song, especially at 
New Year’s Eve and partings. The students learn that this Scottish song is in a particular 
dialect, and spend time practising each line. These songs help reinforce friendships as they 
will be easy to remember when the friends part, and are an example of the fun of creative 
expression in cultural diplomacy projects and the power of music diplomacy. The programme 
then returns to the narrators, who remind the listeners how much they enjoyed teaching them 
English, that there is so a lot more to learn and that ‘we believe that a better understanding of 
a foreign language gives a better understanding of the people who speak that language.’ The 
hosts hope that the course helped them understand not only the English language, but the 
Australian people. This lesson cleverly encouraged international friendships, suggested to all 
listeners that students return home to good government positions, confirmed a British 
relationship (including a traditional Scottish traditional song suggests an ancient culture) and 
highlighted that Australia wants to be understood by the Indonesians (putting Indonesians in 
the position of power). This transcript shows the skills of the scriptwriters in this cultural 
diplomacy-style programme, which includes following government policy lines while 
establishing long-term relationships, promoting a favourable atmosphere for international 
trade and commerce and showing respect for the audience by understanding cultural values. 
The play in lesson no. 99 describes a very long journey by a trucker, and the dusty, barren 
terrain. This subtly reminds the Asian audience that much of Australia is uninhabitable. Draft 
transcripts were checked to ensure that the Australian messages were directed by policy, and 
also to ensure that they were not likely to cause offence. P. Peters, Department of 
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Immigration, wrote to Osman at Radio Australia, concerned that in one script a café is called 
the ‘Black Cat Café’ and should be renamed, as ‘I believe black is an unlucky colour and that 
cats are despised animals in the Muslim way of thinking.’140 
 
A letter from Richard Boyer to Casey in 1956 celebrated the results of the most recent census 
conducted by the International Shortwave Club.141 Measured every three years, Radio 
Australia had come out on top for three consecutive awards, each time moving further ahead 
of the nearest competitors. Boyer wrote: ‘I do feel this is something of which we can really be 
proud of and of which your government might take adequate notice.’142 He assured Casey 
that ‘we have won the franchise of international listening to a point which cannot be 
ignored.’143 Boyer believed that this popularity was to be found in the objectivity and 
reliability of the material they broadcasted. Boyer assured Casey that this did not mean that 
they were not selling democracy as opposed to communism, but that their method was to do 
so in a positive fashion, not in the negative way followed by the VOA. The ABC extolled the 
virtues of democracy and the benefits it had brought to Australia. Acknowledging that Casey 
and some others in the Department had ‘been somewhat critical’ of ABC policy in respect to 
Radio Australia broadcasts, Boyer was at pains to reassure that the policy objectives were at 
the forefront of their purpose. Communism and the Cold War were the two focal areas for 
government propaganda, and Radio Australia handled both thoughtfully. 
Continuing with the theme of people-to-people relationships formed by visiting different 
countries, a tour of Radio Australia staff in 1961 examined the effects of Radio Australia in 
South East Asia.144 The intention was to understand the popularity of the broadcasts and 
adjust them if necessary, to discern which programmes had had an effect on the Cold War, if 
their frequency should be increased or decreased, and ‘to determine whether there is a visible 
return for Radio Australia and hence to provide a case to Treasury to make available 
additional funds for an extension of either English or foreign language programs or both.’145 
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While cultural diplomacy projects are generally designed to outlast governments, they must 
still be justified to the Ministers responsible for funding. By listening to the audience and 
adjusting programming, Radio Australia was making this a collaborative project, in-line with 
modern theories of cultural diplomacy. 
In the 1960s Radio Australia programmes were expanding. ‘Talk’ programmes had 
progressed from a single speaker to interviews, short documentaries were presented by 
several speakers and ‘magazine’ programmes comprised several short items.146 Moses 
created a submission for Cabinet, explaining that the primary purpose of the talks was ‘to 
project Australia overseas,’ and the subject matter includes various aspects of Australian life 
and institutions, including literature and history, scientific developments, interviews with 
Asians studying and working in Australia, economic reviews, and programs on international 
affairs.147 Radio Australia was the most quoted news media in South East Asia, Moses 
advised, and ‘many daily newspapers and radio stations in the region monitor the service and 
translate it’148 where necessary. This was due to the fact that it was ‘independent of the 
Federal Government,’149 and its only task was to present the facts that matter. As Moses 
wrote, Radio Australia played ‘an increasingly important role in Australia’s good neighbour 
policy towards the nations in Asia, Africa and the Pacific.’150 
Moses was pleased that the talk programmes covered such a variety of topics, and not just 
those related to Australia. He advised that such enquiries indicated that Radio Australia was 
‘considered a source of information on general subjects,’ and that both the enquiries 
themselves, and the considered responses, added to the prestige of Radio Australia.151 The 
individual needs of specific countries were considered and special programmes were 
prepared on request. In this draft submission to Cabinet in July 1962, Moses highlighted that 
‘by far the most important development of Australian Broadcasting Commission extension 
services through Radio Australia has been the English language teaching program for 
Indonesians.’152 
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While the Australian Radio programme was very popular overseas, domestically many would 
not have known much about the purpose or content of the overseas broadcasts. Few stories 
appeared in domestic newspapers. One confirmed that to most Australians, ‘Radio Australia 
is some mysterious station which is broadcasting radio programmes from this country, but it 
is here that their knowledge of the organisation ends.’153 In 1954 The Watch informed its 
readers that it had recently discovered that Radio Australia began operations in 1944, and by 
that time transmitted Australian news and information all over the world. It proceeded to 
detail the equipment that carries these transmissions. Another newspaper reported that a 
spokesman for the DEA stated that radio was ‘one of the most important means of informing 
neighbouring countries of the Australian way of life,’ and confirmed that the DEA provided 
‘some of the material for broadcasting and actively co-operate[d] with ABC radio in 
Australian broadcasts.’154 
The Northern Standard in Darwin published an informative piece on Radio Australia, 
describing the powerful transmitters and relay stations used to transmit the programmes to 
Asia.155 The author explained how recorded concerts can be broadcast to the world, and along 
with plays, variety shows and features, ‘form an integral part of the carefully planned 
programmes of the Overseas Service.’156 News, talks and documentaries were prepared 
‘because they have the special purpose of projecting to other countries a picture of the 
Australian scene and way of life and of reflecting the attitude of the Australian people to 
national and international events.’157 Radio Australia’s presentation of ‘news and 
commentaries is impartial and objective; the ABC is not concerned with propaganda,’158 and 
for this it had earned the commendation of listeners overseas. 
In Australia, the success of Radio Australia in the International Shortwave Club survey was 
celebrated in 1956 by The Argus. Wood attributed some of this success to the ‘good 
entertaining programmes at good signal strength.’159 Again in 1962, The Age informed the 
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domestic audience of the continued success of the enterprise.160 Another triumph in the 
International Shortwave Club’s polling saw Radio Australia with the ‘most popular service in 
the world.’161 Australian readers were assured that the policy had always been to maintain 
accuracy and fair-mindedness in the treatment of the news, to allow individual comment and 
to ‘provide services which will be genuinely useful to listeners.’162 Its distance from the 
Department was appreciated, and as a journalist commented: ‘this small enterprise is doing 
Australia great good in the world, and we should be careful that no attempt is made to tamper 
with it for propagandist purposes.’163 Giving the domestic audience pride in such a successful 
programme encouraged further government support, which was the intention. 
Summary 
By the end of the Menzies Era, more than eight million radio sets serviced a population of 
approximately 11.3 million Australians. The introduction of television did not make radio 
obsolete; instead, radio focused on the voice to penetrate ‘the world of the mind, the world of 
ideas that could be sparked by sound,’164 without distracting visual images. Another 
advantage of radio was that one could still perform other chores while listening, and was not 
confined to one room or the location of the receiver, making it more practical than 
newspapers. The distribution of images and sound via electronic media ‘transformed 
humanity’ and allowed an ‘immediate sensory perception of far-away events,’ giving 
individuals opportunities to engage with those events.165 The city limits and community to be 
controlled by Plato’s aural limits had few restrictions by the mid-20th century. While nations 
established identities and international relationships, radio broadcasts were used to convey 
messages beyond borders. 
The aims of cultural diplomacy are to exchange ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of 
culture or identity, in order to strengthen relationships, enhance cooperation and promote 
international interests. Radio Australia acted as the Voice of Australia, the voice of not just 
the government but the whole community. Programmes considered the needs and values of 
the audience while promoting Australian culture. The English language lessons were a 
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highlight of this project, and in the effort to ‘win hearts and minds,’ familiar language is 
essential. As Julian Hale states, radio propaganda is only effective when it reflects the 
traditions and the psychology of the country it represents.166 It must echo the way of life of 
the speaker. Just as the jazz movement affected both the American and international 
audiences with its anti-racism message, so too could Australians share the common struggles 
of an unforgiving landscape, the challenges of developing infrastructure on a restricted 
budget and promote the benefits of a democratic society. As a political agenda, the anti-
communist message was heard as a pro-democracy message, in a deliberate campaign to 
secure Australian borders. 
By broadcasting in local languages, responding to all correspondence and visiting its 
audience, Radio Australia became part of the lives of its international listeners. It literally 
gave them a voice in interviews and chat shows. Radios were switched on in cafés and other 
public places, allowing a shared experience. The longevity of the project suggests its success 
as a relationship-building tool, and its reliance on government funding supposes that it met 
government policy directives. As an exercise in the deployment of a state’s culture in support 
of its foreign policy, Radio Australia is an appropriate case study. 
Postscript 
Radio Australia continued without major changes until the mid-1990s, when its purpose was 
questioned in an independent review examining the effectiveness of the ABC.167 This 
prompted a 1997 Senate Report, called ‘The Role and Future of Radio Australia and 
Australian Television.’168 Hampered by a lack of cooperation from the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and other Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) staff, the committee 
nonetheless discussed the origins of media broadcasting in Australia, its purposes and future 
directions. They discovered that the past and present functions had not changed greatly. 
Wood, the broadcast writer, told the committee: ‘Today, the bulk of the 100 or so countries 
engaged in information broadcasting use it as an instrument of foreign policy, projecting the 
positive side of the country’s character to the rest of the world.’169 Radio and other electronic 
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media, could ‘extend [a country’s] zone of political, cultural and economic beliefs into 
territorial areas of other nations and distant continents.’170 The success of these broadcasts 
relies on ‘the credibility of the broadcaster’s product as perceived by the listener.’171 
Following the history of Radio Australia, from its inception as support for the BBC External 
Service, through its growth in the 1950s and 1960s and the tussle over control between the 
ABC and DEA, its role as an important tool in foreign policy has never been questioned. Its 
success as a tool in cultural diplomacy-style projects is largely a result of the refusal of the 
ABC to allow Radio Australia to become a direct tool of propaganda, and in its insistence 
that its broadcasting represent all of Australian society, not just its government. The Report 
acknowledged that the inclusion of foreign-language broadcasting allowed it to ‘reach the 
listener at every level of society, to promote human rights, regional trade and development 
and universal peace.’172 By distancing itself from an overt foreign policy stance, it allowed 
listeners to trust its English lessons and business programmes and enjoy cultural and 
educational presentations without feeling that they were victims of a propaganda campaign. 
Presenting programmes in the language of the listener shows respect for their culture, and this 
would encourage favourable opinions. Adhering to local customs and acknowledging local 
religious or political holidays confirms this respect. The Executive Producer of the 
Vietnamese Service also confirmed this, informing the committee that tailoring and 
presenting information in a format easily understood by the audience was appreciated.173 
Radio Australia was seen by its Asia Pacific audience as an independent broadcaster 
providing news and information that was neither propaganda nor censored. 174 That this is the 
modern view of the institution is largely due to the hard work and strong will of all 
stakeholders in the Menzies Era. The programming is not simply entertaining and 
educational, Andrew Clark wrote, but ‘designed to give an Australian view on the region and 
the world.’175 He highlighted the outpouring of support from the international audience for 
the Radio Australia programme when budget cuts suggested the service would close. Former 
ABC chairman Donald McDonald argued that Radio Australia accumulated an ‘impressive 
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capital of goodwill for Australia,’176and this was due to the foresight of the executives who 
managed the service in the Menzies Era. 
The instigation of language lessons in 1959 enabled future expansion of the topics covered. 
Economics, digital communications, development strategies and other modern concerns are 
now discussed and developed.177 This is only possible because of the long-range vision of 
these early programmes. The government responded to requests for English language lessons 
and is now able to use the knowledge gained by these to further affect the education of the 
audience. This is cultural diplomacy at its best, and while not measurable, is an undeniable 
success. 
The programming was also designed to enhance foreign policy, to reflect Australian culture 
and society and to serve as an ambassador for the Australian Government.178 Although 
enthusiasm for the project diminished in the 1990s, broadcasts were revived in 2001 by 
popular demand, much of it from the Asia Pacific region.179 While still funded in part by 
DFAT, the ABC provides a buffer, allowing it to retain a neutrality and independence that 
makes it useful as an ongoing cultural diplomacy programme. While meeting budget targets 
is a more significant demand now, the service still broadcasts in six languages, focused on 
South East Asia. One submission to the Senate Report stated that ‘respect, loyalty, empathy 
and trust cannot be bought,’180 nor easily measured, as they are not tangible. The continued 
existence of this medium attests to its success as a government voice, as well as a successful 
forum for cultural exchange. 
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Cultural diplomacy practice is as broad and inclusive as the scholarly debate. These cases 
enrich the conversation, and while this is not strictly a theoretical thesis, the philosophy 
provides a context and relevance to the examples. The stories highlight the public 
participation in foreign policy decisions, the impact of a government programme on 
individuals and the legacy of international activities. After exploring these four cultural 
diplomacy projects, some of the definitions can be put into perspective and the literature 
made sense of, to further understand the Menzies Era activities in light of modern ideas of 
cultural diplomacy. 
The theoretical examination proposed a series of questions about the role of cultural 
diplomacy regarding channels of communication and listening, whether the focus was on the 
international or domestic audience and who could participate in cultural diplomacy activities. 
The case studies explored these questions and found that each activity required different 
methods, although there were similarities. Two-way communication encourages collaboration 
and strengthens relationships, both domestic and international audiences were needed for a 
comprehensive programme and all citizens could participate, from foreign aid workers to 
those who shared their homes with international visitors during the Olympics. 
The Colombo Plan, the Olympic Games, the Pavilion at Expo 67 and the efforts of Radio 
Australia all promoted a cultural experience to achieve some foreign policy goals. They used 
collaborative projects to encourage long-term people-to-people relationships. They utilised 
the exchange of ideas, values and traditions to strengthen relationships, enhance sociocultural 
cooperation and promote national interests. While modern theory and ideas of cultural 
diplomacy scholarship have been imposed on the events, the intention, purpose and methods 
used in these activities clearly show that the activities were designed with the motives of 
cultural exchange to facilitate foreign policy. There were limitations, failures, missed 
opportunities and dark purposes. Cultural diplomacy is often a positive international 
interaction, but it is necessary to view programmes with caution. 
In Chapter 5: Developing Australia, international aid was discussed as a forum for cultural 
diplomacy. Aid can have countless purposes but is generally linked to political objectives, to 
encourage a government to favour the donor’s priorities. Political affiliation, access to natural 
resources or controlling trade can be a motive for the developmental or humanitarian face of 
international aid. During the Menzies Era, the most significant aid project for Australia was 
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the Colombo Plan, a collaborative project focusing on developing the South and South East 
Asian region. This series of bilateral agreements had as many purposes as participants. From 
the perspective of the Australian Government in 1949, the principal security issue was to halt 
the spread of communism to Australia’s north, and to create a buffer zone for defence. This 
project encompassed material aid and knowledge sharing. The receiving countries understood 
that accepting aid could compromise their rights to economic autonomy, and in several newly 
independent countries this was a consideration when accepting aid. The governments of 
China and Russia also offered developmental assistance, and some South East Asian 
countries balanced assistance from both communist and Western countries, in order to show 
political neutrality and independence. 
The Colombo Plan followed the old adage of ‘give a man a fish and feed him for a day; teach 
a man to fish and feed him for life.’ While some needs were immediate and required urgent 
implementation, the extension to the original plan allowed knowledge sharing, which has 
seen significant benefits. After a decade of the Plan, a relational shift was observed, with 
economic security displacing the initial military concerns. By improving the quality of life for 
South and South East Asian residents such as through developing infrastructure, food supply 
and health facilities, political stability was also encouraged, thus discouraging the spread of 
communism. The recipients of aid were encouraged to participate in their own progress, not 
only in the labour but also the decision-making process, as governments were encouraged to 
devise their own development plans. 
Media advertising was an important aspect of the plan, and targeted both domestic and 
international audiences. The magazine Hemisphere was produced for South and South East 
Asian students. Its purpose was to exchange cultural explanations, as a reminder that the 
students came from varied backgrounds with individual cultures, and that South and South 
East Asia is not a homogenous whole but a region of rich and varied cultures as different to 
each other as to Australia. The magazine did not enter into controversy but focused on 
personal stories of success and challenge. The introduction of a Letters to the Editor page 
turned it into a collaborative work. 
The Australian audience read The Seed of Freedom and watched ‘The Builders.’ The film 
highlighted commonalities between cultures, such as the struggles with irrigation and harsh 
landscapes, food production and community health, and this helped the audience understand 
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the human aspect of the foreign policy project. Australians feared that the Cold War would 
become a ‘hot’ war, so the political objectives of the plan were understood. Sharing 
Australian cultural experiences and ideologies as a pathway to achieving political stability, 
and the incorporation of collaborative and long-term projects, qualifies this programme as a 
cultural diplomacy activity. 
The Colombo Plan built freedom: freedom from want, from fear, to worship and to seek 
tolerance and understanding. Freedom is ingrained in Australian culture, and as an ideology it 
is not easy to negotiate under traditional diplomatic schemes. Sharing the ideology of 
freedom by sharing culture was a success of cultural diplomacy. Australian generosity 
coupled with foreign policy objectives allowed participation in a regional aid scheme. A 
restricted budget promoted a shift of focus towards knowledge transfer. Limited personal 
knowledge of South and South East Asian cultures was improved by exchanges of students, 
professionals, labourers and politicians. While there were criticisms of financial and material 
waste, the success lay in the person-to-person relationships that were created, and in the 
growth in cultural understanding. That the Colombo Plan scholarship scheme has recently 
been revitalised speaks to the successes of the early activities, and the importance of the 
regional relationships formed. 
Cultural diplomacy can also be understood through examples of international sporting events, 
such as the Olympic Games. During the Menzies Era, Australia had already established an 
international sporting reputation, with Don Bradman, Pharlap, the Melbourne Cup and rivalry 
with England over the Ashes test cricket series being iconic Australian achievements. The 
Olympic Games combined an ancient tradition that involved universal rules, concepts of fair 
play, sportspersonship and contest in an ideal playing field, with the prospect of displaying a 
national culture internationally. A small team of government staff worked with businesses 
and the broader community to promote nationalism and an Australian cultural experience at 
the iconic event. 
The 1956 Melbourne Games were the first to suffer from boycotts, a definite example of 
political statement affecting a cultural event. Two decades after the highly politicised Berlin 
Games—where the German Government prioritised the promotion of Nazi ideology—the 
international crises of the Suez Canal closure, communist aggression in Hungary and Chinese 
political unrest saw governments choose not to participate in the Games in order to publicise 
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their political perspectives. While the Games were designed to spread the spirit of comity 
through peaceful contests and share cultural experiences, international relationships are not 
always friendly. As a forum for cultural diplomacy, the Games provide opportunities to 
promote political ideology, and the media can also be used to explain foreign policy agendas 
related to a sporting event. This shows a less optimistic result of cultural diplomacy, but one 
that nevertheless fits the theory, where the state’s foreign policy aims are supported by a 
cultural experience—in this case the public rejection of participation in a cultural event. 
The accommodation of the media was one of the greatest concerns for the organisers of the 
Melbourne Games. Providing adequate facilities—from desks and telephones to radio 
transmitters, film crews, accommodation, transport and meals—was a high priority. The 
media were VIPs with the power to make or break Melbourne’s reputation as a sporting city. 
Newspaper articles reminded the locals that Australia was on show, that the world would be 
watching and that the success of the Games would bring further economic benefits to the 
country. The Games also helped consolidate Melbourne’s identity (and self-perception) as a 
sporting, accommodating and progressive city. It contributed to the domestic cultural 
diplomacy objectives of establishing a cohesive Australian identity and present to 
international audiences the international efforts. 
The most significant contribution of the Melbourne Games to Olympic history was the 
change made to the closing ceremony when the traditional team march was replaced by a 
communal celebration of all athletes mingling together. This placed these Games, known as 
the Friendly Games, in international history and established Australia’s cultural and political 
ideology as a country of sportspersonship, fair play, honesty even contest on a level playing 
field. The Australian political and foreign policy ideals were projected onto a cultural event, 
allowing the world to understand Australia and promoting the message beyond that of 
traditional diplomacy. 
The Melbourne Games brought the ancient tradition to the Southern Hemisphere and the 
Asian region for the first time. They incited interest in South East Asian countries as it was 
more affordable to send athletes, journalists and spectators to Australia. This had the benefit 
of exposing more regional visitors to Australian culture (which had already begun with the 
Colombo Plan exchange) and of legitimising Radio Australia’s commentary on the Games in 
its Asian broadcasts. Besides the exposure of Melbourne’s progress to Western audiences, the 
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Games provided a forum for conversation and the sharing of cultural experiences in the Asia 
Pacific region. 
Financial constraints meant that the organisers developed a careful publicity campaign, 
encouraging businesses to promote the Games on their products for import and export, and 
individual citizens on international Qantas flights were given promotion packs to distribute. 
The organising committee collaborated with the Department of Housing to create the 
Olympic Village, with the dual purpose of becoming a community housing project post-
Games. While there were considerable financial limitations on this project, Australians had 
become very good at being creative with limited funds, especially in a remote location, and 
the Games prove this. The Olympic Games were a metaphorical battleground on which 
nations determined the strengths and weaknesses of others while displaying their own. 
Hosting the Games allows the international promotion of the sporting ethics of a nation and 
connection to its wider culture, so speaks to its trading and economic relationships. 
An illustration of the international significance of the Melbourne Games came from Texas. 
As the new Olympic pool was being built, the organising committee received a request from 
the Houston suburb of Sharpstown, which was building its own Olympic-sized pool. The PR 
officer requested that a memento of the Melbourne pool be sent to Texas to be incorporated 
into the pool and link the two facilities. The committee obliged with a special tile decorated 
with the Olympic rings, and the inscription: ‘This tile from Melbourne’s new Olympic 
swimming pool was sent to Sharpstown, Texas, from the Organising Committee, Melbourne, 
1956.’1 
Definitions of cultural diplomacy include the exchange of ideas, information, art and other 
aspects of culture among nations and their peoples, in order to encourage mutual 
understanding. These are perfectly presented in international exhibitions, including Expo 67, 
which are a forum for a global audience to share multiple and varied cultural experiences in a 
limited time. Organisation of a mega-event is necessarily collaborative, involving politicians 
and government staff, private agencies, construction staff and media representatives. They are 
an opportunity to open international markets as they evolved from instructional and trade 
fairs. This purpose still holds, although it is less obvious in modern examples. 
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Expositions of this kind are a temporary spectacle. What makes them important as cultural 
diplomacy activities is the creation of display. Nations offer presentations of their national 
cultures in a limited space and time. The content is vital as the messages presented in the 
displays are likely to be the only exposure many visitors will have to that particular national 
culture. Planning a pavilion for an international expo requires the whole of a culture to be 
condensed into one story, in one pavilion, over a six month period. Organisers are often 
working out of context to the landscape, climate, and even the language to be displayed. But 
this also is a forum to promote national resources, manufacturing and technological 
advancement, and to encourage trade and tourism. The message has to be clear to all 
prospective audiences. Deciding on the displays for the Australian Pavilion at Expo 67 was 
an opportunity to debate the cultural messages promoted. The DEA collaborated with 
businesses and influential citizens to create the best story in support of government directives. 
Ideas related to the challenges of the landscape, the vastness of the country, the mystery of 
the outback and the civilising influence of the cities and suburbs were all proposed. A simple 
box shape for the pavilion was selected, built out of glass and steel to show manufacturing 
excellence. Set above bushland complete with kangaroos, the message was that the Australian 
people would not destroy the natural heritage but would rise above the challenges it 
presented. Visitors were warned that the mood inside was deliberately relaxed, offering a 
reprieve from the busy-ness of the rest of the world. A woollen cocoon of quality carpet 
greeted visitors through subdued and subtle displays of art, technology, exploration and 
manufacturing innovation. The story of the Australian Pavilion was the story of Australian 
culture. It was a story of progress in a harsh landscape, of quality manufacturing and of a 
quiet confidence in achievement. 
This Expo was a birthday party for Canada, and as a Commonwealth sibling, Menzies 
decided it was important that Australia attend despite budgetary limitations. The restrictions 
compromised the scale of the pavilion, but as is clear from the successful display, the 
organisers were able to turn the financial disadvantage into a message suiting their intent. 
Australia did not need ostentatious displays to show the skill and quality of its manufacturing, 
technological design or the beauty of its landscape. The purposes of advertising trade and 
tourism opportunities were well served by the calm environment. The reception of the 
musical arrangements on Australia’s special day disappointed some participants, as they 
found that some of the performance’s uniqueness was lost on the wider audience. This was a 
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minor setback, and only barely touched upon in the newspapers, but it highlights that sharing 
culture, especially in an artificial context, requires consideration. 
The hosts and hostesses who attended were not trained diplomats and came from various 
walks of life. The voices heard through the innovative sound chairs also offered the 
opportunity to hear Australian voices, the inflections, accents, mood and tone of the people. 
The stories told were diverse, about Australian nature, the way of life of ordinary people, 
exploration and the battle to tame the landscape. It was the Australian people who told the 
story of Australian culture. 
The foreign policy aims behind participating at Expo 67, such as the exchange of ideas and 
culture, are supported by examples of increased trade opportunities. The exposure to 
Australian native animals and the display of the Great Barrier Reef was designed to 
encourage tourism, and while it is difficult to measure actual tourist numbers, as a marketing 
exercise the exposure was exceptional. Although the event itself was short-term, the 
international relationships formed by the visitors and participating countries were beyond 
monetary value. The historical record will show that Australia participated in Canada’s 
centenary celebrations with a sophisticated and calm presence. 
The sound chairs at Expo 67 highlighted the value of the human voice in telling a story, and 
this is also an advantage of radio programmes. Good diplomacy practitioners will find 
productive common ground with people from various cultures and operate within this to 
achieve their goals. Skilled diplomacy practitioners working with cultural diplomacy theories 
will use their cultural understanding to inform policies and shape programmes. The Radio 
Australia staff combined the value of the human voice with cultural understandings, to 
produce a collaborative venture that supported foreign policy. As the aural zone for 
information was expanded by the new technology of radio, so too was the zone of possible 
influence. Countries with the power to broadcast messages had the power to affect the 
thinking of a targeted audience. Australian broadcasters were able to place transmitters in 
areas that had the strongest signals for South East Asian audiences, thus supporting the 
regional focus of other cultural diplomacy programmes like the Colombo Plan. As the Plan 
supplied radio sets to many communities, the Radio Australia broadcasts were popular, and 
as with the Colombo Plan, pro-democracy messages were a feature of all programming. This 
aspect of government propaganda was tempered by the management of the ABC. 
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A long management tussle between the DEA and the ABC saw a liaison officer bridge the 
two entities. This collaboration resulted in a balance between government needs and a 
reputation for independence and reliable journalism, which benefitted Radio Australia as it 
came to be relied upon for honest and objective reporting. The success of the station is 
credited to this balance. Billy Hughes commented that radio is a medium through which all 
people can know one another and understand each other’s point of view. Radio Australia 
determined to understand its audience and responded to the numerous letters it received. The 
audience asked for language lessons so they received them. It asked for more popular music, 
so that was delivered. The Department informed the station of important holy and national 
days, and these were noted and celebrated in programming. Daily routines were taken into 
account, and broadcasts were scheduled around prayer and siesta times in some countries. 
Although these were not part of Australian culture, it was important to the audience, so 
respected by the broadcaster. 
Serials and musicals from Australian commercial stations were obtained to help paint a 
picture of Australian life, and these were complemented by Radio Australia’s own 
programming, which sought to understand its international audience. The official guidelines 
for Radio Australia were to create an atmosphere favourable to government policy, and the 
manifesto reads like a cultural diplomacy text. Themes such as political independence, 
economic and social development, individual liberties and freedom of the press were 
included, with a judicious selection of news with positive views of the free world. These 
would be presented wherever possible from a South East Asian viewpoint and with a South 
East Asian commentary. The idea was to broadcast into homes, schools and communal places 
the cultural ideals of Australia. 
The success of Radio Australia as a cultural diplomacy activity rested on the decision to 
collaborate with the audience. To deliver the language programmes the listeners wanted and 
then use the scripts to portray certain Australian values or messages. The lessons also allowed 
discussions to progress and become more detailed, moving towards lessons of economics, 
development and politics, all steered by government intention. Collaborating with 
government departments rather than being under their control allowed an element of distance. 
The possibility of questioning or criticising government decisions contributed to a national 
culture of honesty and imperfection, which is important in cultural diplomacy relationships. 
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As radio is a perfect tool for advertising, culture and ideals came to be sold in plays, 
commentaries, interviews and news items. Radio would provide news of Australia to families 
who had sent students to study, report on Colombo Plan projects and explain the Australian 
way of life. As a projected cultural image, it was able to carefully structure the culture it 
delivered, as could an expo. By listening to audience feedback, Radio Australia was able to 
assess and refine the message in response. 
Radio Australia was a successful forum for cultural diplomacy, both in its own programming 
and in its promotion of other activities. In the Menzies Era, Radio Australia shaped its 
programmes to affect public opinion. The Australian cultural experience was the backdrop 
for government messages. This project did not design or change foreign policy, but as a 
cultural diplomacy-style activity it supported policy aims and decisions. 
The project of Radio Australia necessitated the creation of a liaison officer between the ABC 
and the DEA. The Colombo Plan initially involved five government departments, and Casey 
notes in his diaries that the Colombo Plan took a substantial amount of administrative effort.2 
During preparations for the 1956 Olympic Games, a mini ministry sprung up around him to 
take on organisational duties. As the DEA grew into its role, it found itself managing various 
cultural diplomacy-type projects, with little knowledge of the countries being dealt with and 
few established protocols. Budget was always hard fought for, never generous, and it appears 
that this primary restriction produced the innovative and creative projects of the Menzies Era. 
Moving through theory to policy and on to the actions associated with cultural diplomacy, we 
see that there are possibilities as well as limitations. Cultural diplomacy is not intended to 
create or change policy, but to support it. During the Cold War, cultural diplomacy efforts did 
not alter global politics but were an attempt to produce a positive atmosphere of growth and 
understanding through collaborative projects that would outlast specific governments. These 
activities did not change or end the White Australia immigration policy, but they did try to 
explain the policy decision and create a general environment of acceptance. Treaties, trade, 
and security agreements still had to focus on the government’s needs. Cultural diplomacy 
does not seek to displace traditional diplomacy, only to support it. 
                                                          
2 Richard Casey, Casey Family, MS 6150, Series 4, Vol. 14, January 52-July 54, Box 27, NAA, pp. 46, 21, 
March, 1952. 
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Cultural diplomacy can develop long-term relationships that outlast governments and bad 
decisions, but it cannot sell bad policy. It should be used in support of policy to create a 
receptive environment, but should not use cultural institutions to push government policy. It 
can promote ideologies and themes that are difficult to put into a short-term diplomatic 
project. National brands and reputations—such as engineering excellence in Germany, Swiss 
precision, Chinese industriousness, and American freedom—are all types of thematic 
messages that cultural diplomacy programmes can help promote. They are messages that are 
difficult to put into a single trade or economic policy, and require different treatment. 
This thesis is full of terms relating to power: Western Powers, Pacific powers, European 
powers, Commonwealth powers, Communist powers, regional powers, external powers, 
economic powers, power blocs, post-colonial power, middle power, the powers, these 
powers, the powerful, halls of power, decision making power, purchasing power, industrial 
power, great powers, superpowers, major powers, military powers, soft power, hard power, 
smart power, and activities designed to empower. Cultural diplomacy uses cultural exchanges 
to support foreign policy- and this is all about power relationships. It can allow cultural 
understanding and engagement to target messages and gain understandings, to promote ideas 
and a way of life, and influence opinion, and, when used in a strategic manner, can affect the 
perceived power of a culture or nation. Cultural diplomacy is one of the tools with which 
diplomats and politicians can complement other foreign policy objectives. 
This thesis began with a term that was difficult to define and measure. In a world of Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs), spreadsheets and graphs, where does cultural diplomacy fit? 
The literature discussion identified some relevant points. It is not important to say whether 
one activity is cultural diplomacy and another is not; what is important is the intent of the 
project, the methods used and the expected result. If the foreign policy objective requires the 
sharing of a national culture to achieve a long-term relationship, then activities and projects 
will form a cultural diplomacy programme. If, for trade or security purposes, a closer 
relationship with a particular country or region is required, then traditional diplomacy 
agreements can be supported by a range of international projects that encourage the 
relationship. The traditional diplomatic negotiations might arrange the formal agreements, 
while the cultural exchange projects are able to inform public acceptance and possibly 
enthusiasm for the relationship. 
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No archival records have examined the end of any of these case studies and determined their 
effectiveness. Cultural diplomacy theories are contemporary, and so are their assessments. 
We can only evaluate achievement by weighing the intent with the observable result. Each 
case study had a definite political aim. Each of the examples contained newspaper or first-
hand stories of how individuals were affected by the experience of Australian culture, as well 
as government department notes on the public reception of the plan, acknowledging that there 
were some complaints, mistakes and missed opportunities. In all, there was observable 
appreciation of Australian culture, and a favourable reception of further political and trade 
relationships. 
Most important in the cultural diplomacy structure is to encourage the link between policy 
making and research. Policies will determine the focus of an activity; for example, which 
countries to trade with? Which countries are considered to be a security threat? Which 
tourism or immigration markets should be engaged with? Cultural diplomacy studies can 
provide some ideas and theories behind the activities, and raise questions such as should 
domestic or international audiences be focused on? How can audience feedback be 
incorporated into the programme? Should communications be from the government to the 
people or the people to the government? Historical analysis of some specific international 
programmes highlights how some of these questions were dealt with in the Menzies Era, by 
viewing them through the lens of cultural diplomacy. 
Securing political stability in Australia’s north was a priority in the Menzies Era, and the 
Colombo Plan and Radio Australia were used to complement other diplomatic efforts. An 
objective of participating in the international sporting community and displaying a friendly 
and capable country was strengthened by hosting an Olympic Games. Participation in Expo 
67 enabled the projection of an image of a forward-looking, technologically developing 
country. Audience needs contributed to Colombo Plan Policy, whereas the Expo focused 
more on the image the government wanted to send. Radio Australia was designed for an 
international audience, and the Olympics drew more of a domestic audience, although neither 
was exclusive. The Colombo Plan and Radio Australia were collaborative projects, and urged 
in increased understanding of audience needs. Cultural diplomacy need not be a black-and-
white endeavour. Modern political scientists can take these case studies and determine future 
possibilities. 
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Countries have always interacted with each other when there is a need. Diplomatic missions 
have been part of international relationships for thousands of years. As the modern world 
contains technology that delivers instant news, allows mass public opinion on policy 
decisions and governments are more dependent on the favour of publics to implement policy, 
methods of diplomacy must incorporate these new circumstances. Cultural diplomacy offers a 
forum for exploring alternative methods of diplomatic interaction. In the Menzies Era, it was 
clear that cultural diplomacy-style activities advanced Australia’s influence and reputation in 
the international arena, by sharing cultural experiences in pursuit of foreign policy goals. 
Epilogue 
Cultural diplomacy has had a difficult entrance into Australian politics, in part due to 
inadequate definitions and confusion over terminology. ‘Culture’ is often demoted to the 
creative arts, and as such, the potential for this type of diplomacy has been underrated. With a 
clearer understanding of the potential of cultural diplomacy and its rise in international 
discussions, new moves to deliberately incorporate this type of programme have seen 
exciting advances in the field. In the following discussion on Australian senate reports, the 
term public diplomacy is used as an umbrella term, covering many activities that are now 
seen as cultural diplomacy. 
Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image 
A 2007 Australian Senate Report defined public diplomacy as a way to ‘influence the 
perceptions, opinions and attitudes of people in other countries in a way that will serve the 
home country’s foreign policy interests.’3 Drawing on descriptions used by the US, Canada 
and UK, the writers remark that public diplomacy ‘works outside the bounds of traditional 
diplomacy.’4 The Report discussed the definitions of public diplomacy, how it is used in 
Australia, what possibilities it has, how it has been used in the past and how it may be useful 
in future foreign affairs. Cultural diplomacy is described as the creative arts, so is only a 
minor aspect of public diplomacy. The Report noted a lack of Australian scholarship on 
public diplomacy, particularly in diplomatic literature. The ‘real absence of discourse about 
public diplomacy in Australia’ was particularly noticed against a growing body of 
                                                          
3 Senate Committee Report, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image,’ Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade, August 2007. 
4 ibid. 
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international literature and international conferences and seminars on the subject.5 Confusion 
over definitions may have contributed to the poor response to the Government’s call for 
submissions to the Senate Inquiry, even from within government. This lack of awareness of 
theory did not prevent the ‘diplomacy of the deed,’ as described by DFAT. Australians 
quickly and generously respond to disaster relief efforts, augmenting its image as ‘good 
international citizens.’6 Student exchange has proven fundamental to the Australian education 
system, international sporting contests are well attended and Australian media is well 
received overseas. 
The Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology submission suggested that historic links to 
Britain and the US may have created problems for Australia’s public diplomacy, and that 
Australia may be viewed as an ‘outpost,’ with ‘little to distinguish it from its powerful 
allies.’7 Even though Australia has been working to establish an individual national identity, 
there is still work to be done. The focus on public diplomacy for the Australian Government 
is to direct an international reputation as ‘a responsible member of the international 
community, committed to the rule of law, ready to assist in cases of humanitarian need, and 
as a constructive contributor to the economic development of its neighbourhood.’8 The 
committee wrote that they would like to see Australia thought of as ‘a thoughtful and creative 
country, genuinely committed to peace and prosperity of its region and a source of practical 
ideas.’9 This fits with the assumed positioning of middle powers in international relations. 
Former Australian diplomat Dr Alison Broinowski stressed the need to understand what 
people in the receiving countries are seeking from Australia, rather than just deciding what to 
give them.10 Field practitioners have noted this need. Analysing the effectiveness of the 
message is vital to the success of public diplomacy: it is about engagement and relationships 
‘that ensure that links and communications systems between countries continue to function 
despite tensions or breakdowns in formal diplomacy.’11 The committee acknowledged that 
public diplomacy was about ‘cultivating good relations against the day you need them,’ and 
that this cannot be done remotely.12 This connects to other definitions that see public and 
                                                          
5 ibid, p. 28. 
6 ibid, p. 34. Though the recent treatment of asylum seekers in recent years has tainted its image abroad. 
7 Senate Committee Report, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image,’ p. 52. 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid, p. 54 
10 ibid, p. 65. Broinowski worked with the Department in the 1970s. 
11 ibid, p. 79. 
12 ibid, p. 80–81. 
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cultural diplomacy as a long-term investment, with person-to-person relationships creating a 
stronger human connection and distancing the specific political agenda. It is easier to 
influence people if you understand their language and culture, and to present new ideas in a 
familiar forum. This was part of the success of Die Neue Zeitung newspaper. The Senate 
Report acknowledged this idea, highlighting the importance of the Last Three Feet, known to 
be vital to all diplomatic relationships, but especially to public and cultural diplomacy efforts. 
The Australian Government approach to public diplomacy is fragmented, and this may 
compromise its effect. One member of the committee described bikini-clad girls competing 
with educational, trade and investment seminars.13 In a coordinated marketing campaign this 
diversity could be celebrated. As many of the agents of public diplomacy are not under 
government control—NGOs, citizen diplomats, international organisations—it is up to the 
government to find ways of shaping messages into an overall ideology. Implementing 
policies that use public and cultural diplomacy as tools alongside traditional diplomacy would 
help focus all international relationships. The lack of formal policy and agreed definitions 
contributes to the underutilisation of cultural diplomacy. 
Cultural diplomacy, as defined by the Report, includes ‘the exchange of ideas, information, 
art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual 
understanding.’14 This definition was taken from a US report on cultural diplomacy, titled 
‘Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy,’ and is based on that of Milton 
Cummings. It recognises that cultural diplomacy enhances a country’s image and can be used 
to build a ‘foundation of trust’ between nations.15 An expansion of this beyond traditional 
creative arts, and using this mutual understanding to influence the deployment and formation 
of policy, would see cultural diplomacy reach its potential. Through this Senate Report, 
cultural diplomacy is seen as a lesser tool of public diplomacy, rather than a programme in its 
own right. The 2014-16 Strategy discusses cultural diplomacy initiatives in support of public 
diplomacy programmes. This recognition of a more powerful role of cultural diplomacy goes 
some way to establishing its difference from public diplomacy. By using case studies and 
highlighting well-known events in Australian history as significant cases for cultural 
diplomacy, this thesis has aimed to lift the profile of cultural diplomacy. The importance of 
                                                          
13 ibid, p. 107. 
14 Senate Committee Report, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image,’ p. 115. 
15 ibid. 
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this type of diplomacy increases as it is formally included in legislation. As its potential 
becomes clearer, so too will its achievements. 
Australia Unlimited 
Early in 2015, the Australian DFAT launched the Australian Cultural Diplomacy Grants 
Program.16 Using Australia’s creative culture, DFAT seeks to engage overseas audiences and 
increase awareness of Australia’s contemporary identity. Cultural exchange and creative 
collaboration are seen as a positive way of strengthening people-to-people linkages, and to 
reinforce Australia’s image as ‘a stable, sophisticated, multicultural and creative nation with a 
rich and diverse culture.’17 This programme offers grants to creative individuals and groups 
whose projects focus on specific cultural relations objectives that contribute to advancing 
Australia’s policy priorities and enhancing understanding of Australia. The cultural exchange 
is intended for an international audience, and is to be acted upon by non-government 
agencies. 
The Department aims to project a contemporary image of Australia and its capabilities 
internationally, through the delivery of high-quality, innovative collaborative projects; 
strengthening long-term cultural relationships with key regional partners; enhancing market 
access and developing strategies for Australian exports; and strengthening commercial 
agreements in target areas.18 The Australian Government seeks to develop a sporting 
diplomacy strategy, including Australia’s sports ‘brand,’ which includes the ideals of 
innovation and integrity. A science diplomacy programme hopes to raise Australia’s profile 
as a partner for scientific research, collaboration and exchange. It is hoped that as well as 
promoting Australia as a preferred destination for education, it would also enhance the 
country’s reputation for competitiveness.19 
The success of cultural diplomacy in Australia will be determined by the degree to which the 
government integrates personal relationships into the core business of diplomacy.20 By using 
a more comprehensive understanding of the power of cultural diplomacy, the Department 
                                                          
16 Uncredited author, Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Australian Cultural Diplomacy Grants Program,’ 
http://dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/public-diplomacy/acdgp/Pages/australian-cultural-diplomacy-grants-
program.aspx retrieved 4 January, 2015 
17 ibid. 
18 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Australian Cultural Diplomacy Grants Program,’ 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
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might discover other collaborations that could help them meet these goals. The mission 
statement for Australia’s public diplomacy strategy 2014-16 states that its goals are to 
‘strengthen Australia’s influence, reputation and relationships internationally by promoting a 
clear, creative and confident vision for Australia’s international policy agenda that reflects 
our core national interests and improves domestic understanding of DFAT’s role.’21 To 
achieve this, the Department will employ soft power strategies. By targeting international 
governments; businesses; NGOs, research, science and medical institutions; education 
bodies; commentators; host nations; women’s organisations; and sporting and education 
groups, the government aims to facilitate networks and collaborations that will build 
understanding, trust and advance Australia’s national interests. DFAT ‘will advance targeted 
public diplomacy initiatives which promote our economic, artistic and cultural, sporting, 
scientific and education assets to underline Australia’s credentials as a destination for 
business, investment, tourism and study.’22 With a desire to promote a contemporary, creative 
and tolerant nation, DFAT hopes this will also show Australia as an attractive place to study, 
work, visit, live and invest. This displays an understanding of the importance of broader 
interpersonal relations in the success of specific government goals, and its effects on the 
consideration of government policy. 
Both public and cultural diplomacy are important tools for the Australian Government. As a 
middle power in international politics, personal relationships, reputation and the national 
‘brand’ are vital to Australia’s trade and economic progress, as well as to the country’s 
physical security. DFAT sees that cultural diplomacy can provide a forum for forging 
alliances, along with those that are built on economic or geographic connections. In a world 
focused on budgets and measurability, they have placed a three year time frame on the 
majority of these projects, in order to be able to assess their effectiveness and adjust them if 
necessary. The outcomes of this programme would be strengthened by a broader 
understanding of cultural diplomacy, its breadth and scope. A look at DFAT’s thinking less 
than a decade ago shows that the perceptions of cultural diplomacy possibilities have 
definitely expanded. This progression is exciting, and a focused approach to cultural 
diplomacy in its ‘new’ iterations has the potential to be a positive addition to foreign affairs. 
                                                          
21 ibid. 
22 Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Australian Cultural Diplomacy Grants Program’ 
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